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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigated the seemingly conflicting and incompatible ideological 
positions that post-apartheid South Africa appears to straddle. On the one hand, South 
Africa is an aspiring liberal democracy courtesy of its constitution of 1996, which is 
liberal in that it enshrines a wide range of rights and freedoms for the individual. On 
the other hand, the same constitution recognises the institution of traditional 
leadership, whose claim to power is hereditary and not by popular vote. Thus the study 
established that South Africa is an aspiring liberal democracy that is also heavily 
steeped in African traditions and cultures. It offered a rebuttal of the view that existence 
and recognition of traditional institutions of politics and governance in a liberal 
democracy is a fundamental contradiction. Drawing on the literature the study showed 
that liberal democracies such as Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium, The 
Netherlands and Spain, have had monarchies from time immemorial. But their 
monarchies are not a hindrance to either liberalism or liberal democracy. The study 
underscored the importance of Ubuntu as a socio-cultural discourse in South Africa, 
more so given that South Africa is an African country whose population is 80 per cent 
African. Concomitantly the study proposed a philosophy of education that 
amalgamates some aspects of liberal education with some aspects of African 
traditional education. Aspects of liberal education that were found to pertain to the 
amalgamation are ‘cultivating humanity’ and ‘narrative imagination’, while aspects of 
African traditional education are the values and principles implicit in Ubuntu, the latter 
understood as a humane normative concept. At a practical classroom level the study 
proposed that such an amalgamated philosophy of education would be attained 
through storytelling and the teaching of history through chronology and causation. As 
a form of ‘narrative’, storytelling reveals the finite in its fragile uniqueness and 
illustrates how the past influences and shapes the present, and how the present 
determines aspects of the past that are useful and meaningful today. Similarly the 
teaching of history through chronology and causation enables the students to organise 
their historical thought processes and construct their own probable historical 
narratives. The teaching of history through chronology and causation therefore offers 
the students multiple opportunities to gain a better understanding of historical events, 
and lessons that can be learn from such events.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION   
    
1.1  Background to the study 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa straddles two seemingly conflicting and incompatible 
ideological positions. On the one hand, South Africa is a liberal democracy thanks to 
the 1996 Constitution (Enslin, 1999). The Constitution has been described as a model 
liberal democratic constitution that bears all “the hallmarks of liberal democracy” 
(Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004:552; Dugard, 1998:23). In addition, it has been “widely 
hailed as liberal and egalitarian” (Deveaux, 2003:162), because “it values human 
dignity and frames human rights at its heart” (Robinson, 2012:2). Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, The Bill of Rights, enshrines a wide variety of rights and freedoms for the 
individual -  the right to equality, the right to dignity, to life, freedom and security, 
privacy; the right to freedom of religion, belief, opinion, conscience, and thought; the 
right to freedom of expression, of movement, and of association (Goldstone, 1997: 
456-457). These rights and freedoms are protected by the ‘Limitation of Rights 
Clause’, whose main purpose is to ensure that “in no case may the core element of a 
basic right be encroached upon" (Sarkin, 1998-1999:186). The ‘Limitation of Rights 
Clause’ is premised on the assumption that “the sine qua non of the liberal state in all 
its varieties is that governmental power and authority be limited by a system of 
constitutional rules and practices in which individual liberty and the equality of persons 
under the rule of law are respected” (Gray, 1995:71-72). 
 
Section 33 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa states that the rights entrenched in it 
may be limited by law of general application provided that such a limitation is 
permissible, reasonable, justifiable, and does not negate the essential content of the 
right in question (Goldstone, 1997: 460). Again section 9 (3), of the Bill of Rights is 
explicit that “[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
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conscience, belief, culture, language and birth”. Waldron (1987:130) notes that “in 
politics, liberals are committed to intellectual freedom, freedom of speech, association, 
and civil liberties generally. In the realm of personal life, they raise their banners for 
freedom of religious belief and practice, freedom of lifestyle, and freedom (provided 
again that it is genuine freedom for everyone involved) in regard to sexual practices, 
marital affairs, pornography, the use of drugs and all those familiar liberal concerns”. 
In addition, Wolfe (2009:11) posits that liberals “insist on the importance of rights, 
including the right of people to practice their religion as they see fit, to speak for and 
assemble around causes in which they believe, and to possess a significant degree of 
control over their personal livelihood”. It is Wolfe’s view that “liberals believe that 
individuals live within an ordered world that necessarily constraints the ability of people 
to do whatever they want whenever they want to do it”. However, Wolfe is quick to 
caution that for liberals, “[s]uch constraints are not imposed by authorities over which 
people have no control or shaped by traditions they cannot influence; they are 
established instead by people themselves through some form of consent or social 
contract. Independence cannot exist without interdependence”. 
 
On the other hand, the same Constitution recognises the institution of traditional 
leadership. Section 211, titled “Recognition” states as follows:  
 Subsection (1): the institution, status and role of traditional leadership, 
according to customary law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution.  
 Subsection (2): a traditional authority that observes a system of customary law 
may function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes 
amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs. 
 Subsection (3): the courts must apply customary law when that law is 
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals 
with customary law. 
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Section 212, titled “Role of traditional leaders” reads as follows: 
 Subsection (1): National legislation may provide for a role for traditional 
leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. 
 Subsection (2): To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role 
of traditional leaders, customary law and the customs of communities observing 
a system of customary law- 
 (a) National or provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of 
houses of traditional leaders; and 
 (b) National legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders. 
 
Coexistence between the traditional African values, as in the institution of traditional 
leadership and liberal democracy values, is a highly contested issue. Beall (2006:459) 
argues that “chieftaincy operates on principles that are antithetical to democratic 
ideals. The selection of the office of the chief is not by popular vote, but is hereditary 
and usually for life”. But presumed in this argument is the view that traditional African 
values are incompatible with, and might even be contradictory to liberal democratic 
values. A similar argument is advanced by Ntsebeza (2005:2), who posits in his book 
Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa, that the 
Constitution of South Africa, along with emerging post-1994 legislation, advocate a 
form of democracy that is “based on the liberal principles of representation at all levels 
of government, including local government, while, at the same time, recognising a 
hereditary institution of traditional leadership for rural residents”. Arising from this 
observation, Ntsebeza (2005:23) argues that “a fundamental contradiction exists in 
the South African Constitution in attempts to accommodate the role of the institution 
of traditional leadership and its incumbents in a liberal democracy based on multi-party 
principles and representative government”. It is Ntsebeza’s (2005:256) view that 
“recognition of the hereditary institution of traditional leadership in the South African 
constitution while at the same time enshrining liberal democratic principles based on 
representative government in the same constitution is a fundamental contradiction”. 
He contends that “the two cannot exist at the same time for the simple reason that 
traditional authorities’ claim to power is by birth right and their subjects are not afforded 
the opportunity urban-based South Africans enjoy of choosing or electing their 
leaders”. In the same vein, Bentley (2005:49) argues that “the Constitution therefore 
recognises rights and institutions that may potentially be in conflict with one another, 
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and in particular, as far as cultural rights and the powers of traditional leadership are 
concerned, this is of particular concern for the declared equal rights of women”. 
 
The two seemingly opposed ideological positions mapped above have profound 
implications for the debate on South Africa’s aims and conceptions of education. But 
how profound can these implications be? For instance, is South Africa the only liberal 
democracy that also embraces traditional institutions such as chieftaincy? Put 
differently, is the existence of chieftaincy in a liberal democracy a peculiarly South 
African phenomenon? The literature indicates that countries such as Japan (Ruoff, 
2001; Fujitani, 1998), the United Kingdom (UK) (Harvey, 2004), Belgium (van 
Goethem, 2011), The Netherlands (Andeweg & Urwin, 2002) and Spain (Bogdanor, 
1996), have had monarchies from time immemorial. And yet their monarchies are not 
a hindrance to liberal democracy. There is a tendency to privilege mainstream Western 
epistemological traditions and ideas of politics over indigenous African epistemological 
traditions and ideas of politics. This modus operandi is most explicit in Eurocentric 
fiction and historiographies. A typical example is Conrad (1999)’s highly celebrated 
work of fiction, Heart of Darkness. In Heart of Darkness, Conrad portrays the African 
continent as ‘dark’ both in symbolic and practical terms, and its inhabitants as patently 
barbaric and incorrigibly backward.  
 
In the 1970s, Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe was terribly disconcerted by Conrad’s 
portrayal of Africa as ‘the other world’; the antithesis of Europe and therefore of 
civilisation; the place where man’s vaunted intelligence and refinement are mocked by 
triumphant bestiality. Commenting on Heart of Darkness, Achebe (1978:9) wondered 
whether a “novel which celebrates this dehumanisation, which depersonalises a 
portion of the human race, can be called a great work of art”. He was mostly perturbed 
that Heart of Darkness continued to be the most commonly prescribed novel in 
twentieth-century literature courses in most African Universities’ English Departments 
(Achebe, 1978:11). In the same vein, Mudimbe (2005, 1988, 1985), who has written 
books such as The Idea of Africa, and The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, 
and the Order of Knowledge ponders whether “the African Weltanschauungen 
[worldview] and the African traditional systems of thought are unthinkable and cannot 
be made explicit within the framework of their own rationality” (Mudimbe, 1988:10). It 
is his view that “thus far the ways in which the African Weltanschauungen and 
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traditional African epistemologies have been evaluated and the means used to explain 
them relate to theories and methods whose constraints, rules, and systems of 
operation suppose a non-African epistemological locus”. 
 
German philosopher Friedrich Hegel (2001:109) has described Africa as “the land of 
childhood that is enveloped in the dark mantle of night”. Hegel agonised that “the 
peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend for the simple reason that in 
reference to it, one must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies one’s 
ideas of universality”. He argued that in ‘Negro’ life “the characteristic point is the fact 
that consciousness had not yet attained the realisation of any substantial objective 
existence” (Hegel, 2001:110-111). Interestingly, during apartheid, Article 15: ‘African 
(Bantu) Teaching and Education’, of the Christian National Education (CNE) Policy, 
justified the poor provision of education for blacks as follows: “on the grounds of 
cultural infancy of the native, we believe that it is the right and task of the state, in 
collaboration with the Christian churches, to give and control native education and 
training of the native teaching forces’ (Rose & Tunmer, 1975: 128). The above-
mentioned incidents are attempts to privilege mainstream Western epistemological 
order over traditional African epistemologies and worldviews.  
 
It is against the backdrop of the above exposition that in this study I attempt to mount 
a rebuttal of what I deem Eurocentric views that seek to denigrate indigenous African 
epistemologies and cast aspersion on the viability of such epistemologies as models 
of education and citizenship in African democracies. I shall defend the notion of 
Ubuntu as a philosophy or worldview; a normative principle or moral theory; a notion 
of African communal justice and fairness; a potential public policy, and a pedagogical 
principle.1 My aim is to interrogate the view that traditional African values and ideas of 
politics are fundamentally incompatible with, and even contradictory to liberal 
democratic values and ideas of politics. Bottoci (2007:106) argues that among the 
                                                          
1 See Letseka, M. 2014. Ubuntu and Justice as Fairness. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5 
(9), 544-551; Letseka, M. 2013a. Educating for Ubuntu/Botho: lessons from Basotho indigenous 
education. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3 (2), 337-344; Letseka, M. 3013b. Anchoring Ubuntu morality. 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4 (3), 351- 359; Letseka, M. 2012. In defence of Ubuntu. 
Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31 (1), 47-60; Letseka, M. 2000. African Philosophy and 
Educational Discourse. In Philip Higgs, Ntombizolile Vakalisa, Tyobeka Mda, & N’dri Thérése Assié-
Lumumba (eds) African Voices in Education, Juta: Cape Town, 179-193. 
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characteristic features of myth that can be emphasised, “the most general is that the 
work on myth takes place within a network of symbols. In a sense, then, a myth is a 
symbol or, to be more precise, it involves a network of symbols. But while all myths 
employ symbols, not all symbols are myths”. Equally, “although symbols are 
everywhere, at least wherever there is language and communication, myths are not”.  
 
I challenge perceptions of incompatibility between traditional African thought and 
modern ideas of politics. I shall raise and attempt to clarify the following questions: 
 How plausible is the perceived binary or polarity between indigenous African 
values and ideas of politics and liberal democratic values and ideas of politics?  
 How sustainable is the view that tradition is antithetical to innovation or 
modernity?  
 Isn’t it the case that modernity is always a refinement that grows out of the 
ashes of tradition (s)? 
 Can it not be reasonably argued that even in the most advanced modern 
Western civilisations there will always be remnants of tradition that are 
preserved for posterity as evidence of where that particular civilisation comes 
from?  
 
Gusfield (1967:352-353) argues that “what is seen today as a traditional society is 
often itself a product of change…the old is not necessarily replaced by the new. The 
acceptance of a new product, a new religion, a new mode of decision-making does 
not necessarily lead to the disappearance of the older form”. Gusfield (1967:355) 
insists that “the outcome of the modernising processes and traditional forms is often 
an admixture in which each derives a degree of support from the other, rather than a 
clash of opposites”. In concurrence, Gyekye (1997:217-218) contends that “no human 
culture is absolutely unchanging, totally refusing to take advantage of possible benefits 
that often accompany encounters with other cultures”.  
 
1.2   Problem Statement 
 
There is a perception among sociologists and public law scholars in South Africa that 
indigenous African values and ideas of politics are incompatible with, and even 
contradictory to liberal democratic values and ideas of politics. According to this 
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perception, a socio-political order that seeks to amalgamate indigenous African values 
and liberal democratic values as South Africa does through its widely acclaimed liberal 
constitution is doomed to fail. Perceptions like these have profound implications for 
attempts to develop aims and conceptions of education that attempt to mediate the 
two value systems by producing young people who are citizens of the global, 
cosmopolitan world, and are also sensitive to their indigenous African traditional 
cultures and heritages.  
 
As a philosopher of education, I am fascinated by perceptions. My fascination derives 
from the need to establish philosophical grounds as to whether perceptions have a 
conceptual content (Crane, 2009; Brewer, 2006, 2005; Byrne, 2005; McDowell, 1996). 
For instance, “how perception and reality are related, something sufficient to sustain 
the idea that the world reveals itself to a perceiving subject in different regions and 
aspects, in a way that depends on the subject’s movement through the world” 
(McDowell, 1996: 54). As Byrne (2005: 245) cogently puts it, “perceiving is very much 
like a traditional propositional attitude, such as believing or intending; the issue is 
whether the contents or propositions that perceiving is a relation to, are conceptual”. 
Byrne’s (2005: 247) conclusion is that “while we often know things by perception, 
experiences do not always justify beliefs”. Let me break this down by way of 
elaboration. The fact that an object looks blue on the surface does not necessarily 
mean it is blue. It could be blue-plated, when in fact its actual substance is black, like 
a coal rock. The perception that it is blue can be confirmed or disputed by applying 
Karl Popper’s ‘Principles of Falsification’, also known as the philosophy of ‘Critical 
Rationalism’. The latter requires taken-for-granted perceptions to be subjected to 
rigours of logical scrutiny and/or scientific testing in order to establish their validity or 
soundness. Tarnas (2010) reminds us that in classical Cartesian [flowing from the 
work of French philosopher René Descartes] philosophical perspective if the only 
reality that the human mind has direct access to is its own experience, then the world 
apprehended by mind is ultimately only the mind’s interpretation of the world.  
 
Crane (2009:452-453) wonders whether there is “a way of talking about perception, or 
perceptual experience, which corresponds more closely with its metaphysics or its 
phenomenology”? In the same vein, Merleau-Ponty (1992: x) posits that “perception 
is not a science of the world; it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position”. 
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Instead it is “the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by 
them”. Merleau-Ponty (1992:58) suggests that “our perception ends in objects, and 
the object once constituted, appears as the reason for all the experiences of it which 
we have had or could have”. Often though, perception “presents itself as actual”. But 
is perception actual or simply imagined? For Tarnas (2010:418-419),  
“Every act of perception and cognition is contingent, mediated, situated, 
contextual, theory-soaked. Human language cannot establish its ground in an 
independent reality. Meaning is rendered by the mind and cannot be assumed 
to inhere in the object, in the world beyond the mind, for that world can never 
be contacted without having already been saturated by the mind’s own nature. 
That world cannot even be justifiably postulated. Radical uncertainty prevails, 
for in the end what one knows and experiences are to an indeterminate extent 
a projection.”  
 
It is Tarnas’ (2010:417) view that “the human mind can claim no direct mirror like 
knowledge of the objective world, for the object it experiences has already been 
structured by the subject’s own internal organisation. The human being knows not the 
world-in-itself but rather the world-as-rendered-by-the-human-mind”. 
   
This study grew out of a philosophical struggle over whether perceptions of 
contradiction and incompatibility between indigenous African values and liberal 
democratic values have any semblance of validity. For quite some time I mulled over 
the claims that attempting to amalgamate indigenous African values and liberal 
democratic values can potentially paralyse South Africa’s liberal democratic ambitions, 
and by extension, efforts to conceive a philosophy of education that attempts to 
mediate the two value systems. With this in mind, what I attempt to do in this study is 
to mount a political philosophic rebuttal of the above-mentioned claims of contradiction 
and incompatibility. To that end I shall argue that there is no reason, whether 
conceptual or empirical, why South Africa cannot amalgamate indigenous African 
values and liberal democratic values. Concomitantly, there is no reason why South 
Africa cannot forge a philosophy of education that seeks to amalgamate indigenous 
African values and liberal democratic values. After all, the basic aim of education in a 
democratic state should be “the cultivation of ‘moral’ democratic citizenship" (Divala & 
Mathebuka, 2013: 279). And it is my contention that this is also the cherished aim of 
indigenous African philosophy and liberal democratic theory. 
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Ware (1992:140) argues that “the 'exporting' of liberal democracy to ex-colonies or to 
regimes which were conquered militarily, but which had no previous history of liberal 
democracy (such as Japan), transforms liberal democracy”. As a result, “there are 
today quite distinct types of liberal democracy” (Ware, 1992:137). In recognition of this 
proliferation some liberals have argued that there now exists “a family of liberalisms” 
(Simhony, 2003:283), “a multitude of liberalisms” (McKay, 2000:627), and “many 
liberalisms” (Rawls, 1996:223). Coming back to Japan, in his book The Clash of 
Civilisation and the Remaking of World Order, Huntington (1996:94) argues that 
“historically Japan has gone through ‘cycles of importation of external cultures’ and 
'indigenisation' of those cultures through replication and refinement”.  Consequently, 
“Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the 
West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important 
dimensions” (Huntington, 1993:45).  
 
My own observation is that Japanese political culture resonates with most of Africa’s 
cultural orientation in that it is more oriented towards groups rather than individuals. 
As Fukuyama (1992: 231) observes, in Japanese culture “an individual does not work 
so much for his own short-term benefit, but for the well-being of the larger group or 
groups of which he is a member. His status is determined less by his performance as 
an individual, than by the performance of his group”. This observation resonates with 
Ubuntu’s maxim of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, or “a person is a person through other 
persons”. Mokgoro (1998:16) echoes similar views to Fukuyama’s (1992) above in her 
observation that Ubuntu is a metaphor that describes group solidarity in African 
cultures, whereby “the individual’s existence and wellbeing are relative to that of the 
group”. Against the backdrop of this exposition, it is my contention that South Africa’s 
appeal to liberalism manifests the extent to which the term liberalism has continued to 
proliferate worldwide. Enslin (1999:175) is in no doubt though that “the new democratic 
order in South Africa and its education system presuppose some central distinguishing 
features of liberalism”. 
 
Centrally therefore, in this study I propose a conception of a philosophy of education 
that is rooted in Africa in a sense that it begins with “the affirmation and restoration of 
the dignity of peoples in all their diversity, hues and shapes, including those who were 
‘dehumanised’ or seen as secondary citizens or non-citizens in South Africa and 
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Africa” (Lenka-Bula, 2011:10). Such a philosophy of education shall affirm the 
underlying values and principles of the Constitution of South Africa. For instance, 
Chapter 2, Bill of Rights, enshrines the rights of all people and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom”.  Section 9 (1) states that “everyone is 
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. 
Section 9 (2) conceives of equality as “the full enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”. 
As mentioned in the background section above, Section 9 (3) adds impetus to these 
provisions by limiting the state from encroaching on the individual’s fundamental rights 
and freedoms. Sections 10 and 11 affirm the right to respect, protection of everyone’s 
dignity, and the right to life. Consistent with the above-mentioned values and principles 
of the constitution, the proposed philosophy of education shall seek to initiate and 
anchor the young people in Ubuntu’s moral dispositions (Letseka, 2013a, 2013b) 
within a liberal democratic political dispensation. 
 
1.3   Research questions  
 
Against the backdrop of the above-stated problem, this study shall be guided by the 
following main question:  
 
1.3.1 The main research question 
 Is the perception that indigenous African values and ideas of politics are 
incompatible with, and contradictory to liberal democratic values and ideas of 
politics necessarily valid?  
 
 
 
 
1.3.2 Sub-research questions 
 What is the basis of the claim that a liberal democratic state that attempts to 
shape its future political trajectory through the amalgamation of indigenous 
African values and liberal democratic values is doomed to fail? 
 Is the amalgamation of indigenous African institutions such as chieftaincy and 
the monarchy peculiar to South Africa? 
 What should a philosophy of education that amalgamates indigenous African 
values and liberal democratic values consist of?  
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1.4  Aim of the study  
 
1.4.1 The broad aim  
 
The primary aim of this study is to mount a rebuttal of perceptions that indigenous 
African values and ideas of politics are incompatible with, and may even be 
contradictory to liberal democratic values and ideas of politics. Additional to this 
rebuttal, the study shall propose a conception of a philosophy of education whose aims 
shall, on the one hand be rooted in Africa in that it shall draw on the African traditions 
and cultural heritages as well as the inherently communal and interdependent feature 
of most traditional African communities. On the other hand, such a philosophy shall 
seek to immerse and initiate the young people in the values that are associated with 
a globalised cosmopolitan environment of which we are all a part. Nussbaum (2002:9) 
neatly captures this local-global nexus in her observation that “to be a citizen of the 
world one does not need to give up local identifications, which can be a source of great 
richness in life”. 
 
1.4.2 The specific aims 
The specific aims of this study shall be: 
 to articulate, at a philosophical level, the potential for the amalgamation of 
liberal democratic values and indigenous African values.   
 to make a case for indigenous African epistemologies such as Ubuntu as viable 
models of education and citizenship in African democracies. 
 to attempt to formulate a philosophy of education for post-apartheid South 
Africa whose aims and conceptions shall be to prepare the young people to 
embrace their indigenous African cultures while also cognisant of the wider, 
globalised and cosmopolitan environment.  
 
1.5 Justification of the study  
 
It is indeed an irony of colonisation and cultural imperialism that in a country like South 
Africa, with a population that is 80 per cent black and African (Statistics South Africa, 
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2010), some sections of society still entertain doubts about the viability of indigenous 
African epistemologies such as Ubuntu as models of education and citizenship (Enslin 
& Horsthemke, 2004; Horsthemke, 2004; Marx, 2002). This raises serious concerns, 
for instance, whether the country has been fully liberated from imperial cultural 
worldviews and Eurocentric historiographies. Amin (1989) contends that Eurocentrism 
claims that imitation of expression of the Western model by all people is the only 
solution to the challenges of our time. Of course this claim is premised on the 
unfortunate history of colonial conquest. Keita (2002: 288) observes that historically 
“Euro-Americans conquered the world, renamed places, rearranged economies, 
societies, and politics, and drove to the margins pre-modern ways of knowing space, 
time, and many other things”. He argues that “they [Euro-Americans] universalised 
history in such a way that the world as we know it today has become subject to 
racialised historiographies and epistemologies. The histories emerging from the 
nineteenth century onwards, whether written by Europeans or not, were decidedly 
Eurocentric”. With respect to ‘imperial cultural worldviews, Smith (2008:23) argues that 
Eurocentric scholars tend to view indigenous epistemologies ‘through imperial eyes’, 
which have denigrating undertones. I explore this issue in more detail in Chapter 3 
below and shall therefore not dwell on it here. 
 
To draw on Spivak’s (1988) landmark paper, “Can the subaltern speak?”, this study is 
a modest attempt to mount a counter-hegemonic discourse. It seeks to contribute new 
literature that celebrates and commemorates indigenous African epistemologies and 
other indigenous ways of knowing. The study testifies to what Fricker (2007) calls 
‘epistemic injustice’, in her book Epistemic Injustice: Power & The Ethics of Knowing. 
Fricker (2007:5) writes that “any epistemic injustice wrongs someone in their capacity 
as a subject of knowledge, and thus in a capacity essential to human value”. Epistemic 
injustice can also take the form of hermeneutical injustice – wherein people participate 
unequally in the practices through which social meanings are generated, or as 
testimonial injustice, in which case “someone is wronged in their capacity as a giver 
of knowledge”. To be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower, Fricker (2007: 44) 
argues, “is to be wronged in a capacity essential to human value. When one is 
undermined or otherwise wronged in a capacity essential to human value, one suffers 
an intrinsic injustice”. It is Fricker’s (2007: 6) view that this sort  of “marginalisation can 
mean that our collective forms of understanding are rendered structurally prejudicial 
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in respect of content and/or style: the social experiences of members of 
hermeneutically marginalised groups are left inadequately conceptualised and so ill-
understood, perhaps even by the subjects themselves”. Fricker (2007:176) concludes 
that “combating epistemic injustice clearly calls for virtues of epistemic justice to be 
possessed by institutions as well as by individuals”. It is her contention that “the only 
way to fully understand the normative demands made on us in epistemic life is by 
changing the philosophical gaze so that we see through to the negative space that is 
epistemic injustice” (Fricker, 2007:177). Thus, what this study attempts to do is 
confront attacks on Ubuntu and other indigenous African epistemologies with a view 
to exposing their ‘epistemic injustice’, and to insert indigenous African epistemologies 
in mainstream philosophical discourses, thereby affirming their value and viability. 
 
In the next section, I briefly describe the research methods through which this shall be 
driven. Given its philosophical orientation, this study shall be foregrounded by a 
‘philosophical inquiry’. I deal with ‘philosophical inquiry’ in more detail in Chapter 3 
below. Here I only make brief remarks. I employ ‘philosophical inquiry’ to interrogate 
Eurocentric paradigms whose intentions is to cast aspersion on, and to denigrate 
indigenous African epistemologies while simultaneously privileging mainstream 
Western epistemologies and worldviews. It is disconcerting that in an African country 
where the black African people constitute the majority population, negative and 
denigrating views on indigenous African worldviews by some English liberal scholars 
tend to receive more coverage and credibility than they ought to, or the so-called 
credibility excess (Fricker, 2003). One of my intentions in this study is to interrogate 
such an excess. 
1.6   Research methodology and design  
 
This study is located in the fields of philosophy of education and African philosophy. 
By their very nature, philosophy of education and African philosophy are conceptual, 
reflective and speculative on the notions of knowledge, truth, and the meaning of life. 
Against the backdrop of the above understanding of philosophically inclined fields, this 
study shall be conducted through a philosophical inquiry. A characteristic feature of 
philosophic inquiry is the questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions whose truth or 
falsity might not be determined by appeal to scientific experimentation and/or 
observation. As Knight and Collins (2010:309) observe, “a philosophical inquiry is 
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inquiry in which data gathering makes up only a small part of the task”. Instead a 
philosophical inquiry “is directed at issues whose resolution depends less on data 
gathering than on the formulation of arguments”. It is a norm in philosophical inquiry 
for philosophers to ponder over questions such as: Are thoughts and feelings real? 
How did the world begin? What is friendship? And should society uphold divisions of 
labour along gender lines? With respect to this particular study the sort of questions 
elicited are the following: what would be the basis for privileging Eurocentric 
epistemologies over indigenous African epistemologies? How valid is the assumption 
that coexistence between indigenous African values and liberal democratic values is 
incompatible, contradictory, and therefore doomed to fail? How plausible is the view 
that indigenous African epistemologies are not viable as models of education and 
citizenship in African democracies? What would be the aims of a philosophy of 
education in a liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in indigenous African 
cultures and traditions? Knight and Collins (2010:309) remind us that these questions 
“arise for all humans; they arise from the fact that humans are self-conscious, able to 
reflect on the content of our consciousness, and on the relationship between our 
experience and the rest of the world”. 
 
This study shall be underpinned by certain political and epistemological considerations 
that influence debates on education in South Africa. For instance, these include the 
fact that politically South Africa is a liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in 
indigenous African cultures such as the pervasiveness of chieftaincy in the vastly rural 
areas, which is coupled with a deep commitment to particular cultural practices such 
as initiation of young men and women. The epistemological trajectory stands at a 
profoundly complex point. How, for instance, can a conception of education be framed 
that not only straddles the liberal democratic culture and indigenous African cultures, 
but also seeks to amalgamate the two while maintaining a constructive tension that 
might arise from the intended amalgamation? The study grapples with this seeming 
tension. It shall inquire into what ought to be taught and learned in South Africa where 
there are these contending hegemonic positions over whose knowledge ought to be 
of most worth. A philosophical inquiry is often used interchangeably with a ‘dialectical 
philosophy’. Carr (1997: 205) argues that a ‘dialectical philosophy’ “allows the 
contradictions and illusions inherent in conventional knowledge and understanding to 
be exposed and transcended through critical dialogue and debate”.  
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Thus, the study shall be conducted more as a ‘community of philosophical inquiry’ 
(CPI), which Kennedy (2004:744) defines as a way of practising philosophy “that is 
characterised by conversation; that creates its discussion agenda from questions 
posed by the conversants as a response to some stimulus (whether text or some other 
media); and that includes discussion of specific philosophers or philosophical 
traditions, if at all, only in order to develop its own ideas about the concepts under 
discussion”. Kennedy (2004:744-745) posits that “as a pedagogical form, CPI is 
dialogical and multi-logical rather than monological, constructivist rather than trans-
missional, and its curriculum is at least partially co-constructed and emergent. As a 
form of communal discourse, it aspires to an ideal speech situation in the sense that 
power is present in the discursive system, not as reified in role hierarchy or arguments 
from authority but in the transformative, systemic dynamics of dialogue”. 
 
1.7   Consideration of research ethics 
  
Given that this study will be conducted under the auspices of the University of South 
Africa (UNISA), it shall be governed by the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics, which 
was approved by Council in September 2013. While this study shall not particularly 
involve human participants, in which case issues of vulnerability, the need for just and 
dignified treatment of participants, confidentiality and non-disclosure of participants’ 
identities arise, the policy discourages “unethical research practice” (section 3.1.2). 
The policy urges researchers to always “make ethics an integral part of planning and 
methodology of research” (section 3.1.5). While the policy recognises that 
“researchers have the fundamental right to academic freedom and freedom of 
scientific research” (section 5.1), it urges researchers to “be competent and 
accountable”; to “act in a responsible manner and to strive to achieve the highest 
possible level of excellence, integrity and scientific quality in their research” (section 
5.2.1). Given that this study is a document-based philosophic inquiry, the UNISA 
Policy on Research Ethics cautions that “researchers may not commit plagiarism, 
piracy, falsification or the fabrication of results at any stage of the research. The 
findings of research should be reported accurately and truthfully, and historical records 
and study material should be preserved and protected” (section 5.2.9). In the conduct 
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of this study all the above-mentioned considerations of research ethics will be 
observed and adhered to. 
 
1.8 Chapter outline 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This introductory chapter sets the stage by providing a roadmap of how the study as 
a whole shall pen out. It sketches the key areas of contestation, the underlying 
assumptions, and the central arguments. It delineates the conceptual tools that will be 
employed and offers methodological justification for such conceptual tools. Finally, it 
sketches the major propositions that the study intends to make, and their envisaged 
impact.  
 
Chapter 2: Introductory literature review 
 
This chapter shall provide a detailed review of the literature that frames this study. The 
literature comprises books and journal articles on traditional African epistemologies, 
traditional African ideas of politics and governance, liberalism, liberal democracy, and 
conceptions of education in South Africa. Given that South Africa is an aspiring liberal 
democracy that is also heavily steeped in local traditions and cultures, a detailed 
review of the literature that shapes the analysis of these different nuances cannot be 
overemphasised. As Boote and Beile (2005) remind us, a good literature review should 
be the basis of both theoretical and methodological sophistication, thereby improving 
the quality and usefulness of subsequent research. Such a literature review might 
recognise the methodological weaknesses of a field of study and propose new 
methodologies to compensate for those weaknesses. 
 
Chapter 3: Research Design and Research Methodology  
 
This chapter shall describe the study’s research method. Given that the study’s focus 
is in philosophy of education and African philosophy, it shall therefore be conducted 
through the Socratic method of critical self-examination or philosophical inquiry (PI). 
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PI questions the underlying assumptions whose truth or falsity is not depended on 
experiment or observation, but on the formulation of critical arguments and an 
acknowledgement of the role of values in understanding one’s notion of social reality. 
Concepts such as ‘tradition and modernity’, ‘Ubuntu’, ‘liberalism’, ‘liberal democracy’, 
African philosophy and ‘philosophy of education’ will be analysed using philosophy as 
qualitative research methodology. 
 
Chapter 4: Liberal Democracy in South Africa 
 
Nigerian political economist Claude Ake (1993) argues that the familiar assumptions 
and political arrangements of liberal democracy make little sense in Africa. In the same 
vein, South African historian Hermann Gilliomee (1995) doubts that South Africa 
represents enough of a common society to provide a sufficiently stable base for a well-
functioning liberal democracy. The chapter is premised on the following assumptions: 
(a) liberal democracy is not the monopoly of Western societies. Struggles outside the 
West have shaped its content and contributed to its redefinition, (b) there is therefore 
not just one single view of liberalism that defines what it means to be a liberal, (c) 
instead there are ‘many liberalisms’; ‘a multitude of liberalisms’, and ‘a family of 
liberalisms’. The chapter mounts a rebuttal of the claims that liberal democracy is a 
Western construct that has no place in Africa. It argues that there is no reason why 
South Africa should not claim liberal democracy as its defining political theory and 
philosophy. 
 
Chapter 5: Indigenous African Epistemology: A Focus on Ubuntu  
 
This chapter shall explore the enduring indigenous African traditions and cultures in 
South Africa, for instance, the institution of traditional leadership or chieftaincy, which 
is also known as Ubukhosi. Its focus shall be on the notion of Ubuntu as an indigenous 
African epistemology, or way of knowing. The chapter shall challenge Eurocentric 
views that tend to cast indigenous African epistemologies as devoid of value or 
capacity to serve as models for education, morality, democracy and citizenship in 
Africa. It shall argue that these views tend to regard indigenous epistemologies 
through ‘imperial eyes’ or through ‘Eurocentric’ lenses. 
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Chapter 6: Amalgamation of Traditional African Values and Liberal Democratic 
Values in South Africa  
  
The chapter sketches the potential for coexistence between traditional African values 
and liberal democratic values in post-apartheid South Africa. South Africa’s 
Constitution of 1996 is hailed as liberal and egalitarian because it enshrines a wide 
range of rights and freedoms for the individual. And yet the same Constitution 
recognises the institution of traditional leadership, which is criticised for being 
hereditary and therefore conferring power on chiefs by birth right and not by 
democratic processes and procedures. This chapter explores the question whether 
‘traditional African values’’ and ‘liberal democratic values’ are necessarily a 
fundamental contradiction as critics claim.  
 
Chapter 7: Conceptions of Education in a Liberal Democratic South Africa 
 
This chapter shall explore a conception of philosophy of education in post-apartheid 
South Africa, which a liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in African 
traditions and cultures. Such a conception of education shall be rooted in the African 
notion of reality while also cognisant of the cosmopolitan imperatives of living in a 
globalised environment. It shall endeavour to prepare young people who are rooted in 
their local traditions and cultures but are also comfortable to live and flourish in a 
globalised cosmopolitan environment. Thus, the chapter shall propose a philosophy 
of education that seeks to amalgamate traditional African values and liberal 
democratic values. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion  
  
The first part of this final chapter shall weave together all the foregoing underlying 
assumptions, key arguments, areas of contestation and emergent trends with a view 
to providing a concise conclusion to the study. The second part shall provide  
suggestions on how to teach an Ubuntu-oriented liberal philosophy of education that 
endeavors to emerse the students in the capacity for ‘cultivating humanity’ and 
‘narrative imagination’. It shall propose storytelling and the teaching of history   based 
on chronology and causation. The third part shall sketch areas for further research 
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that shall be taken up after the study in the form of papers to be presented at national 
and international conferences, to submit them to be considered for publication in 
national and internal scholarly journals.      
 
1.9   Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have provided the roadmap that this study shall follow. I started with 
background information in which I sketched two conflicting and seemingly 
incompatible ideological positions that can be said to characterise post-apartheid 
South Africa. On the one hand, South Africa is a liberal democracy on account of its 
liberal and egalitarian Constitution. On the other hand, South Africa is an African 
country that is deeply steeped on African traditions and cultures. This feature of South 
Africa is more manifest in the fact that the country’s widely acclaimed Constitution 
recognises the institution of traditional leadership and by extension the practices and 
procedures inherent in customary law. This latter point is at heart of the study’s 
problem statement in that some scholars have found this feature to be not only 
incompatible with, but also to be contradictory to liberal democratic values. The 
question this raises is: What sort of conception of education would suit a socio-political 
culture of this nature? A view which I shall argue in this study, to which I only cursively 
hinted at in this introductory chapter, is that existence of institutions such as chieftaincy 
in a liberal democracy is not peculiar to South Africa. Liberal democracies such as 
Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium, The Netherlands and Spain have had 
monarchies. But their monarchies are not obstacles to their liberal democracies. 
Instead, there exists a symbiotic relationship between the two in which monarchies 
support the liberal democratic institutions, and concomitantly, the liberal democratic 
institutions confer democratic accountability on their monarchs. This is a powerful point 
that helps nullify claims that traditional African values are incompatible with, and might 
even be contradictory to liberal democratic values. 
 
I briefly demarcated the study’s main and sub-research questions, as well as the aim 
of the study. The key question that this study grapples with is whether there is validity 
in the claim that a liberal democratic state that attempts to shape its future political 
trajectory through the amalgamation of indigenous African values and liberal 
democratic values is doomed to fail? I showed that the study aims to map out the 
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potential for amalgamation of liberal democratic values and indigenous African values, 
and how this impacts conceptions of education.  
 
I mapped out the study’s research methodology. I pointed out that given that the study 
in the areas of philosophy of education and African philosophy, it shall be conducted 
through a philosophical inquiry. A characteristic feature of philosophic inquiry is to 
question the taken-for-granted assumptions about our notions of reality, ‘truth’ or 
knowledge. In the case of this study, it shall inquire about the conception of education 
that not only straddles the liberal democratic culture and indigenous African cultures, 
but also grapples with amalgamating the two while maintaining a constructive tension 
that might arise from the intended amalgamation. I closed the chapter by pointing out 
that while this study does not involve humans in that it is philosophical and speculative, 
however its conduct shall, at all times adhere to, and be governed by the UNISA Policy 
on Research Ethics. In the next chapter I review the literature from which I shall draw 
in this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INTRODUCTORY LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1    Introduction  
 
In this chapter I provide a review of some of the literature on which I shall draw to 
support the arguments I advance in the study. Perhaps I should preface this 
introduction with brief remarks on conceptions and purposes of a literature review. In 
her recently published book Conducting Research Literature Reviews, Arlene Fink 
(2014:3) argues that “a research literature review is a systematic, explicit, and 
reproducible method for identifying, evaluating, and synthesizing the existing body of 
completed and recorded work produced by researchers, scholars, and practitioners”. 
For Fink (2014:77), by definition, a literature review should be “based on an analysis 
of the original studies”, given that “original studies allow the reviewer to report”. The 
reason for this is that “a research review bases its conclusions on the original work of 
scholars and researchers. Focusing on high quality original research rather than on 
interpretations of the findings is the only guarantee you have that the results of the 
review will be under your supervision and accurate” (Fink, 2014:3). 
 
In the same vein, in his book Doing a Literature Review: Releasing Social Science 
Research Imagination, Hart (2002:13) defines a literature review as “the selection of 
available documents (both published and unpublished) on the topic, which contain 
information, ideas, data and evidence written from a particular standpoint to fulfil 
certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the topic and how it is to be 
investigated, and the effective evaluation of these documents in relation to the 
research being proposed”. Hart (2002:27) contends that the purposes of a literature 
review are, among others: 
 To assist the researcher to distinguish what has been done from what needs to 
be done;  
 To discover important variables relevant to the topic;  
 To synthesise and gain a new perspective;  
 To identify relationships between ideas and practice;  
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 To establish the context of the topic or problem;  
 To rationalise the significance of the problem;  
 To enhance the researcher’s acquisition of the subject vocabulary;  
 To enable the researcher to understand the structure of the subject;  
 To assist the researcher to identify the main methodologies and research 
techniques that should been used; and  
 To place the research in a historical context and to highlight familiarity with 
state-of-the-art developments in the chosen field of study.  
 
Rudolph (2009:2) adds another, equally important purpose of a literature review, and 
that is, “it provides a framework for relating new findings to previous findings in the 
discussion section of a dissertation. Without establishing the state of the previous 
research, it is impossible to establish how the new research advances the previous 
research”. Coming back to Hart (2002:27-28), it is his view that the above purposes of 
a literature review should not be seen as ranked in order of importance. This is 
because no other purpose is of greater significance than others. Instead, they are all 
equally important. Hart (2002:28) argues that at the very basic level “a thesis that 
duplicates what has already been done is of very little use and is a waste of resources”. 
Knowing who is doing what, and where they are doing it enables the researcher to 
evaluate the relevance of their research. But how long should a literature review be? 
For Berg (2001: 275), “the basic rule of thumb in writing literature reviews is to keep 
them long enough to cover the area, but short enough to remain interesting”. 
 
This chapter is organised in five sections. In section one I briefly review the literature 
in philosophy of education that has influenced my views in the past 30 or so years and 
has a (in)direct bearing on this study. These include, but are not limited to the work of 
Richard Stanley Peters and his associates at the Institute of Education, University of 
London - Paul Hirst, John White, Patricia White, Graham Haydon, Richard Pring and 
R. F. Dearden. At the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, where I 
studied for my Master’s degree in the mid-1980s the work of Wally Morrow and Penny 
Enslin influenced me immensely. A common feature that these scholars have is that 
they are both critical and analytically philosophical in their engagement with 
educational issues. My close association and workingwith some of relations with 
Morrow and Enslin in the late 1980s at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
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Johannesburg, and with Hirst, Haydon, John and Patricia White in the late 1990s at 
the Institute of Education (IoE), University of London afforded my the opportunity to 
acquire and internalise the skills of critical and philosophical analysis of educational 
issues as well. The Wednesday afternoon philosophy of education seminars at the IoE 
afforded me an invaluable opportunity to participate and interact in high level sessions 
and discussions with other philosophy of education scholars such as, for instance, 
Richard Pring from Cambridge University, Eamonn Callan from Stanford University, 
and to learn how they present their arguments and defend their positions. In section 
two I review the literature in political philosophy. This review is necessary because 
political philosophy also encompasse the notions liberalism, which is the one of the 
foci of this study. Reviewing the literature on political philosophy will allow me to touch 
on ‘political representation’ and ‘the role of women’ in the traditional African polity. In 
section three I review the literature in African Philosophy and Ubuntu. In section four I 
explore the literature on education. South Africa is a liberal democracy that is heavily 
steeped in African traditions and cultures. Can the two be reconciled or amalgamated?  
In the final section I provide some concluding remarks. I now turn to selected literature 
on philosophy of education. 
 
2.2  Philosophy of Education  
 
As indicated above the work of R. S. Peters on philosophy of education is among those 
that left a lasting influence on my ability to engage in philosophical analysis of 
educational issues. It is no coincidence that Peters’ work continues to have an 
enduring and powerful influence on contemporary philosophers of education. Some 
have credited Peters with establishing “a secure role for philosophy of education in the 
professional preparation of critical and reflective practising teachers” (Carr, 1994). 
While others have credited him with founding the Philosophy of Education Society of 
Great Britain (PESGB) and its official journal, the Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
which he edited for many years (Cooper, 1986). Peters (1980:2) believed that 
philosophy of education “draws on such established branches of philosophy and 
brings them together in ways which are relevant to educational issues. In this respect 
it is very much like political philosophy”. He argued that in tackling “issues such as the 
rights of parents and children, punishment in schools, the freedom of the child, and 
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the authority of the teacher, it is possible to draw on and develop work done by 
philosophers on ‘rights’, ‘punishment’, ‘freedom’, and ‘authority’” (Peters, 1980:2). 
Peters was convinced that “philosophical work in other fields such as political 
philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of mind had to be applied appropriately to 
educational issues, not in a mechanical way, but in a way that acknowledged the 
unique qualities of the educational context” (Katz, 2010:98). 
 
Peters’ inaugural lecture, “Education as initiation”, which he delivered at the Institute 
of Education, University of London on  9th December 1963, as well as his seminal book 
Ethics and Education (1966) are the most sought after sources for philosophising 
about education. In subsequent publications, he raised critical philosophical questions 
on ‘the concept of education’; ‘the aims of education’; ‘conceptions of knowledge 
(epistemology)’, and ‘whether some forms of knowledge are more worthwhile teaching 
than others’ (Peters, 2010, 1981, 1980, 1973)? He argued that ‘education as initiation’ 
“consists in initiating others into activities, modes of conduct and thought which have 
standards written into them by reference to which it is possible to act, think, and feel 
with varying degrees of skill, relevance and taste” (Peters, 1973:102). Most 
importantly, he challenged educators’ taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
perceived goodness of education and ‘notions of knowledge’. He was concerned that 
“in exploring the concept of education, a territory is being entered where there are few 
signposts” (Peters, 2010:1). For instance, philosophically, there are disputes between 
rival proposals about what the ‘aims of education’ are. Some say that the aim of 
education is to prepare children for their future occupations; others say that the aim of 
education is growth; still some say that the aim of education is the transmission of 
culture; while others say that the aim of education is to preserve the status quo in 
society, or to contribute to a better society in the future (Morrow, 1989). These 
disparate views are not unusual. The word ‘aim’ “belongs to the same family of 
concepts as does ‘purpose’; so also do ‘intention’ and ‘motive’. They are all 
conceptually connected with actions and activities; but there are subtle differences 
between them in the ways in which they are so connected” (Peters, 1981:12). 
 
Peters’ deepest worry was that the educational philosophy which was taught in the 
context of professional preparation “had been little more an uncritical survey of the 
doctrines of great past educators (Plato, Rousseau, Arnold, Dewey) - and that 
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professionals in both training and practice were ill-equipped with the analytical tools 
necessary for the critical appraisal of those modern educational theories and policy 
initiatives with which they were required to come to grips” (Carr, 1998:181). This 
observation has lately been made by Egan (2001; 1992). Egan argues that the 
dominant concept of education in most Western countries draws on Durkheim’s 
socialisation; Plato’s academic idea; and Rousseau’s developmental idea. However, 
when the three ideas are merged they yield a radically incoherent concept of education 
that is characterised by conceptual discordance. For instance, Durkheim’s main goal 
was to socialise learners and homogenise them; to make them alike in important ways. 
Plato’s Socratic pedagogy aimed to make students sceptical of prevailing norms and 
values: to develop a questioning mind-set. While Rousseau’s approach emphasised 
attention to individual differences, to individuals’ stages of development, learning 
styles and forms of motivation.  
 
Peters’ philosophical insights have encouraged me to develop a philosophically 
questioning mind-set about the veracity of South Africa’s education policy. I have 
debated educational issues in South Africa in articles in which I shallenge some of the 
taken-for-granted policy assumptions. For instance, in the article titled “The illusion of 
‘Education for All’ in South Africa”, which appears in Procedia - Social and Behavioural 
Sciences, (2014b), volume 116, I rebut the rhetoric about the country’s capacity to 
attain the Millenium Development Goals in education. In the article titled “South 
Africa’s education has promises to keep but miles to go”, which appears in Phi Delta 
Kappan, (2013d), volume 94, number 6, I highlight some of the challenges of access 
to education with respect to some of the most rural and disadvantaged communities 
in South Africa. In the article titled “The challenges of university teaching in the era of 
managerialism”, which appears in Africa Education Review, (2008), volume 5, number 
2, I grapple with the critical value of higher education at the time when higher education 
has become shackled to marketisation, neo-liberal values and state-sponsored 
conceptions of knowing. In the article titled, “Why Students leave: the problem of high 
university dropout rates”, which appears in HSRC Review, (2007), volume 5, number 
3, I report on a study I conducted for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 
on student pathways and university dropout; in a co-authored article with Kingston 
Nyamapfene titled, “Problems of learning among first year students in South African 
universities”, which appears in South African Journal of Higher Education, (1995) 
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volume 9, number 1, we reported on the study we conducted on the impact of student 
under-preparedness for university teaching and learning.  
 
My own initiation into philosophy of education at Wits University was predicated on the 
requirement to read, among others, Plato’s (1985) book entitled, The Republic. This 
was premised on the assumption that the logical structure of Plato’s educational 
proposals is not only essential for novice philosophers of education, but that it would 
equip novice philosophers of education with the requisite philosophical skills to be able 
to deal with the challenges they might face in the world of educational practice. The 
Republic presents a logical and coherent pedagogical package admired by most 
philosophers of education. This is because Plato’s educational proposals follow “from 
a combination of value-judgements and assumptions about human nature”. They 
seem perfectly exemplary in structure because Plato had “a worked-out theory of 
knowledge, a worked-out ethical theory and a worked-out theory of human nature” 
(Peters, 1981:4). As Peters (1981:5) points out, for Plato, “the problem of education is 
to produce people in whom reason is properly developed, who care about the objects 
of the theoretical life, who are not side-tracked by subjectivism, who know fully what 
they want, and who have the strength of character to carry it through”. Plato referred 
to such a calibre of people as ‘philosopher-kings’. In The Republic he posits that only 
those who possess the knowledge of ideas are qualified to make authoritative public 
statements about notions of the good life and to influence society’s conceptions of 
education and governance. Plato (1985:263) was convinced that the ideal, well-
ordered and disciplined society in true Spartan tradition would “never grow into a 
reality or see the light of day…till those we now call kings and rulers really and truly 
become philosophers, and political power and philosophy thus come into the same 
hands”.  
 
Hare (1982) notes that on this premise if the good life is to be lived, society’s 
institutions would have to be structured in such a way as to further the education of 
philosopher-kings. We should be a little introspective though not to presume that Plato 
was conferring unfettered wisdom and unregulated power on ‘philosopher-kings’. 
Because that is a recipe for all sorts of vices that can be attributed to bad governance 
- authoritarianism, lack of accountability, disregard for the rule of law, corruption, a 
sense entitlement and political impunity. I think Miller (2003:13) is spot-on in his 
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observation that “political philosophy does not involve endowing philosophers with a 
special kind of knowledge not available to other human beings”. The reason for this is 
that philosophers “think and reason in much the same way as everyone else, but they 
do so more critically and more systematically. They take less for granted: they ask 
whether our beliefs are consistent with one another, whether they are supported by 
evidence”. I will come back to Miller in more detail in the section on political philosophy 
below where I touch on some of his publications on the discipline. 
 
One of the most important lessons I have learned as I developed a deeper grasp of 
philosophy of education is to avoid reading any philosophical piece hastily and refrain 
from making premature inferences. In “Was Plato nearly right about education?” 
Peters was sceptical of Plato’s central assumptions about education. He wanted to 
show that even the seemingly flawless and generally appealing educational proposals 
such as Plato’s will have some kind of flaws when their philosophical premises are 
tossed around and recast, along the lines of Karl Popper’s ‘principle of falsification’.2 
Peters (1981:12-13) noted that Plato was fascinated by Geometry’s capacity for 
certainty. There is no room for normal human bias and fallibility in Geometry. Instead 
Geometry provides “the basic understanding of the structure of the world”, as well as 
“some kind of certainty about moral issues”. But this is exactly where Peters found a 
flaw in some aspects of Plato’s educational proposals, especially with respect to moral 
issues. Moral issues are not mathematical theorems. They do not follow a linear 
predetermined trajectory. For instance, a mathematical formula such as: ‘if x then y’ 
cannot fully explain why someone acted in a particular way and not the other. This is 
because such a formula cannot offer a deeper understanding of things like ‘values’, 
‘emotions’, ‘feelings’ or ‘aspirations’. And yet these are central to how people live their 
lives and make important choices and decisions every day. Peters (1981:13) made a 
case for the “stress on criticism and on humility, on the possibility of error, and on the 
co-operative nature of reason”, things that are not reducible, as it were, to Geometrical 
specificity or precision. He argued that “the political institutions in which reason is 
immanent must be fostered”. He insisted that “it is democracy, not meritocracy, which 
is the articulation of reason in its social form”, because “democracy at the very least 
involves ‘parlement’ or discussion in the making of public decisions”.    
                                                          
2 See “Falsifiability and Falsification”, in Karl Popper. 2005. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 
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At this stage I want to pause and briefly acknowledge the contribution of Peters’ 
countryman and fellow philosopher of education, John Wilson. Wilson (2010; 1988) 
also raised serious questions about the relationship between philosophy and 
education. For instance, in his book, Preface to the Philosophy of Education, which 
was initially published in 1979 and was republished in 2010, Wilson (2010:8) 
demarcates critical education questions that philosophy of education should commit 
to clarifying: what is it to learn something? What sorts of things are there to learn? Is 
there a criterion on how much education a man needs? What is it to be a serious 
learner? What are the obstacles to serious learning? Are there some things which can 
reasonably be given priority? Note that this final question resonates with Peters’ 
inquiry into ‘whether some forms of knowledge are [more] worthwhile teaching than 
others?  
 
In a useful article entitled: “What philosophy can do for education?”, which appears in 
Canadian Journal of Education, Wilson (1988:84) argues that the enterprise of 
philosophy consists of examining and trying to improve our understanding of our basic 
concepts and values and because on any serious account of education, that enterprise 
is inextricably bound up with concepts and values that are unclear, controversial, and 
hence in need of a critical examination. In concurrence, Holma (2009:325) argues that 
“philosophy is an academic discipline specialised in analysing and understanding the 
wider processes of the constructing of theories, questioning their hidden background 
premises, and revealing and examining the values affecting academic - as well as 
other - human practices”. She further argues that “the perennial philosophical 
questions have straightforward connections to the world of education: for example, the 
ethical questions of responsibility and humanity, as well as the epistemological 
questions of knowledge and its justification cannot be escaped in educational 
thinking”. In this study for example the hidden background assumptions of the work of 
South African scholars such as Enslin and Horsthemke (2004) on the viability of 
indigenous African epistemologies as models fo education and democracy; and 
Ntsebeza’s (2005) view that existence of traditional forms of politics and governance 
in a liberal democracy is both incompatible and contradictory, shall be critically 
analysed and rebutted.   
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In her book entitled, Civic Virtues and Public Schooling: Educating Citizens for a 
Democratic Society, Patricia White (1996) ventures into a whole gamut of civic virtues 
she believes pertain to education for citizenship and which philosophers of education 
should promote in schools through their teaching and research. These are ‘hope and 
confidence’, ‘courage’, ‘self-respect and self-esteem’, ‘friendship’, ‘trust’, ‘honesty’, 
and ‘decency’. White’s (1996:3) central assumption is that “things will go better in the 
polity if citizens acquire the appropriate democratic dispositions”. To that end, 
“teachers have to encourage understanding of, and trust in, the political institutions of 
the wider society and at the same time teach the importance of distrust. These are 
delicate, necessarily tension-ridden tasks (White, 1996:4). White (1996:6) elaborates 
that “the aim is to give students some picture of the nature of different dispositions, 
their place in the ethical life, the tensions between them, how they might be changed 
over time, and why some people or groups of people might be particularly disposed to 
think and act in some ways rather than others”. Having taught philosophy of education 
in South Africa for over two decades, during which time I also witnessed the historic 
transition from apartheid to democracy, it is my contention that the issues White 
grapples with in her book pertain to Europe as much as they also pertain to post-
apartheid South Africa.  
 
The issues White (1996) raises above resonate with Eamonn Callan’s (1997) views, 
which he maps out in his book, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal 
Democracy. Callan (1997:2) argues that “to believe in liberal democracy is to believe 
in free and equal citizenship”. For him, “free and equal citizenship is also about the 
kind of people we become and the kind of people we encourage or allow our children 
to become”. It is Callan’s (1997:3) contention that education for liberal democratic 
citizenship can only occur in a political culture. In this political culture there is an active 
commitment to the good of the polity, confidence and competence in judgements. 
These judgements should be on how that good should be advanced, and a respect for 
fellow citizens as well as a sense of common fate with them that goes beyond the 
tribalisms of ethnicity and religion and is yet alive to the significance these will have in 
many people’s lives. (Please read sentence again) 
 
Against the backdrop of the above analysis, it can be reasonably argued that 
philosophers of education study the problems of education from a philosophical 
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perspective. They draw on “standard branches of philosophy such as epistemology 
(the theory of knowledge), philosophy of language, ethics, social or political 
philosophy, philosophy of science, and, perhaps, philosophy of mind and aesthetics” 
(Noddings, 1998:7). These should be to “foster understanding of the philosophical 
issues underlying contemporary debates” (Noddings, 1998:155). South Africa’s Wally 
Morrow, whose work I turn to below, endorses some of these views. For instance, he 
argues that “anyone trying to do philosophy is necessarily part of a community of 
enquirers, unified not by a prior commitment to particular doctrines, schools of thought, 
or modes of procedure, but simply by a determination to find out what is true about the 
grammar of human thought” (Morrow, 1989:58). Morrow (1989:51) contends that 
“philosophy is an investigation of the grammar of human thought (or some sphere of 
human thought)”; it is “a ‘metatheoretical’ enterprise – that is, philosophy tries to find 
theories about theories”. In the same vein, “philosophy of education is a theoretical 
discipline which has as its aim the critical investigation of forms of understanding 
relevant to education”. Morrow (1989: xiii) further states that “philosophy of education 
is a discipline which is concerned with issues which are of profound importance to 
everyone, not only to professional philosophers, and it is an aspect of public critical 
debate about education and schooling in society”. 
 
In the introduction I mentioned that Morrow (2009; 2007; 1989) and Enslin (1993; 
1984) influenced me immensely during my philosophy of education Masters student 
days at Wits in the mid-1980s. Let me briefly elaborate. When describing the title of 
his book, Chains of Thought: Philosophical Essays in South African Education, Morrow 
(1989: xvii) writes that “the ‘chains of thought’ which the essays set out to break are 
‘restraints’ or ‘fetters’; the ‘chain of thought’ which the book itself is, is a ‘sequence’, a 
‘connected series’ of thought”. Morrow’s use of the verb ‘break’ is instructive given that 
he taught philosophy of education at the height of the oppressive and repressive 
nature of apartheid in the 1980s. At the time, Wits was one of the few universities that 
were sanctuaries for counter hegemonic discourses. Morrow agonised about the 
naked exercise of brutal force by the apartheid regime and mulled over how philosophy 
of education might provide a platform for individuals to transcend their repressive 
material conditions of existence. As he puts it, the main purpose of the book was “to 
contribute to critical discussion about education in South Africa” (Morrow, 1989: xviii). 
Morrow argued that “neither education nor democracy can flourish until people learn 
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how to speak with their own voices, to appropriate the language they are using, and 
to mean what they say”. 
 
In a subsequent publication entitled: Learning to Teach in South Africa, Morrow 
(2007:142) posited that as a consequence of apartheid “a shared moral discourse has 
not been able to develop in South Africa, and without a shared moral discourse it is 
not possible to have a significant discussion of the aims of education”. Morrow used 
his sharp philosophical vantage point to argue that apartheid was a form of oppression 
“that disempowered its victims”; that persistently treated them “as objects of policy”, 
and refused to see them “as wholly and rightfully human, as beings who have moral 
titles and standings”. For Morrow (2007:146), apartheid and apartheid education were 
based on moral relativism. He argued that “where moral relativism holds sway, a 
critical consideration of public moral issues is undermined, and a discussion of the 
aims of education becomes merely an assertion of incommensurable convictions”. 
Morrow (2007:146-47) appealed for a “rigorous critique and deconstruction of the 
forms of understanding that shape and maintain the institutions, relationships and 
practices that constitute apartheid education”. He argued that until such a project is 
undertaken “the effects of apartheid education will stretch forward into the future and 
hamper attempts to reconstruct South African society as a non-racial democratic 
polity”. It is ironic that Morrow’s philosophical predictions ring true to South Africa’s 
current educational system and its challenges, which pertain to conceptions of, and 
access to knowledge, or as he calls it, “lack of epistemological access”.       
  
Enslin is a liberal philosopher of education. This can be gleaned from her doctoral 
thesis entitled: “In defence of liberal theory of education”, which she submitted at Wits 
in 1986. Enslin (1986) delineates the ideas and thoughts of English liberal philosopher 
John Stuart Mill on the notion of liberty. She makes a case for the centrality of personal 
autonomy to liberal philosophy. She finds resonance between Mill’s liberal 
philosophical thoughts and the work of University of London’s philosopher of 
education, John White (1982), which the latter maps out in his book The Aims of 
Education Restated. In a useful article entitled: “Are Hirst and Peters liberal 
philosophers of education?”, which appears in the Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
Enslin (1985) challenges the radical Marxist stances of Matthews (1980), Harris (1980, 
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1979) and Sarup (1978) which held that the liberal ideas of R. S. Peters and Paul Hirst 
were mere ‘liberal rhetoric’ and apologies for the ‘liberal tradition’.  
 
Enslin also featured prominently in the Wits team that drew on philosophy of education 
to interrogate the science claims of fundamental pedagogics. In a trenchant chapter 
entitled: “The role of fundamental pedagogics in the formulation of educational policy 
in South Africa”, which appears in Peter Kallaway’s inspiring book, Apartheid and 
Education: The Education of Black South Africans, Enslin (1984:139) draws on Louis 
Althusser’s powerful thesis ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ to argue that 
Althusser’s ideas can “illuminate the function of fundamental pedagogics,…a powerful 
doctrine in educational theory at several Afrikaans-medium universities”, and help to 
“analyse the role of fundamental pedagogics in reproducing the ruling ideology in 
South Africa”. Althusser’s views can show that fundamental pedagogics was indeed 
the educational ideological state apparatus (ISA).  Enslin (1984:144) argues that  
“While it is claimed that the science of Fundamental Pedagogics can offer  us 
a means of establishing ‘universally valid’ knowledge about education, instead 
of ‘ideology’, ‘metaphysics’ and ‘dogmatics’, as philosophy of education used 
to do, the consequence of the practice of this science is to legitimate the CNE 
ideology”.  
 
It is Enslin’s (1984:145) contention that fundamental pedagogics distorted “the real 
relations between the ‘superior’ ruling class and the ‘inferior’ black culture in South 
Africa as represented in CNE, the real relations of exploitation being concealed, where 
the ideology is effective, from both exploiters and exploited”. Thus, in fundamental 
pedagogics we have, in Althusserian terms, an ideological practice masquerading as 
theoretical practice. 
 
One of the potential criticisms of the tradition of philosophy of education I have 
demarcated above might be that it is wholly based on the tradition of ‘continental 
philosophy’, also known as ‘modern European philosophy’. In his book entitled: 
Continental Philosophy: A very Short Introduction, Critchley (2001) writes that 
continental philosophy is the name for a 200-year period in the history of philosophy 
that begins with the publication of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy in the 1780s, 
and was followed by the German idealism and romanticism led by Fichte, Schelling, 
Hegel, Schlegel and Novalis, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer; the critique of 
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metaphysics associated with Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Bergson; the 
Germano-phone phenomenology and existential philosophy of Edmund Husserl, Max 
Scheler, Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger; the French phenomenology, 
Hegelianism, and anti-Hegelianism of Kojève, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, 
Bataille, de Beauvoir; the  Hermeneutics era of Dilthey, Gadamer, Ricoeur; the 
Western Marxism and the Frankfurt School traditions of Lukacs, Benjamin, 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas; the French structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, 
Lacan and Althusser; the poststructuralism of Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze; the 
postmodernism era of Lyotard and Baudrillard, and feminism associated with Irigaray 
and Kristeva. My challenge in this study is whether this modern European 
philosophical paradigm can be reconciled with philosophising on education in South 
Africa, which has embraced Western liberal democratic principles and values, while 
still holding on to African traditions and cultures.  
 
To briefly summarise, I have sketched selected pieces of the literature in philosophy 
of education that have left a lasting impression on me as a philosophy of education 
theorist and practitioner. I mentioned my fondness of the pioneering work of R. S. 
Peters of the University of London, showing that Peters ventured into a territory 
unheard of before in UK’s educational theory and practice. In South Africa, I briefly 
sketched the philosophical contributions of Wally Morrow and Penny Enslin to my 
development as a philosopher of education. I showed that like their UK counterparts 
they too drew on mainstream philosophy to unpack education generally, and the 
philosophical pretentions of fundamental pedagogics and the CNE policy in particular. 
Given that philosophy of education grapples with education as a political, ideological, 
and hegemonic issue, in the next section I review the literature in political philosophy 
with a view to showing how an understanding of political philosophical concepts is 
symbiotically related to a deeper understanding of philosophy of educational issues. 
 
 2.3  Political Philosophy 
 
The discipline of political philosophy has a strong presence in this study. This is 
because some of the issues I grapple with include notions such as ‘power’, ‘the 
exercise of power’, ‘social justice’, and ‘political representation’ as it pertains to the 
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role of women in the traditional African polity. As a social science discipline, political 
philosophy has some connections with education. Pitkin (1972:193) argued that 
political philosophy deals with the familiar problems such as “the nature of culture, how 
an individual is shaped into a member of a particular society, how creativity and 
change take place, how personality and culture interact,…the relationship between 
private and public, the problem of political obligation, the nature of citizenship and of 
authority”. Perhaps I should preface this section with a brief clarification of my 
understanding of the discipline of political philosophy. In a short but lucidly written book 
entitled Political Philosophy: A very Short Introduction, Miller (2003:2) defines political 
philosophy as “an investigation into the nature, causes, and effects of good and bad 
government, and our picture not only encapsulates this quest, but expresses in striking 
visual form three ideas that stand at the very heart of the subject”. The three ideas are 
as follows:  
 Good and bad government profoundly affect the quality of human lives. 
Therefore, people cannot turn their backs on politics, retreat into private life, 
and imagine that the way they are governed will not have profound effects on 
their personal happiness;  
 The form a government takes is not predetermined: people have choices to 
make. A bad government is an indicator of what might happen if the rulers failed 
in their duty to the people, or if the people failed in their duty to keep a watchful 
eye on their representatives; and   
 People can know what distinguishes good government from bad: they can trace 
the effects of different forms of government, and can learn what qualities go to 
make up the best form of government. A good ruler will be surrounded by 
figures representing the qualities that characterise good government. 
In a later publication entitled, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy, 
Miller (2013:34) argues that “political philosophy in democratic societies should be 
aimed at citizens generally, setting out principles that they might follow when 
supporting or changing their institutions and practices”. He further argues that it should 
be “in the business of changing political attitudes, of showing people what their 
convictions mean when applied consistently to political questions” (Miller, 2013:34). 
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In the same vein, in his book entitled, Modern Political Philosophy: Theories of the 
Just Society, Brown (1990) writes that the central questions of political philosophy 
concern the nature of the good or right organisation of society. He elaborates, 
“Traditionally conceived, political philosophy concerns itself with certain perennial 
problems involving the nature of justice, political obligations and, more generally, the 
good society” (Brown, 1990:14). In Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 
Rawls (2008:10) endorses Brown’s views above. He argues that “political philosophy 
may contribute to how a people think of their political and social institutions as a whole, 
of themselves as citizens, and of their basic aims and purposes as a society with a 
history”. However, I think Bufacchi (2012:27) neatly sums it up in his book entitled, 
Social Injustice: Essays in Political Philosophy:  
“The point of political philosophy is not merely to create an arena where 
professional academics and students can play an increasingly sophisticated 
intellectual game, which is as highly stimulating as it is increasingly insignificant. 
Instead political philosophy ought to strive for three main goals: to identify the 
nature of the social and political problems inflicting our societies, especially the 
problem of social injustice; to set the agenda for future social policies; and to 
indicate solutions to these problems”. 
  
Perhaps I should close this clarification of my take on political philosophy by briefly 
touching on the work of Jonathan Wolff. In a wonderfully written book entitled, An 
Introduction to Political Philosophy, Wolff (1996:2) argues that “political philosophy is 
a normative discipline, meaning that it tries to establish norms (rules or ideal 
standards). Thus “one task for the political philosopher…. is to determine the correct 
balance between autonomy and authority, or, in other words, to determine the proper 
distribution of political power”. I shall say more on the notion of ‘power’ below with 
reference to the work of Lukes (2001) and Poulantzas (1973). 
  
The above clarification is necessary in order for me to indicate how I shall respond to 
political philosophy-related issues in the study - women’s representation in traditional 
African societies; the exercise of power, and co-existence between traditional African 
values and liberal democratic values. Women in South Africa were active in the 
drafting of the new Constitution that guarantees women a whole range of rights and 
freedoms (Tripp, 2001). Hence it has been argued that gender issues have been 
central to state restructuring to promote and maintain gender equality (McEwan, 
2001). And yet others have expressed dissatisfaction with the much vaunted changes 
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in so far as they pertain to women. For instance, in the article entitled, “Are the powers 
of traditional leaders in South Africa compatible with women’s equal rights?, three 
conceptual arguments”, which appears in the journal, Human Rights Review, Bentley 
(2005) argues that the much touted changes for many women have been ‘on paper’ 
only. In the same vein, Walker (2003) observes that instituting programmes that 
challenge unequal gender relations is difficult, partly because the subordinate status 
of rural women is embedded in multi-layered relationships that are not easily reduced 
to policy prescriptions.  
 
There are concerns that women’s views in the traditional African polity might not have 
been sufficiently represented notwithstanding that there was tacit understanding that 
husbands represented their wives and/or households in the pitso/imbizo [public 
assembly] pep pro [as delegated representatives] or pro bono publico [as legal 
representatives acting for the public good]. It seems these concerns also pertain to 
post-apartheid South Africa. For instance, in her article entitled, “Liberal constitutions 
and traditional cultures: The South African customary law debate”, which appears in 
the journal Citizenship Inquiry, Deveaux (2003:161) contends that “liberal constitutions 
that protect citizens’ individual equality rights as well as their right to practice their 
culture run into difficulties where gender is concerned”. She wonders “whether the Bill 
of Rights should apply directly or indirectly to common law and to customary law” 
(Deveaux, 2003:164), because effectively, “this means that the question of how 
conflicts between constitutional provisions and practices associated with customary 
law will be treated in future is an open one”.  
 
The place and role of liberalism and liberal democracy in the African political discourse 
have come under heavy scrutiny over the past years. And the trend continues even 
with the new generation of African scholars. For instance, in his book entitled, 
Democracy and Development in Africa, Ake (1996:130) argues that “liberal democracy 
is inimical to the idea of the people having effective decision making power. The 
essence of liberal democracy is precisely the abolition of popular power and the 
replacement of popular sovereignty with the rule of law”. In the article entitled, “The 
unique case of African democracy”, which appears in the journal International Affairs, 
Ake (1993:243) argues that “the familiar assumptions and political arrangements of 
liberal democracy make little sense in Africa”. For him, “most of Africa is still far from 
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liberal democracy and further still from the participative social democracy” (Ake, 
1996:137). It is his contention that Africa needs the following: 
 A democracy in which people have some real decision-making over and above 
the formal consent of electoral choice;  
 A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social, and 
economic rights, as opposed to a liberal democracy that emphasises abstract 
political rights; 
 A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on 
individual rights; and 
 A democracy of incorporation. To be as inclusive as possible, the legislative 
bodies should have special representation of mass organisations, especially 
youth, the labour movement, and women's groups, which are usually 
marginalised. Without the active participation of these groups democracy is 
unlikely to occur.  
 
In Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa, Ntsebeza 
(2005) takes issue with the South African Constitution’s recognition of the institution 
of traditional leadership or Ubukhosi – chieftaincy. For him such recognition constitutes 
a ‘fundamental contradiction’ because the institution of traditional leadership is 
hereditary and not democratic. This flies in the face of liberal democratic principles of 
freedom and the right to choose or elect leaders to public office. In addition, Jo Beall, 
who has conducted extensive research on the relationship between Ubukhosi and the 
wider governance structures in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, advances a similar 
argument to Ntsebeza’s. In the article entitled, “Cultural weapons: traditions, 
inventions and the transition to democratic governance in Metropolitan Durban”, which 
appears in the journal, Urban Studies, Beall (2006:495) argues that   
“Chieftaincy operates on principles that are antithetical to democratic ideals. 
Selection for the office of chief is not by popular vote, but is hereditary and 
usually for life. Traditional authority structures are hierarchical and patriarchal. 
Customary practices and laws are exclusionary and oppressive towards 
women. Under such a system, there are obvious limits to representation and 
downward accountability”. 
 
In an earlier co-authored article entitled: “Emergent democracy and ‘resurgent’ 
tradition: institutions, chieftaincy and transition in KwaZulu-Natal”, which appears in 
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the Journal of Southern African Studies, Beall, Mkhize., and Vawda (2005:756) argue 
that “the relationship between Ubukhosi (chieftaincy) and wider governance structures 
must be seen as part of a longer history, exhibiting both continuities and 
discontinuities”. They wonder whether “the institution of Ubukhosi might evolve or 
mutate through its encounter with more democratic institutions of governance” (Beall, 
et al. 2005: 767). 
 
The debates sketched above highlight the centrality of the notion of ‘representation’, 
in particular ‘political representation’, to socio-political interactions. At stake here is 
how the notion of ‘representation’ might have been conceived in the traditional African 
polity, and how it ought to be conceived in post-apartheid South Africa. Pitkin’s (1967) 
ground-breaking book entitled, The Concept of Representation, provides the 
necessary conceptual tools for theorising the notion of ‘political representation’. And 
so are also some of the articles she published on the notion of representation, for 
instance, “Hobbes’s concept of representation - I”, which appears in American Political 
Science Review, and “Commentary: The paradox of representation”, which appears 
in Nomos X, Representation (Pitkin, 1968, 1964). In 1972 Pitkin published 
Wittgenstein and Justice: The Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and 
Political Thought, in which she revisited her earlier views on the notion of 
representation, and responded to some of the criticisms of The Concept of 
Representation.    
 
Pitkin (1967:1) is explicit that The Concept of Representation is “not a historical study 
of the way in which representative government has evolved, nor yet an empirical 
investigation of the behaviour of contemporary representatives or the expectations 
voters have about them”. Rather it “is primarily a conceptual analysis”. She contends 
that in philosophy “the function of the linguistic analysis of concepts is often taken to 
be the clearing up of certain characteristic ‘muddles’ or philosophical pseudo-problems 
arising out of the misuse of ordinary words” (Pitkin, 1967:7). 
 
Briefly, Pitkin’s (1967:209) conceives of ‘representation’ as “acting in the interest of 
the represented, in a manner responsive to them”. She devotes specific chapters in 
her book to “Standing for”, which refers to ‘descriptive representation’ (chapter four); 
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‘Symbolic Representation’ (chapter five), and “Representing as Acting For” (chapter 
six). Pitkin’s (1967:8) working assumption is that “representation does have an 
identifiable meaning, applied in different but controlled and discoverable ways in 
different contexts”. She argues that “representation means, as the word's etymological 
origins indicate, re-presentation, a making present again”. This implies “the making 
present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in 
fact”. Thus, the essence of representation’ “is that the representatives - whatever the 
manner of their investiture - are authorised in advance to act conjointly on behalf of 
their constituents and bind them by their collective decisions” (Pitkin, 1967: 43). Pitkin 
(1967:155) posits that “the substance of the activity of representing seems to consist 
in promoting the interests of the represented, in a context where the latter is conceived 
as capable of action and judgment, but in such a way that he does not object to what 
is done in his name”.  
 
Contemporary political scientists who have drawn on Pitkin’s work to contribute to the 
debate on the notion of representation include David Runciman. In the article entitled, 
“The paradox of political representation”, which appears in the Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Runciman (2007:93) shares some of Pitkin’s etymological observations 
on the notion of representation. But he goes further to highlight its paradoxical nature. 
As he puts it, “this is not a formal or logical paradox, but a linguistic one, and it has its 
roots in the etymology of the term: ‘re-presentation’ implies that something must be 
present in order to be ‘re-presented’ but also absent in order to be ‘re-presented’”. The 
essence of Runciman’s (2007:94) argument is to highlight “a fundamental dualism built 
into the meaning of representation”. He argues that “the paradoxical character of the 
concept of representation derives from the simultaneity of this requirement of presence 
and non-presence, enabling contradictory conclusions to be drawn from any given use 
of the concept” (Runciman, 2007:95). However, Runciman acknowledges that Pitkin 
was unambiguous that the activity of representation is tied to the promotion of 
interests; it cannot simply be identified with the representation of interests, because it 
also has to allow for a kind of ‘presence’ on the part of those whose interests are 
represented. In a later article, entitled, “Representation and democracy: uneasy 
alliance”, which appears in Scandinavian Political Studies, Pitkin (2004:336) offers a 
useful clarification of the paradox of representation: 
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“The way a city or a mountain is ‘made present’ on a map differs totally from 
the way a litigant is ‘made present’ by an attorney. The way Macbeth is ‘made 
present’ on the stage differs from the way an ambassador represents a state, 
or the way one ‘makes representations about’ something, or what characterises 
representational art or a representative sample”. 
 
Concerns about women’s representation in political decision-making in the traditional 
African polity raise questions about power and how it is exercised. French philosopher 
Michel Foucault (1998; 1980; 1977) has written extensively on the notion of power and 
how power is exercised. But for my purpose in this study, I prefer Steven Lukes’ (2005) 
book, entitled: Power; A Radical View. Lukes (2005:30) argues that “the concept of 
power is, in consequence, what has been called an ‘essentially contested concept’ - 
one of those concepts which inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper 
uses on the part of their users”. To that extent, “to engage in such disputes is itself to 
engage in politics”. Lukes’ (2005:41) central project is to answer the questions “What 
is an exercise of power? What is it to exercise power?” He argues that effective 
exercise of power occurs when “A gets B to do what he [B] would not otherwise do” 
(Lukes, 2005:43). Lukes’ thesis on power is consistent with Althusserian theorist, 
Nicos Poulantzas’ conception of power. In his book entitled: Political Power and Social 
Classes, Poulantzas (1973:104) defines power as “the capacity of a social class to 
realise its specific objective interests”. Let me elaborate. When the Italian fascist 
regime of Benito Mussolini incarcerated communist party activist and general 
secretary Antonio Gramsci in 1926 for speaking out against fascism, and kept him in 
jail until his death in 1937, the aim was to stop Gramsci’s brain from “working for 20 
years” (Monasta, 1993:599). Similarly, when South Africa’s apartheid regime banished 
Nelson Mandela to Robben Island in 1964, and kept him prisoner for twenty-seven 
(27) years, it was, like the Italian fascist regime trying to silence him for his counter-
hegemonic stance. Against this backdrop my view is that we need a new lens on the 
debates on men, power and women in the traditional African polity. Such a lens should 
enable us to have a more nuanced understanding of how men and women related in 
traditional African societies.      
 
To summarise, I prefaced this section with a clarification of my understanding of 
political philosophy. I argued that political philosophy is a normative discipline in that 
it seeks to determine the correct balance between autonomy and authority, and the 
proper distribution of political power. I showed that this conception of political 
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philosophy pertains to my purposes in this study given that it has the potential to 
enable me to unpack the concerns regarding women’s representation in the traditional 
African polity. If we recall Pitkin’s conception of ‘representation’, it remains to be seen 
whether it can be reasonably argued that in the traditional African polity men were 
authorised to act on behalf of women with a view to advancing the latter’s interests. I 
touched on the exercise of power, and whether there is substance in the claim that 
traditional African values are fundamentally contradictory to liberal democratic values. 
In the next section I focus on the literature on African philosophy and Ubuntu.  
 
2.4  African Philosophy and the notion of Ubuntu 
 
The issue whether African philosophy exists or not (Letseka, 2012; Hallen, 2002; 
Bodunrin, 1981; Temples, 1959); whether it is still in the making (Gratton, 2003; 
Letseka, 2000; Wiredu, 1980, 1996), or whether it exists as mythologies or as a form 
of ethno-philosophy (Ochieng’-Odhiambo, 2006, 2002; Oruka, 2002, 1990, 1972; 
Hountondji, 1996), has been sufficiently exhausted by African philosophers. 
Therefore, I shall not dwell on it here. Instead, what I shall attempt to do in this section 
is to focus on the literature that explores the question whether African philosophy can 
add value to conceptions of education and social policy in South Africa, and how a 
modern African society might be ordered (Letseka, 2013a, 2013b; Gyekye, 1997; 
Wiredu, 1996).  
 
In a provocative but denigrating article entitled, “Can Ubuntu provide a model for 
citizenship education in African democracies?”, which appears in Comparative 
Education, Enslin and Horsthemke (2004) cast aspersion on the capacity of 
indigenous African epistemologies, including Ubuntu, to serve as models for 
citizenship education in African democracies. I shall show that in traditional African 
societies Ubuntu is widely embraced as a worldview, as a normative concept or a 
moral theory, as a public policy, as a notion of communal justice and social order, and 
as a pedagogical principle (Letseka, 2014a; 2013a; 2013b; 2012; 2000; Metz, 2011; 
2007; Metz & Gaie, 2010; Broodryk, 2002; Ramose, 2002a, 2002b, 1999; Sindane, 
1994; Mokgoro, 1998; Shutte, 1994). In her book entitled, Decolonising 
Methodologies: Research and Indigenous People, Waikado University scholar of 
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indigenous knowledge Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2008:56) coins the phrase research 
'through imperial eyes', which she argues and describes “an approach which assumes 
that Western ideas about the most fundamental things are the only ideas possible to 
hold, certainly the only rational ideas, and the only ideas which can make sense of the 
world, of reality, of social life and of human beings”.  
 
Smith’s (2008) argument above resonates with Amin’s (2009) critique of Eurocentrism 
in his book entitled, Eurocentrism. Amin (2009) argues that Eurocentrism is a 
culturalist phenomenon that assumes existence of irreducibly distinct cultural variants 
that shape the historical paths of different peoples. Its manifestations “are expressed 
in the most varied of areas: day-to-day relationships between individuals, political 
information and opinion, general views concerning society and culture, social science. 
These expressions are sometimes violent, leading all the way to racism, and 
sometimes subtle” (Amin, 2009: 179). Eurocentrism claims that imitation of expression 
of the Western model by all people is the only solution to the challenges of our time. 
Thus Eurocentrism “implies a theory of world history and, departing from it, a global 
political project” (Amin, 2009: 154).  
 
My intention in this study is to highlight the importance of Ubuntu to the traditional 
African lebenswelt [world of lived experiences]. Ubuntu is a form of traditional 
knowledge [indigenous epistemology]. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)’s (2003:2) report entitled, Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage defines ‘intangible cultural heritage’ 
as “the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the 
instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognise as part of their cultural 
heritage”. The ‘intangible cultural heritage’ manifests in: 
 Oral traditions and expressions, including language as a vehicle of the 
intangible cultural heritage; 
 Performing arts; 
 Social practices, rituals and festive events; 
 Knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe; and 
 Traditional craftsmanship.  
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These manifestations are transmitted from generation to generation, and are 
“constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, 
their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity 
and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity”.   
 
Notwithstanding the vicious criticisms by Enslin and Horsthemke, (2004) and Marx 
(2002), Ubuntu has important normative, cultural and educational implications. This 
much is confirmed by the African scholars who have attempted to insert Ubuntu in 
mainstream philosophical discourses and to make a case for its epistemological 
viability and philosophical legitimacy. In my view, the work of Mogobe Ramose stands 
out in this endeavour. Ramose’s (1999) book entitled, African Philosophy through 
Ubuntu, and his chapter contributions that are specific to Ubuntu are worth mentioning. 
For instance, “The philosophy of Ubuntu and Ubuntu as a philosophy”, and “The ethics 
of Ubuntu”, both of which appear in Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings, 
which is edited by P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux (2003), provide useful insights into 
Ramose’s views and ideas on Ubuntu. Ramose (2002a:270) argues that understood 
as being human (humanness); a humane, respectful, and polite attitude towards 
others, “Ubuntu is the root of African philosophy. The being of an African in the 
universe is inseparably anchored upon Ubuntu”. In his book entitled, Ubuntu: Life 
lessons from Africa, Johann Broodryk (2002) conceives of Ubuntu / botho as a 
comprehensive ancient African worldview based on the values of humanness, caring, 
sharing, respect, compassion and associated values, ensuring a happy and qualitative 
human community life in a spirit of family.  
 
I have elaborated on these aspects of Ubuntu in my own research. For instance, in a 
chapter contribution entitled, “African philosophy and educational discourse”, which 
appears in Phillip Higgs’ co-edited book African Voices in Education, I argue that 
“Botho or Ubuntu is therefore normative in that it prescribes desirable and accepted 
forms of human conduct in a particular community of people” (Letseka, 2000:186). I 
posit that “Botho or Ubuntu is treated as normative in that it encapsulates moral norms 
and virtues such as kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and 
respect and concern for others” (Letseka, 2000:179-180). In the article entitled, “In 
defence of Ubuntu”, which appears in Studies in Philosophy and Education, I argue 
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that “Ubuntu articulates our inter-connectedness, our common humanity and the 
responsibility to each that flows from our connection. It is a worldview that emphasises 
the communality and interdependence of the members of the community” (Letseka, 
2012:54). Hence in South Africa Ubuntu is associated with the saying, umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu (Nguni), or its Sotho alternative motho ke motho ka batho. The 
English translation of this saying approximates: ‘‘a human being is a human being 
because of other human beings’.  
 
In his books entitled, African Religions and Philosophy (1989) and Introduction to 
African Religion (1975) Mbiti (1989) coins the maxim: “I am, because we are; and since 
we are, therefore I am”. This maxim resonates with Ubuntu’s feature of ‘communal 
interdependence’ sketched above. Mbiti (1989:106) argues that according to this 
maxim, in Africa “the individual cannot exist alone except corporately. She owes her 
existence to other people, including those of past generations and her 
contemporaries”. Concomitantly, “whatever happens to the individual happens to the 
whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual”. In 
their article entitled, “Studying morality within the African context: a model of moral 
analysis and construction”, which appears in Journal of Moral Education, Verhoef and 
Michel (1997:396) argue that the ‘we’ of the African ethos “is a shared experience, a 
body of collective experience, an understanding that one's experiences are never 
entirely one's own”.  
 
I have since moved the debate further from merely defending Ubuntu against those 
who attack it by fleshing out Ubuntu’s pedagogical implications in the article entitled, 
“Educating for Ubuntu”, which appears in Open Journal of Philosophy (Letseka, 
2013a). In the article entitled, “Anchoring Ubuntu morality”, which appears in 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, I argue a case for anchoring Ubuntu 
morality in personhood, in the family, and in the community (Letseka, 2013b). I argue 
for Ubuntu to serve as a communal notion of ‘justice as fairness’ in the article entitled, 
“Ubuntu and justice as fairness”, which appears in Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences (Letseka, 2014a). 
 
To summarise, I have asserted from the outset that in this review I am not going to 
belabour the old debate on whether African philosophy exists or not, and in what it 
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exists. Instead I shall focus on the literature that contribute towards our understanding 
of the ways in which African philosophy and Ubuntu can add value to the role of 
education in Africa and contribute to social policy. I have sketched numerous pieces 
of literature that attest to the potential for Ubuntu to serve as a moral theory, that is, to 
have a normative upshot in traditional and modern African societies. In the next section 
I review the literature on conceptions of education in a South Africa that is a liberal 
democracy, but is also heavily steeped in African cultures and traditions. 
 
2.5  Conceptions of education in South Africa 
 
In this penultimate section I broach the literature on conceptions of education in a post-
apartheid South Africa. Post-apartheid South Africa is a fascinating political philosophy 
and philosophy of education laboratory. On the one hand, it is an African country that 
has embraced liberal democratic values and ideas of politics, thanks to its Constitution, 
which is hailed worldwide as liberal and egalitarian. Chapter two in particular, which is 
the Bill of Rights, enshrines a wide variety of rights and freedoms for the individual. 
For instance, section 9 (3) is very clear that even the state cannot unfairly discriminate 
against anyone on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth. On the other hand, the same Constitution recognises the 
institution of traditional leadership, which implies that it recognises the place and role 
of traditions and cultures in South African society. While there were concerns after 
1996 that the Constitution was silent on the legal and policy roles of traditional leaders 
in a liberal democracy, subsequent policies and legislation have eventually addressed 
these concerns, hopefully. For instance, the White Paper on Local Government of 
1998; the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance of 2003, as well as 
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003, and the 
Communal Land Rights Act of 2004, all provide the necessary details not stated in the 
Constitution by mapping out the roles and duties of traditional leaders while also 
emphasising the supremacy of the Constitution.  
 
In this section I touch on the literature that might assist in working out a conception of 
education that reconciles and amalgamates the liberal democratic values and 
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traditional African values, while also supporting the cosmopolitanism that comes with 
teaching and learning in a constantly changing globalised world. In his book entitled, 
Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience (1997), 
and in an earlier chapter contribution entitled, “Traditional political ideas: their 
relevance to developments in contemporary Africa” (1992), which appears in Person 
and Philosophy: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I, Gyekye (1992:242) sets out to  
“explore the traditional African values and ideas of government with a view to 
pointing out the democratic features of this indigenous system of government, 
and to examine whether or not, and in what ways, such features can be said to 
be harmonious with the ethics of contemporary culture and hence relevant to 
developments in political life and thought in modern Africa”.  
 
Taking cue from Gyekye above, in this section I shall touch on the literature that sheds 
light on the plausibility of educating the young people to live their lives in a modern 
cosmopolitan environment (Gitlin, 2006; Nussbaum, 2002), while still cognisant of their 
communal cultures and traditions (Gyekye, 1997, 1992). In a chapter entitled, 
“Patriotism and cosmopolitanism”, which appears in For the Love of Country, a book 
she has co-edited with Joshua Cohen, Martha Nussbaum (2002:8) advocates 
education for world citizenship. She argues that “to be a citizen of the world one does 
not need to give up local identifications, which can frequently be a source of great 
richness in life” (Nussbaum, 2002:9). Rather we should think of ourselves “not as 
devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first 
one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then follows the extended 
family, then, in order, neighbours or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow 
countrymen”. A conception of multicultural cosmopolitan education in the globalised 
world we live in today cannot be overemphasised as it serves the purpose of making 
youngsters aware of the imperatives of our globally networked society (Castells, 
2010).  
 
How then do we conceive of an educational framework that taps into traditional African 
cultures, forms of knowledge, and skills and make these applicable to the social and 
cultural life of modern Africa? Gyekye (1992:245) is clear that traditional African ideas 
that are considered worthwhile “must be thoroughly and critically examined and sorted 
out in a sophisticated manner”. They must be “explored, refined, trimmed and given a 
modern translation”. This brings up the BIG question: which indigenous African forms 
47 
 
 
 
of education can be considered worthwhile and pertinent for “developments in the 
political life and thought in modern Africa?” Most of the literature on indigenous African 
education emphasises the centrality of moral values, ‘good’ human conduct and social 
etiquette, as well as the transmission of society’s cultures (Marah, 2006; Adeyemi & 
Adeyinka, 2003, 2002; Adeyinka & Ndwapi, 2002; Adeyinka, 2000, 1993). In their co-
authored chapter entitled, “What kinds of people are we? Values education after 
Apartheid”, which appears in Aspin and Chapman’s book, Values Education and 
Lifelong Learning, Pendlebury and Enslin (2007) also contribute to the debate by 
reflecting on the role of values education in shaping the kind of personhood that is 
desirable in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
The Department of Education’s (2001) Manifesto on Values, Education and 
Democracy identifies ten (10) critical values that schools should promote. The values 
in question are, democracy, social justice and equity, equality, non-racism and non-
sexism, Ubuntu or human dignity, an open society, accountability and responsibility, 
the rule of law, respect, and reconciliation. A question that might be asked at this stage 
is why such an emphasis on ‘values’? The answer is fairly simple: values are desirable 
characteristics because they are essential for life, and intertwine with morality. 
Critically though, the above-mentioned values are also entrenched in the country’s 
constitution. In a later report entitled, Values and Human Rights in the Curriculum, the 
Department of Education (DoE) (2005) provides a breakdown of how values education 
will be rolled out at different learning phases, and what the different emphases should 
be. The DoE (2005: 7) notes that  
“Human rights claim their roots as being simply in the humanness people 
‘contain’, which cannot be separated from their being. Whilst some values may 
be specific to a culture or a religion, there are those which many would consider 
‘universal’. Amongst these are the values which form the cornerstone of our 
own democracy: dignity, equality, justice and freedom”. 
 
In the closing section of the review I want to suggest that values are essential to the 
educational development of ‘the self’ and to desirable ‘personhood’. The notions of 
‘the self’ and ‘personhood’ feature prominently in the work of Kenyan philosopher 
Dismas Masolo. In his book entitled, Self and Community in a Changing World, Masolo 
(2010:89) argues that “personhood is inter-subjectively constituted”. Thus “by means 
of communicative interaction we become more than just human beings: we become 
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persons” (Masolo, 2010: p. 142). In the same vein, in a chapter entitled, “On three 
normative conceptions of a person”, which appears in Kwasi Wiredu (ed) A 
Companion to Africa Philosophy, Menkiti  (2004:326) argues that “in the stated journey 
of the individual toward personhood the community plays a vital role both as catalyst 
and as prescriber of norms”. Therefore, it follows that the notion of ‘personhood’ is at 
the epicentre of ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ we ought to teach the young people. The 
conception of education I shall propose in this study shall be one that embraces some 
assumptions of liberal democratic values and some assumptions of traditional African 
values. It shall be one that is rooted in communities where communally-inclined 
‘selves’ and ‘personhood’ can be developed, but also recognises the importance of 
‘world citizenship’. 
 
To briefly summarise, in this section I have reviewed the literature that pertains to the 
formulation of an educational framework that addresses the twine foci of South African 
society, as an African liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in African 
traditions and cultures. I suggested that such an educational framework would be one 
that endeavours to educate the young people to live and flourish in an African liberal 
democracy and at the same time be cognisant of their communal traditions and 
cultures. I argued that the proposed educational framework shall be informed by the 
cornerstones of the Constitution of South Africa - dignity, equality, justice and freedom. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have presented a review of the literature from which I shall draw to 
support my central arguments. In section one I touched on the literature in philosophy 
of education that influenced my thoughts about the discipline. I particularly mentioned 
the work of University of London philosopher of education R. S Peters and his 
associates. In South Africa I singled out Wally Morrow and Penny Enslin who taught 
me philosophy of education while I was studying for my Masters’ degree at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. In the second section I reviewed the 
literature that assisted me to clarify my understanding of the discipline of political 
philosophy. The reason for this is that some of the issues that are central to my 
analysis in this study are of a political philosophy nature. Briefly, what the literature 
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highlighted is that political philosophy is a normative discipline. It tries to establish 
norms with a view to determining the correct balance between autonomy and authority, 
or the proper distribution of political power. I also touched on the literature in ‘political 
representation’ with a view to understanding how women’s representation in public 
decision-making structures in the traditional Africa polity might be explained.  
 
In section three I reviewed the literature on African philosophy and the notion of 
Ubuntu. The intention was to show that understood as being human (humanness); a 
humane, respectful, and polite attitude towards others, Ubuntu has important 
normative, cultural and educational implications. In the penultimate section above, I 
reviewed the literature that might assist in formulating an educational framework for 
educating the young people to live in a modern globalised cosmopolitan environment, 
without losing sight of their communal traditions and cultures. Such an educational 
framework would then serve as a tool for the amalgamation of traditional African 
values and liberal democratic values. In the next chapter I map out the study’s 
research methodology. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH APPROACH   
 
3.1  Introduction   
 
This study is in the areas of philosophy of education and African philosophy, as well 
as some aspects of political theory and political philosophy. In Chapter 1 above I 
described the study’s main research question and subsequent sub-questions. I should 
reiterate them here in order to establish a link between the research question and the 
research methodology by which the study shall be driven.   
 
3.1.1 The main research question 
 Is the perception that indigenous African values and ideas of politics are 
incompatible with, and contradictory to liberal democratic values and ideas of 
politics necessarily valid?  
 
3.1.2 Sub-research questions 
 What is the basis of the claim that a liberal democratic state that attempts to 
shape its future political trajectory through the amalgamation of indigenous 
African values and liberal democratic values is doomed to fail? 
 Is the amalgamation of liberal democratic values and indigenous African 
institutions such as chieftaincy and the monarchy peculiar to South Africa? 
 What should a philosophy of education that amalgamates liberal democratic 
values and indigenous African values consist of?  
 
That this study straddles disciplines such as philosophy of education, African 
philosophy, and some aspects of political theory and political philosophy is not 
unusual. Rather it is testimony to the symbiotic relationship that exists between 
education and these various disciplines. Such a relationship also pertains to the need 
for exploring the plausible coexistence between, or the amalgamation of traditional 
African values and liberal democratic values in shaping conceptions of education in 
South Africa’s new democratic dispensation, which is what this study seeks to do. That 
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coexistence or amalgamation is all the more necessary given that while South Africa 
is a liberal democracy on account of its liberal constitution (Robinson, 2012; Enslin & 
Horsthemke, 2004; Deveaux, 2003; Mattes, 2002); it is also heavily steeped in local 
traditions and cultures. These include, but are not limited to the notion of Ubuntu and 
the institution of traditional leadership - chieftaincy or bokgosi. In one of my earlier 
publications I made a case for African philosophy to speculate about the communality 
of the individual in the African setting; to provide the necessary conceptual frameworks 
for interpreting and analysing the humanness that Botho and Ubuntu capture; to 
provide the rational tools for critical reflection on personal wellbeing or human 
flourishing, on communal ethics and how these ought to frame human conduct 
(Letseka, 2000:182). One of the arguments I am advancing in this study is that central 
to traditional African values are semblances of liberal democratic values such as, for 
example, a deep concern for individual wellbeing (White, 2005).  
 
The preoccupation of philosophy is neither simple nor simplistic. As Pring (2005:5) 
reminds us, “the job of philosophy is to remind the over-zealous theorist or politician, 
both of whom want to see things simply, of the complex way in which social reality is 
and has to be understood, and the network of interconnected concepts through which 
experience is sieved and made sense of”. It is Pring’s (2005:179) contention that 
“philosophy is more of an activity than a body of knowledge. It questions what very 
often goes unquestioned; it seeks justification where often people take the value for 
granted; it seeks clarity where often there is muddle”. In short, 
“a central tradition in philosophy has been to question received arguments and 
to seek the truth while knowing that the conclusions would always remain 
provisional; to respect those texts which encapsulate a well-argued position 
without regarding them as beyond criticism or improvement; to respect the 
giving of reasons while recognizing that the canons of good reasoning might 
evolve through criticism or vary according to type of discourse. Living with 
uncertainty is not the offshoot of postmodernism. It is the essence of the 
perennial philosophical tradition” (Pring, 2005: 227). 
 
In the 1980s, John Wilson made a case for an inevitably large overlap between 
education and philosophy. He argued that “on any serious account of philosophy, that 
enterprise consists at least of examining and trying to improve our understanding of 
our basic concepts and values and because on any serious account of education, that 
enterprise is inextricably bound up with concepts and values that are unclear, 
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controversial, and hence very much in need of such examination” (Wilson, 1988:84). 
Wilson posited that “discipline, learning, teaching, the curriculum, indoctrination, 
morality, politics, intelligence, the emotions, subject-titles (science, English, history, et 
cetera), administration, counselling, pastoral care – there is hardly a single concept in 
the world of education which does not fall into this category”. Recently Bridges (2003) 
distinguishes three sets of relationships between philosophy and educational research 
- (a) the role of philosophy in addressing, in particular, the epistemological and ethical 
underpinnings of that research - philosophising about educational research; (b) the 
sense in which philosophising about education itself constitutes a form of educational 
research - philosophising as educational research, and (c) the role of philosophy in the 
process of empirical research - philosophising in educational research (Bridges, 2003: 
13). These relationships are based on the tacit understanding that philosophers 
possess demonstrable skills such as the close analysis of texts, critical assessment of 
arguments, as well as or the deployment of the tools of formal logic (Weinberg, 
Gonnerman, Buckner & Alexander, 2010).  
 
In South Africa, the need to draw on philosophy to debate educational issues has been 
highlighted by Enslin (1993) and in Canada by Egan (2001; 1992). During her 
inaugural lecture at the University of the Witwatersrand, Enslin (1993:3) argued that 
the notion of education is complex and highly contested. 
“First, education is what is called a ‘contested concept’ because it is a concept 
of appraisal; in arguing about whether an activity is educative, we are 
concerned with a practice which we value. Education is a concept formed from 
the normative point of view; it is a moral concept. Secondly, the practice of 
education, like health and justice, is internally complex, in that it picks out a 
variety of activities – including centrally teaching and learning. Thirdly, 
education is a cluster concept, in that it has complex connections with a host of 
other concepts to which it is related so that clarifying the concept of education 
involves the elaboration of the broader conceptual scheme within which it is 
implicated”. 
 
Enslin’s description of education as a ‘contested concept’ and as ‘complex’ calls for 
further clarification. Carr (2005) supports some of Enslin’s views above on the 
contested nature of education. Firstly, he argues that, there is a clear enough 
relationship between education and learning. For instance, whatever is learned in the 
course of education or related enterprises could hardly be other than a matter of the 
acquisition of skills, capacities, dispositions or qualities not previously possessed. 
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Secondly, any learning surely presupposes learners. Thus insofar as there have to be 
subjects of education as well as education in subjects, it seems worth asking what 
kinds of agencies these are, and what benefits we would expect them to derive from 
education. Thirdly, there are apparent links between education, learning and teaching: 
learning is often assumed (rightly or wrongly) to be a causal or other consequence of 
teaching, and the terms ‘education’ and ‘teaching’ are sometimes used 
interchangeably. Fourthly, there is a fairly common association between education and 
schooling. There is a significant tendency to associate education with the sort of 
institutions in which education is held to occur – though the very idea of schools as 
sites of education cannot be taken as a given. 
 
Regarding the complex nature of education, Davis and Sumara (2008:35) posit that 
as a discipline ‘complexity thinking’ “refuses tidy descriptions and unambiguous 
definitions”. It is their view that “complexity thinking recognises that many phenomena 
are inherently stable, but also acknowledges that such stability is in some ways 
illusory, arising in the differences of evolutionary pace between human thought and 
the subjects/objects of human thought”. They further contend that ‘complexity thinking’ 
“is a new attitude toward studying particular sorts of phenomena that is able to 
acknowledge the insights of other traditions without trapping itself in absolutes or 
universals” (Davis & Sumara, 2008:35-36). In the same vein, Mason (2008:6) posits 
that “complexity theory points to methodological, paradigmatic and theoretical 
pluralism”. While Kuhn (2008:177) opines that “complexity offers a way of envisaging 
and working with complex phenomena”, and “has implications for how we conceive of 
social interactions and institutions, such as educational endeavour”. 
 
Coming back to Egan (2001:923), it is his view that “the dominant concept of education 
that currently shapes our schools is not only difficult and contentious, but it is also 
incoherent”. Egan suggests that “thinking about education during this century has 
almost entirely involved just three ideas - Durkheim’s socialisation; Plato’s academic 
idea, and Rousseau’s developmental idea. While these three ideas have become 
entangled with each other throughout the centuries and produced our contemporary 
schools, curricular and teaching practices, they are mutually incompatible. Case in 
point, Durkheim’s socialisation aims to homogenise children, initiate them into 
prevailing social norms and values, and make them alike in important ways. In 
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contrast, Plato’s academic idea seeks to immerse students in those forms of 
knowledge that would give them a privileged rational view of reality and move them 
towards a better-informed understanding of the nature of the world and human 
experiences. The purpose of this privileged rational view is to make students sceptical 
of prevailing norms, values, and beliefs. Finally, Rousseau’s developmental ideal 
requires the education of students to conform to their nature of learning, to attend to 
their individual differences, their stages of development, their learning styles, and 
forms of motivation. In an earlier publication, Egan (1992:646) argues that when we 
look closely at the implications of each of these ideas we run into problems of mutual 
incompatibility. Our general concept of education that has incorporated all three seems 
radically incoherent. Its most prominent features seem discordant. The critical 
challenge for a curriculum that tries to implement such a concept of education is that 
it endeavours to make people more alike while also attempting to make them more 
distinct, and to use knowledge to shape the nature of the individual while letting the 
nature of the individual determine what knowledge is relevant. 
 
Against the backdrop of the above exposition of the complex and contested nature of 
educational theory and practice, in this study I attempt to philosophise about education 
in South Africa. I shall draw on the Socratic method of ‘dialectical philosophy’ or 
‘philosophic inquiry’ to frame my thought processes. Socrates’ ‘dialectical philosophy’ 
provides spaces for “the contradictions and illusions inherent in conventional 
knowledge and understanding to be exposed and transcended through critical 
dialogue and debate” (Carr, 1997:205). West (2004:16) argues that “the Socratic 
commitment to questioning requires a relentless self-examination and critique of 
authority, motivated by an endless quest for intellectual integrity and moral 
consistency. It is manifested? in fearless speech – parrhesia – that unsettles, 
unnerves, and unhouses people from their uncritical sleepwalking”. There is 
resonance between Socrates’ ‘dialectical philosophy’ and Critical Race Theory (CRT). 
CRT’s aim is to unmask and expose continued colonisation within educational 
contexts and societal structures and to transform those contexts and structures (Dana-
Sacco, 2010; Writer, 2008; Brayboy, 2005). I intend to challenge the validity of the 
claims that traditional African values and liberal democratic values are incompatible, 
and that by implication, they are contradictory. This is a contested ideological 
discourse that played itself out during the hectic era of African nationalism in the 
55 
 
 
 
1950s, and during the twin eras of independence in the 1960s and post-colonialism in 
the 1970s. Arising from this ideologically contested space, and as the study’s 
educational upshot, I shall explore ways in which conceptions of education in 
contemporary South Africa might be framed. It should be clear by now that the 
research methodology that I shall employ in this study shall be unavoidably 
philosophical. As Papastephanou (2006:198) rightly observes, “the force of philosophy 
is at its peak when it turns to intellectual undercurrents, to the counterintuitive and the 
counterfactual, not in order to establish them as a new fashion but to seriously bring 
them into academic play. Philosophy is at its critical best when it helps people kick 
over the traces of intellectual hegemonic convergence”. Consistent with 
Papastephanou’s (2006) observations above, in this chapter I grapple with the vexing 
question of “how the notion of ‘method’ shapes the self-understanding in terms of 
which educational researchers make sense of what they are doing, define their cultural 
identities and legitimise their social role” (Carr, 1997:204). 
 
Philosophically grounded educational research shall invariably be premised on the 
principle of argumentation. In this study I seek to advance a philosophical argument 
to rebut the perceptions and claims identified in the research questions above. Let me 
briefly state from the outset that my view of argumentation is that it is premised on 
reasoning. In a provocative article entitled: “Why do humans reason? Arguments for 
an argumentative theory”, which appears in a scientific journal Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences, Mercier and Sperber (2011: 59) argue that “reasoning is best adapted for 
its role in argumentation, which should therefore be seen as its main function”. It is 
their contention that “according to the argumentative theory, reasoning is most 
naturally used in the context of an exchange of arguments during a discussion” 
(Mercier & Sperber, 2011:66). They opine that “the main function of reasoning is 
argumentative: Reasoning has evolved and persisted mainly because it makes human 
communication more effective and advantageous” (Mercier & Sperber, 2011:60). 
Mercier and Sperber (2011: 62) posit that if one’s goal is to convince others, “one 
should be looking first and foremost for supportive arguments”. My goal in this study 
is to convince my readers that indigenous African epistemologies such as the notion 
of Ubuntu and African indigenous education ought to be defended against what 
appears to be colonialist and imperialist-inclined views and misconceptions.  
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In her book, Decolonising Methodologies: Research and Indigenous People, Smith 
(2008:23) argues that “colonialism became imperialism's outpost, the fort and the port 
of imperial outreach”. Colonial outposts became cultural sites which preserved the 
image or represented the image of what the West or 'civilisation' stood for. For Smith 
(2008), colonialism was, in part, an image of imperialism, a particular realisation of the 
imperial imagination. It was also, in part, an image of the future nation it would become. 
She argues that in this image also lie images of the Other, stark contrasts and subtle 
nuances of the ways in which the indigenous communities were perceived and dealt 
with, which makes the stories of colonialism part of the grander narrative and yet part 
also of a very local, very specific experience. Smith (2008:23) cautions against the 
reach of imperialism into 'our heads' which she argues, “challenges those who belong 
to colonised communities to understand how this occurred, partly because we 
perceive a need to decolonise our minds, to recover ourselves, to claim a space in 
which to develop a sense of authentic humanity”. It is her contention that a constant 
reworking of our understandings of the impact of imperialism and colonialism forms 
the basis of an indigenous language of critique. 
 
This chapter is organised around three sections. I start with a brief sketching of my 
chosen research design. Considering that most “research in the social sciences is 
necessarily and ineliminably philosophical” (Bridges & Smith, 2006), I shall briefly 
comment on the basic tenets of philosophic inquiry as a form of qualitative research 
design. I shall also map out the research methodology, which is the foundation on 
which this study shall be anchored. I shall do this against the backdrop of the view that 
philosophers do not explicitly state a particular ‘research methodology’ in their 
research and writings given that philosophising, by its very nature, is a method by 
which philosophers articulate their research propositions and conceptual stances. 
Having said that, this study shall be conducted through two research methodological 
approaches, namely: first, philosophy as ‘qualitative research methodology’ and 
second, review of literature as ‘qualitative research methodology’. In the final section 
I shall provide some concluding remarks. I now turn to the notion of ‘research design’. 
 
3.2  Research design  
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The importance of research design in educational research cannot be taken lightly. 
One of the official journals of the American Educational Research Association (AERA), 
Educational Researcher dedicated volume 32, number 1, of 2003 as a special issue 
under the theme: “The Role of Design in Educational Research”. In the same vein, the 
official publication of the International Society of the Learning Sciences (ISLS), Journal 
of the Learning Sciences dedicated volume 13, number 1, of 2004 as a special issue 
under the theme: “Design-Based Research: Clarifying the Terms, Introduction to the 
Learning Sciences Methodology Strand”. It is probable that there are other journals I 
have not mentioned here that have also gone the route of focusing on the notion of 
research design. While some of the articles in these special issues are tilted more 
towards mathematics and the hard sciences, which conceive of research in terms of 
laboratory experiments, clinical trials and statistical quantification, their significance 
lies in the fact that they underscore the importance of clarifying one’s ‘research design’ 
before undertaking one’s research. It is worthwhile mentioning though that the 
language of research design and research methodology in philosophy of education 
raises more questions than answers. I shall come back to this issue in more detail in 
the section on ‘research methodology’ below.  
 
A critical question to ask at this stage is what actually comprises a ‘research design’? 
Creswell (2009:3) argues that “research designs are plans and the procedures for 
research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data 
collection and analysis”. Researchers are constantly making choices and decisions on 
what might work for their proposed research and what might not work. It is his 
contention that these choices and decisions involve which design should be used to 
study a topic? Informing these choices and decisions are worldviews and assumptions 
the researcher brings to the study. It seems to me though that another related question 
that should also be asked is what is the purpose of a ‘research design’? Gerring (2011: 
626) is unequivocal that “the purpose of a research design is to test a hypothesis”. He 
opines that “a good research design allows one to prove the main hypothesis, while 
rejecting plausible rival hypotheses” (Gerring, 2011: 628). It is “a critically important 
element in the development of a research project” (Berg, 2001:23). In the last instance 
though, “a research design that allows us to effectively compare the truth-value of rival 
theories is generally a better research design”. That is to say, “a research design 
should not be any more complex than it needs to be” (Gerring, 2011: 629). In addition, 
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Gerring (2011:627-631) argues that “methodological criteria pertaining to research 
design fall into six general categories: theoretical fit, cumulation, the treatment, the 
outcome, the sample, and the practical constraints”. 
 
I shall adopt the notion of ‘philosophy as educational research’. Philosophy as 
educational research implies “the kind of analysis that has been traditionally 
associated with philosophy of education, which is, in its own turn, a sub-area of 
philosophy that draws on the parent discipline to determine how to frame and analyse 
philosophical problems peculiar to education” (Moses, 2002:1). The pertinence of 
weaving philosophy into education cannot be overemphasised. As Archie and Archie 
(2004:5) point out, “philosophy is an investigation of the fundamental questions of 
human existence. Such questions include wondering about such things as the 
meaning of life, what kinds of things the universe is made of, whether there can be a 
theory of everything, how we can know what’s the right thing to do, and what is the 
beautiful in life and art”. The reason why philosophers tend to ask these searching and 
fundamentally complex questions is that “philosophy can be characterised as an 
attitude, an approach, or perhaps, even a calling, to ask, answer, or even just comment 
upon certain kinds of questions” (Archie & Archie, 2004:20). This might explain why 
‘philosophic inquiry’ is so critical to all activities that fall under the broad umbrella of 
any discourse that might be deemed to be philosophical. Indeed McKeon (1990:243) 
neatly sums it up in the observation: “philosophic inquiry is an examination of common 
issues to which different philosophic resolutions may be found”. In my research, I have 
inquired on the philosophical implications of indigenous education in Africa in general, 
and in South Africa in particular (Letseka, 2013a). I have argued that “indigenous 
education in Africa was intimately integrated with the social, cultural, artistic, religious, 
and recreational life of the ethnic group”. That through the lebollo [the institution of 
initiation], Basotho indigenous education sought to instil in the young people 
competencies such as thuto-kelello or cognitive engagement; respect for makunutu a 
sechaba - national secrets or classified information.  
 
If I were to invoke Thomas Kuhn’s notion of ‘paradigm’ to declare my preferred 
paradigm or stance in this study, my response would no doubt be that it is the 'Socratic 
method' of dialectical philosophy, also known as ‘philosophic inquiry’ or ‘philosophy as 
qualitative research methodology’. I will come back to Kuhn in more detail in section 
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3.3 below when I broach the notion of ‘research methodology’. However, I should 
hasten to mention that the adjective ‘qualitative’ is neither homogenous nor can it be 
presumed to possess a fixed meaning. Instead it can be spread out wide to include, 
among others, interpretive, critical, feminist, phenomenological or postmodern forms 
of research. Given that this study is “necessarily and ineliminably philosophical” 
(Bridges & Smith, 2006), I shall therefore state my version of qualitative research as 
‘critical’.  I have touched on the ‘Socratic dialectical inquiry’ in section 3.1 above, which 
is an example of a ‘critical’ approach to research (West, 2004; Carr, 1997), and here I 
shall only make cursory remarks. Bridges (1997:179) posits that “the notion of enquiry 
suggests some initial puzzlement or curiosity, a question which the individual seeks to 
clarify and answer”. It is his contention that “inquiry counts as research to the extent 
that it is systematic, but even more to the extent that it can claim to be conscientiously 
self-critical” (Bridges, 1997:180). In the same vein, Watts (2007:7) argues that inquiry 
counts as properly philosophical if it is both critical and reflexive. He opines that “an 
inquiry is critical in the required sense just to the extent that each and every aspect of 
the inquiry is treated as appropriate for discursive appraisal”. And it is reflexive “in the 
required sense just to the extent that it proceeds, at least in the first instance, by means 
of an investigation into whatever is necessarily implicated in the process of taking up 
and conducting a critical inquiry” (Watts, 2007:8). For Richard Rorty (2007: 188), “All 
inquiry is a matter of reweaving our webs of beliefs and desires in such a way as to 
give ourselves more happiness and richer and freer lives”.  
 
Drawing on various works by John Dewey, Biesta and Burbules (2003:58) argue that 
‘inquiry’ begins with a problem. For instance, “to see that a situation requires inquiry 
is the initial step in inquiry”. Thus, “inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation 
of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent 
distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a 
unified whole” (Biesta & Burbules, 2003:59). Furthermore, Biesta and Burbules 
(2003:57) argue that “inquiry does not solve problems by returning to a previous, 
stable situation, but by means of a transformation of the current situation into a new 
situation. There is, therefore, no absolute end to inquiry”. They caution though that 
“just as our understanding of knowledge can only come from a reconstruction of actual 
processes of knowledge acquisition, so can our methods of inquiry only be criticised, 
improved, and validated in and through the process of inquiry itself” (Biesta & 
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Burbules, 2003:56). Indeed in one of his classic treatises entitled: How We Think, 
Dewey (2010:6) notes that “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief 
or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the 
further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought”. For Biesta and 
Burbules (2003:59), inquiry is not just a mental process; not simply something that 
happens in the human mind, instead it is the actual transformation of a situation - 
where a situation always denotes the transaction of organism and environment. It is 
their contention that what distinguishes inquiry from trial and error is the fact that the 
transformation of the situation is controlled or directed by means of reflection or 
thinking. Thus, the process of inquiry consists of the cooperation of two kinds of 
operations: existential operations (the actual transformation of the situation) and 
conceptual operations (reflection or thinking).  
 
How then do I envisage ‘philosophic inquiry’ will play itself out in practice in this study?  
Below I briefly describe selected pieces of literature that I shall interrogate through the 
application of ‘philosophic inquiry’. These include books and journal articles whose 
central assumptions and arguments I challenge and rebut. The intention is to recast 
the assumptions and arguments with a view to positioning indigenous African 
epistemologies within the philosophical space occupied by the taken-for-granted 
dominant and often privileged Western meta-narratives and worldviews. In the last 
instance, this interrogation is necessary for engaging in debates on how conceptions 
of education in post-apartheid South Africa might be framed. 
 
 
3.2.1  The application of ‘philosophic inquiry’ 
  
Millett and Tapper (2012:548) remind us that “Philosophic inquiry is an educational 
approach that has its origins in philosophical pragmatism”. They argue that 
pragmatism “holds that knowledge is the product of inquiry, that ‘knowing’ is not merely 
the acquisition of facts external to the knower, but comes through a problem-solving 
exercise that moves from doubt to belief on the basis of evidence and inference”. For 
Millett and Tapper (2012:551), philosophic inquiry is  
 ‘thinking about thinking’. 
 ‘the quest for meaning’. 
 ‘conversation as dialogue’.  
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 ‘asking open questions’. 
 ‘creative thinking’. 
 ‘value-laden thinking’. 
 
As it is evident from this multifaceted description, philosophic inquiry is a reflective 
process that has as its major goal a transformative ending or outcome. It is Millett and 
Tapper’s (2012:552) contention that reflection is “a persistent ordered act of inquiry 
building towards considered (reflective) judgement. Such inquiry is a creative 
process”. Below I touch on some of the texts that I shall challenge, interrogate and 
rebut drawing on ‘philosophic inquiry’. 
 
A.  Penny Enslin & Kai Horsthemke (2004) 
 
In a provocative article entitled: “Can Ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education 
in African democracies?”, which appears in the journal, Comparative Education, Enslin 
and Horsthemke (2004) express doubts on the viability of Ubuntu as a model for 
citizenship education in African democracies. They argue that the 
Africanist/Afrocentrist project, in which the philosophy of Ubuntu is central, faces 
numerous problems, involves substantial political, moral, epistemological and 
educational errors, and should therefore not be the basis for education for democratic 
citizenship in the South African context. Drawing on the literature, I offer a rebuttal of 
these claims and assumptions for their Eurocentric and imperialist orientation.  
 
In my research I centre Ubuntu in African indigenous education to argue that in African 
traditional societies youngsters were initiated in a wide variety of virtues, known in 
Sesotho language as makhabane (Letseka, 2013a 2012). Thus given that Ubuntu has 
normative implications as well as constitutional value (Letseka, 2013b; Chaskalson, 
2003; Mokgoro, 1998; Goldstone, 1997), it can be argued that Ubuntu is a moral theory 
(Metz & Gaie, 2010; Metz, 2007; Teffo, 1994). Regarding  Enslin and Horsthemke’s 
(2004) attempt to cast doubt over Ubuntu’s viability as a model for citizenship 
education in African democracies, Mamdani (2002:505) is unequivocal that 
democracy is about expanding citizenship. He argues that in terms of citizenship in 
territories that are struggling to come to terms with the colonial political legacy critical 
questions that need to be asked are: “Who is indigenous? Who is a settler? When do 
settlers become natives, and how? What should be the basis of rights in a political 
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community? How do we reform the state from one that divides its population into 
settlers and natives into one that takes the distinction between residents and visitors 
as key to defining rights?” Mamdani (2002:506) suggests that “we problematise, rather 
than canonise, politically sacred cows like civil society and democracy”. For instance, 
whose democracy are Enslin and Horsthemke (2004) really worried about? Is it 
democracy as seen through the eyes of the previously privileged minority or 
democracy as seen through the eyes of the previously marginalised and under-
privileged majority African natives of South Africa? There is no doubt in my mind that 
Enslin and Horsthemke’s notion of democracy borders on the previously privileged 
minority.  
 
In his book entitled: The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of 
Knowledge, Mudimbe (1988) observes that Western interpreters as well as African 
analysts have been using categories and conceptual systems which depend on a 
Western epistemological order. He argues that even in the most explicitly ‘Afrocentric’ 
descriptions, models of analysis explicitly or implicitly, knowingly or unknowingly, refer 
to the same order. Mudimbe (1988: x) asks what seems to me the most pertinent 
question: “Does this mean that African Weltanschauungen and African traditional 
systems of thought are unthinkable and cannot be made explicit within the framework 
of their own rationality?” Smith (2008:39) argues that part of the exercise of research 
for any indigenous researcher should be about recovering our own stories of the past. 
She argues that the issue is about “reconciling and reprioritizing what is really 
important about the past with what is important about the present” Her view on the 
paradigms that look at indigenous epistemologies ‘through imperial eyes’ is that “the 
methodologies and methods of research, the theories that inform them, the questions 
which they generate and the writing styles they employ, all become significant acts 
which need to be considered carefully and critically”, in other words, to be 
'decolonised'.  
 
B. Lungisile Ntsebeza (2005) and Kristina Bentley (2005) 
 
In his book entitled: Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South 
Africa, Ntsebeza (2005) argues that a fundamental contradiction exists in the South 
African Constitution in attempts to accommodate the role of the institution of traditional 
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leadership and its incumbents in a liberal democracy based on multi-party principles 
and representative government. For him, recognising the hereditary institution of 
traditional leadership while at the same time enshrining liberal democratic principles 
based on representative government in the same Constitution constitutes a 
fundamental contradiction. In the same vein, Bentley (2005) worries about conflicts of 
rights in South Africa’s new democratic dispensation, and the particularly difficult 
challenges that such conflicts present when they entail women’s equality and claims 
of cultural recognition. She notes that the South African Constitution recognises civil 
and political, and social and economic (individual) rights and cultural (corporate or 
group) rights. However, she is concerned that “the accommodation of the claims of 
traditional leadership and the recognition of traditional communities in South Africa 
pose a great challenge to democracy and human rights” (Bentley, 2005:49). 
 
Philosophic inquiry’ prompts me to doubt the validity and soundness of Ntsebeza and 
Bentley’s assumptions above. And here is why. Enduring liberal democracies such as 
the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, Denmark, and Japan have had 
monarchies from time immemorial. But their monarchies are in no way fundamentally 
contradictory to liberal democratic principles. For instance, the UK is a liberal 
democracy that has strong monarchical roots, with the Queen serving as a 
[ceremonial] head of state who has the power to instruct the prime minister-elect to 
either form or dissolve government. Ginsburg (2009:87) writes that as head of state 
the monarch is highly respected and will limit his or her interventions in the political 
sphere. Japan is a good example of a non-Western liberal democracy that is also 
heavily steeped in monarchical traditions and cultures (Ruoff, 2001; Fujitani, 1998). In 
Chapter 1 above, I showed that historically Japan has gone through ‘cycles of 
importation of external cultures’ and ‘indigenisation’ of those cultures through 
replication and refinement. Indeed Japan can be said to the first East Asian state to 
modernise and to achieve a stable liberal democracy”. And yet, as Fukuyama (1992: 
231) points out, “Japanese culture…is much more oriented toward groups rather than 
individuals”. He elaborates: “An individual's identity is to a very high degree smothered 
in that of the group: he does not work so much for his own short-term benefit, but for 
the well-being of the larger group or groups of which he is a member. His status is 
determined less by his performance as an individual, than by the performance of his 
group”. In this regard, Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate 
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member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in 
important dimensions (Huntington, 1996; Fukuyama, 1992). 
 
I find Bentley’s (2005) challenge of the Constitution’s recognition of traditional 
communities puzzling given that South Africa is an African country whose population 
is 79.8% African; 9% Coloured; 8.7% White, and 2.5% Indian/Asian (Statistics South 
Africa, 2013). The majority of black Africans live in homesteads that are located in the 
most rural and traditional communities. Bentley (2005) seems to imply that the black 
people’s traditional communities are a danger to democracy as well as to their own 
human rights. This view is fundamentally inconsistent with Mamdani’s (2002) 
argument that democracy’s role is to expand citizenship. 
 
To briefly summarise, I have sketched the ‘research design’ for this study. While I am 
not really charmed by the positivist and technicist research culture that is inclined 
towards clearly specifying a linear approach to research – designing a research 
sample, data collection, data analysis and discussion, I acknowledged that some 
international scholarly journals have devoted special issues to debating and unpacking 
the notion of ‘research design’, perhaps as acknowledgement of the importance of 
getting clear from the outset about one’s research direction before embarking on one’s 
research endeavour. I noted that research designs are plans and procedures for 
research, and stated that my preferred ‘research design’ is 'Socrates’ ‘dialectical 
philosophy’ or ‘philosophical inquiry’. In the penultimate section below, I turn to the 
study’s ‘research methodology’.  
 
3.3  Research approach  
  
Like ‘research design’ above, the notion of ‘research methodology’ in education has 
generated much interest among the various educational and research associations, 
which have also dedicated special issues of their journals to debating its various 
nuances. For instance, volume 31, number 3 of May 2012 of Studies in Philosophy 
and Education was a special issue dedicated to the theme, “The Theory Question in 
Education and the Education Question in Theory”. The International Journal of 
Research and Method in Education dedicated volume 32, number 3 of 2009 as a 
special issue under to the theme: “European Philosophy and Theory: Some New 
65 
 
 
 
Bearings in Educational Research Methodology”. Similarly, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education dedicated two issues, volume 43, number 3, of 2009 as a special issue 
under the theme “The Question of Method in Philosophy of Education”, and volume 
40, number 2 of 2006 under the theme: “Philosophy, Methodology and Educational 
Research”. Firstly, Carr (1997:205) argues that the use of the term ‘method’ often 
refers to technical skills and modes of practice which are deemed necessary to protect 
inquiry from the intrusions of personal knowledge, subjective preferences and 
ideological beliefs. Secondly, the use of ‘method’ always requires the internalisation 
of an ethical consciousness in which, on the one hand, detachment, disinterest and 
neutrality are the major virtues, and on the other, the moral, political and educational 
commitments are the major vices. Thirdly, conforming to the requirements of ‘method’ 
entails diffidence to philosophy, history and tradition and hence to the neglect of that 
form of historical self-consciousness which any adequate understanding of the 
relationship between the pre-modern philosophical form of educational inquiry and its 
modern methodical successor presupposes and requires. 
 
The etymology of the word ‘method’, from which the noun ‘methodology’ derives, has 
its origins in methodus (Latin) and methodos (Greek), both of which imply chasing, 
going after something and ultimately finding the route towards it. Ruitenburg 
(2009:316) contends that ‘method’ “refers to the various ways and modes in which 
philosophers of education think, read, write, speak and listen, that make their work 
systematic, purposeful and responsive to past and present philosophical and 
educational concerns and conversations”. This implies that it is probably not really 
necessary for a philosopher of education to explicitly state his or her methodology 
given that the very act of philosophising about education is itself a method by which 
philosophers debate ideas and articulate their educational propositions and 
conceptual frames. For Bridges (1997:179), it follows that “it is certainly not a standard 
requirement of philosophical writing that the author explains and defends his or her 
methodology”.  
 
Hammersley (2006) argues that in most social science research there is “a crude 
distinction between methodology-as-technique and methodology-as-philosophy”. On 
the one hand, ‘Methodology-as-technique’ tends to portray research as the 
deployment of particular methods or procedures that are taken to be scientific, and 
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therefore capable of yielding objective knowledge. According to this logic, scientific 
principles and procedures are deemed “capable of demonstrating empirical 
conclusions and building knowledge, by contrast with the endless disputes and lack of 
cumulation characteristic of non-scientific fields. By definition, from this point of view, 
any science must break away from philosophy and no longer be dependent upon it” 
(Hammersley, 2006:274). But as Thompson (2012:240) points out, “the generation of 
scientific or objective knowledge is from the very beginning confronted with 
‘limitations’. These limitations have on the one hand to do with the ‘hypothetical’ quality 
of scientific knowledge in the modern era: Every conclusion remains bound to its 
related premises and methodological positions and is thus not unconditionally true”. 
 
It is therefore no coincidence that “in many universities the paradigm of research which 
is best understood and most powerful is the scientific paradigm, with all its socio-
cultural baggage of expensive equipment, large scale funding, international teams and 
half a page of collaborating authors in Nature, as well as its more intrinsic positivistic 
features of data gathering, hypothesis testing and replicability” (Bridges, 2003:21). 
Bridges’ (1997:178) major concern is that “it is easy for research to become defined in 
terms of this paradigm in a way which makes the work of social scientists look like a 
poor imitation of 'proper' science”. But as Hammersley (2006) points out, the tendency 
with ‘methodology-as-technique’ is that it overlooks the fact that doing research 
necessarily involves assumptions that sometimes require philosophical attention. For 
him, ‘methodology-as-technique’ assumes that the relevant philosophical problems 
have all been satisfactorily resolved. But this is often not the case. Quite often some 
philosophical view from the past is simply taken for granted, without recognising 
subsequent challenges to it and the methodological implications of such challenges.  
 
On the other hand, ‘methodology-as-philosophy’, which I endorse, “raises fundamental 
questions about the very pursuit of social and educational research, challenging the 
goal of knowledge, the ideal of truth and the possibility of objectivity” (Hammersley, 
2006:274). For instance, Hammersley (2006:276) argues that it “highlights the role of 
philosophical assumptions in research”, and recognises that educational research is 
always framed in terms of certain values. ‘Methodology-as-philosophy’ requires 
researchers to be explicit about what those values are, and their implications. It draws 
“the attention of educational researchers to the logical grammar of the various value-
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laden concepts that can set the framework for their research, and the relationship of 
these to matters of fact” (Hammersley, 2006:282), or what is known as ‘values 
clarification’. ‘Values clarification’ is premised on the following key assumptions: no 
goal could count as a value unless it is (1) freely chosen (2) from a number of 
alternatives (3) after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative; 
unless (4) one prized the choice and (5) was willing to affirm it publicly; and unless (6) 
one acted upon the choice (7) in repeated situation” (Simpson, 1986: 273).  
 
Thus contrary to the assumptions of ‘methodology-as-technique’, which are predicated 
on positivistic principles of value-free ‘objective knowledge’, ‘methodology-as-
philosophy’ is predicated on ‘values clarification’. It supports certain types of thinking, 
feeling, choosing, communicating, and acting. For instance, “thinking critically is 
regarded as better than thinking non-critically. Considering consequences is regarded 
as better than choosing glibly or thoughtlessly. Choosing freely is considered better 
than simply yielding to authority or peer pressure. If we urge critical thinking, then we 
value rationality. If we support moral reasoning, then we value justice; if we advocate 
divergent thinking, then we value autonomy or freedom” (Simpson, 1986:282). 
‘Methodology-as-philosophy’ resonates with Brazilian philosopher of education Paulo 
Freire’s notion of ‘dialogical education’ as well as Socrates’s method of ‘critical self-
examination’, or parrhesia - fearless speech. In one of my publications I draw on 
West’s (2004) book entitled: Democracy Matters to argue that Socratic questioning 
“wrestles with basic questions such as: What is justice? What is courage? What is 
piety? What is love? It yields intellectual integrity, philosophical humility, and personal 
sincerity” (Letseka, 2008:313). Socratic questioning and ‘methodology-as-philosophy’ 
both seek a deeper understanding of human actors and their contexts. As Guba and 
Lincoln (1994:106) point out, “human behaviour, unlike that of physical objects, cannot 
be understood without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human 
actors to their activities”. In the following sub-sections, I describe the three-pronged 
foci of this study’s research methodology, namely ‘philosophy as qualitative research 
methodology’; ‘review of literature as qualitative research methodology’, and 
‘philosophical research methodology as a paradigm’.  
 
3.3.1 Philosophy as a ‘Qualitative Research Methodology’ 
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Against the backdrop of the above sketching of ‘methodology-as-philosophy’, my 
reference to ‘methodology’ in this study shall be one that eschews some of the 
paradigms and expectations of some social scientists, especially those that emphasise 
empirical data collection techniques and “the tripartite breakdown of method into data 
gathering, data analysis and data representation” (Ruitenberg, 2009: 316). Instead my 
reference to ‘methodology’ shall be premised on the view of philosophy as a 
‘qualitative research ‘methodology’ (Sheffield, 2004). Neuman (2007:89) neatly 
captures the role of qualitative researchers as follows:   
“Qualitative researchers emphasise the social context for understanding the 
social world. They hold that the meaning of a social action or statement 
depends in an important way, on the context in which it appears. When a 
researcher removes an event, social action, answer to a question, or 
conversation from the social context in which it appears or ignores the context, 
social meaning and significance are distorted.” 
 
Heidegger (1996:14) argues that “only when philosophical research and inquiry 
themselves are grasped in an existential way - as a possibility of being of each existing 
Dasein - does it become possible at all to disclose the existentiality of existence and 
therewith to get hold of a sufficiently grounded set of ontological problems”. For 
Heidegger (1996:155), “philosophical research must for once decide to ask what mode 
of being belongs to language in general”. Thus against the backdrop of Heidegger’s 
analysis above, it can be reasonably argued that the role of philosophers as qualitative 
researchers is to “analyse, clarify, and criticise” (Sheffield, 2004:763). In addition, 
Sheffield argues that “in analysis, one reduces complex ideas or explicates human 
situations into understandable, relational concepts… Essential concepts that drive 
practice are extracted from the ‘boom and buzz’ of experience so that they may be 
more easily understood and debated”. ‘Clarification’ points to the “responsibility of 
philosophers…to challenge and ultimately clarify those constructs we use to make 
sense of the world; constructs often taken for granted rather than clarified and truly 
understood”, while “criticism means making judgments as to value”. 
 
Thompson (2012:240) argues that “the ‘philosophical method’ is about openness that 
even transforms the grounds on which we start to engage with the known or with what 
we wish to know”. She contends that “philosophical research is about a practice that 
changes our view of the world and of ourselves in it” (Thompson, 2012: 242). I use 
philosophy in this study to refer to “virtually all forms of intellectual inquiry” (Carr, 
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2006:425). As Carr (2006:422) points out, ‘methodology’ refers to the theoretical 
rationale or, ‘principles’ that justify the research methods appropriate to a field of study. 
So understood, Carr elaborates, “a methodology cannot be derived from research but 
instead has to be grounded in that form of a priori theoretical knowledge usually 
referred to as ‘philosophy”.  
 
3.3.2  Review of Literature as Qualitative Research Methodology  
 
I shall use ‘review of literature’ as a form of ‘philosophical research methodology’. I 
shall do this by interrogating the above-mentioned claims and assumptions in the 
works of Enslin and Horsthemke (2004), Ntsebeza (2005) and Bentley (2005), and 
others that shall be mentioned as the study unfolds. The planned ‘review of literature’ 
as qualitative research method shall serve two purposes: firstly, to recast the above 
claims and assumptions with a view to centring indigenous African epistemologies in 
the dominant mainstream Western conceptions of philosophy and secondly, to make 
a case against research designs and research methods [paradigms] that view 
indigenous African epistemologies through ‘imperial eyes’. I shall argue that such 
paradigms should be critically interrogated and exposed for their continued 
perpetuation of Eurocentric notions of what Apple (2000) calls ‘official knowledge’, or 
“who has been and is now seen as a legitimate ‘author’” (Apple, 2000:xxviii). It is 
Apple’s (2000:10) contention that “the politics of official knowledge are the politics of 
accords or compromises. They are usually not impositions, but signify how dominant 
groups try to create situations where the compromises that are formed favour them”.  
The planned review of literature as ‘qualitative research methodology’ shall allow me 
to broach the question: Who controls our knowledge? The answer to this question 
should lead to advocacy and mobilisation to decolonise the politics and discourses of 
dominant groups (Smith, 2008, Mazrui, 2003; Wa Thiongo, 1994). In South Africa, 
discourses emerging from previously white [whether English-speaking or Afrikaans-
speaking] privileged higher education institutions continue to entertain a perception 
that regardless of the historic political transition of 1994, the country is still under the 
influence of British liberal or conservative Afrikaner ideologies, both of which 
previously controlled conceptions of knowledge; what is knowable? And whose 
knowledge is of most worth? In the early 1980s, Kenyan novelist and playwright Ngugi 
Wa Thiongo (1994:1) made a compelling observation that “imperialism is still the root 
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cause of many problems in Africa”. He argued that “imperialism is not a slogan. It is 
real; it is palpable in content and form and in its methods and effects”. He noted that 
“imperialism is total. It has economic, political, military, cultural, and psychological 
consequences for the people of the world today” (Wa Thiongo, 1994:2). For Apple 
(2000:38), “the issue is what counts as official knowledge, making it subject to critical 
scrutiny by students, teachers, and others”.  
 
Coming back to literature review as qualitative research methodology, Boote and Beile 
(2005:3) contend that “a thorough, sophisticated literature review is the foundation and 
inspiration for substantial, useful research”. Boote and Beile (2005:4) posit that as the 
foundation of any research project, the literature review should accomplish several 
important objectives: 
 It should set the broad context of the study, clearly demarcating what is and 
what is not within the scope of the investigation, and justifying those decisions.  
 It should situate existing literature in a broader scholarly and historical context.  
 It should not only report the claims made in the existing literature. But it should 
also examine critically the research methods used to better understand whether 
the claims are warranted. 
 
For Boote and Beile (2005:9), a good literature review should be the basis of both 
theoretical and methodological sophistication, thereby improving the quality and 
usefulness of subsequent research. They argue that “very sophisticated literature 
reviews might recognise the methodological weaknesses of a field of study and 
propose new methodologies to compensate for those weaknesses”. 
 
3.3.3  Philosophical Research Methodology as a Paradigm 
 
In this study, I intend to interrogate the above-mentioned forms of ‘official knowledge’ 
by drawing on ‘philosophy research methodology’ as a paradigm. Guba and Lincoln 
(1994:105) define a paradigm as “the basic belief system or worldview that guides the 
investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically 
fundamental ways”. It is their contention that “a paradigm may be viewed as a set of 
basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimate or first principles. It represents 
a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the ‘world’, the individual’s place 
in it, and the range of possible relationships in that world and its parts” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994:107).  
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When used with reference to research, a “paradigm is an all-encompassing system of 
interrelated practice and thinking that define the nature of enquiry” (Thomas, 
2010:292). The notion of ‘paradigm’ gained prominence as a result of the publication 
of Thomas Kuhn’s seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Like Guba 
and Lincoln (1994) above, Kuhn (1996:23) defines a paradigm as “an accepted model 
or pattern”. He argues that the study of paradigms “prepares the student for 
membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later practice” 
(Kuhn, 1996:11). To that end “men whose research is based on shared paradigms are 
committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment 
and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, that is, 
for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition”.  
 
I was inducted into the philosophy of education research paradigm at the University of 
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in the 1980s under the guidance of Professors 
Penny Enslin and Wally Morrow. That induction was consolidated in the mid-1990s at 
the Institute of Education, University of London where I was a postgraduate research 
student in philosophy of education under the tutelage of Professor John White. The 
commitment of the above-mentioned philosophers to the discipline of philosophy of 
education, coupled with the provocative philosophical questions they raised and 
debated in education, provided solid building blocks that inspired my immersion in the 
philosophy of education’s scientific community. Kuhn (1996:11) argues that 
“acquisition of a paradigm and of the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign 
of maturity in the development of any given scientific field”. Fundamentally though, 
paradigms are useful tools for explaining and understanding social reality. They “gain 
their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few 
problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognise as acute” (Kuhn, 
1996:23). To that end, “paradigms guide research by direct modelling as well as 
through abstracted rules” (Kuhn, 1996:47). 
 
Guba (1990:18) notes that paradigms are marked by the way their proponents respond 
to three basic questions, which can be characterised by the ontological, the 
epistemological, and the methodological questions. These questions are:  
 Ontological: What is the nature of the ‘knowable’? Or, what is the nature of 
reality?   
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 Epistemological: What is the nature of the relationship between the knower (the 
inquirer) and the known (or knowable)? 
 Methodological: How should the inquirer go about finding out knowledge? 
 
Guba contends that answers to these questions “are the starting points or given that 
determine what the inquiry is and how it is to be practised”. Crucially, Guba (1990:19) 
argues that all belief systems or paradigms are human constructions that are subject 
to all the errors and foibles that inevitably accompany human endeavours. They are 
not static or fixed. Instead they are porous, fluid, always shifting and taking new forms.  
A paradigm shift entails “a change in the beliefs, values and techniques that guide 
scientific inquiry” (Lather, 1992:89). Thus a “new paradigm ought to replace the old 
one”, and “enable us to view the old one in new light” (Alexander, 2006:209). For Kuhn 
(1996:109), “when paradigms change, there are usually significant shifts in the criteria 
determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solutions”. But Guba 
(1990:27) cautions that a “new paradigm will not be a closer approximation of the truth; 
it will simply be more informed and sophisticated than those we are now entertaining”. 
 
In summary, I have contrasted between ‘methodology-as-technique’ and 
‘methodology-as-philosophy’. I have argued that ‘methodology-as-technique’ is based 
on a paradigm of research that is presumed to yield ‘objective knowledge’, while the 
assumptions of ‘methodology-as-philosophy’ recognise the centrality of values to 
research. I stated that given that my aim in this study is to philosophise about 
education and that my research method shall be philosophy as ‘qualitative research 
methodology’. The latter is predicated on ‘philosophic inquiry’. There is tacit 
understanding among philosophers of education that ‘philosophic inquiry’ counts as 
method in so far as it is systematic and based on critical self-examination.   
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to describe my preferred ‘research design’ 
and ‘research methodology’. I noted that the notions of ‘research design’ and ‘research 
methodology’ have generated wide interest among professional associations and their 
scholarly journals, which have devoted Special Issues towards attaining deeper 
understanding the two notions. I highlighted the fact that ‘research design’ and 
‘research methodology’ are contested issues that warrant a critical philosophical 
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clarification. I acknowledged that ‘research design’ and ‘research methodology’ are 
necessary for clarifying one’s research paradigm. However, given the philosophical 
nature of this study I indicated that a suitable ‘research design’ would be ‘dialectical 
philosophy’ or ‘philosophical inquiry’. I contrasted ‘methodology-as-technique’, which 
pertains to the hard sciences and relies more on analysis of statistical data to make 
inferences; and ‘methodology-as-philosophy, which recognises the centrality of values 
to understanding social phenomena. To that end, and given that this study shall be 
ineliminably philosophical, I stated that my preferred paradigm shall be philosophy as 
research methodology. In the next chapter, I turn to liberalism in South Africa. I shall 
flash out liberalism’s complexities and contestations, as well as the challenges of 
liberalism’s survival in South Africa whose ruling tripartite alliance has Marxist-Leninist 
leanings. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Some political commentators have expressed doubts on the viability of liberal 
democracy in Africa in general, and in South Africa in particular (Biko, 2005; 1972; 
Makgoba, 1998; Gilliomee, 1995; Ake, 1993). For instance, Ake (1993:243) argues 
that “the familiar assumptions and political arrangements of liberal democracy make 
little sense in Africa. Liberal democracy assumes individualism, but there is little 
individualism in Africa”. For Ake (1996:132), Africa needs “a social democracy that 
places emphasis on concrete political, social, and economic rights, as opposed to a 
liberal democracy that emphasises abstract political rights”. Similarly, Makgoba 
(1998:272) argues that “individualistic liberalism flies totally against most things that 
Africans have stood for and cherished - Ubuntu, humanism, tolerance, the elimination 
of racial and class divisions, and the emphasis on society”. Gilliomee (1995:97-98) 
takes issue with the view that “South Africa represents enough of a common society 
to provide a sufficiently stable base for a well-functioning liberal democracy”. His view 
is that “South Africa lacks the social requisites associated with the consolidation of 
liberal democracies: broad-based economic development and national homogeneity” 
(Gilliomee, 1995:84). However, Gillomee’s view above is at odds with liberalism’s 
distinctive feature of ‘openness to pluralism’ despite a lack of homogeneity among 
members (Geuss, 2002). As Downing and Thigpen (1993:1050) point out, “liberals 
assume that because there will be a plurality of life plans in a free society, insistence 
on a common good would bring conflict; persons and groups would attempt to further 
their own ways of life through government”.  
 
The above concerns about liberalism in South Africa are not necessarily unfounded. 
As Welsh (1998:1) observes, liberalism in South Africa has been “diffused and lacking 
in organisational focus”. Enslin (1999:180) notes that it continues to be “widely 
derided, or at best ignored as irrelevant to South African affairs”. Some have argued 
that liberalism “has never been a dominant force in South African politics” (Waghid, 
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2003:81). For Makgoba (1998:284), white liberals in particular remain “unpopular 
because in the eyes of the majority and the international community they are subtle 
racists”. Yet, and ironically “political organisations like the National Party and the ANC, 
neither of whom could be described as liberal, could agree on an essentially liberal 
form of state” (Welsh, 1998:28). 
 
From time immemorial, liberalism has either been celebrated and defended (Gaus, 
2000; Gutmann, 1985, Rawls, 1999), or contested (Abbey, 2005; Abbey, 2004; 
Cobbah, 1987; Gray, 1978), scoffed at and reviled (Biko, 2005; Makgoba, 1998; Ake, 
1993). For instance, on the one hand, Gaus (2000:180) contends that “the twentieth 
century was a surprisingly liberal century ….Consensus on the pre-eminence of the 
liberal ideals of liberty and markets appears well-nigh universal”. He argues that by 
the close of the twentieth century “liberalism has apparently defeated, or has certainly 
got the upper hand on its traditional rivals” (Gaus, 2000:195). While Gutmann 
(1985:310) mounts a defence against claims that “liberal politics is philosophically 
indefensible”. On the other hand, Abbey (2004:11) informs us that “Taylor draws 
attention to the ways in which certain interpretations of liberalism shape and distort 
our thinking about what is normal, necessary, or possible in politics”, while Geuss 
(2002:320) finds “signs of a significant theoretical, moral, and political disaffection with 
some aspects of liberalism”. Geuss (2002:320-321) argues that “liberalism has for a 
long time seemed to lack much inspirational potential; it is good at dissolving traditional 
modes of life and their associated values, but less obviously good at replacing them 
with anything particularly distinctive or admirable”. 
 
That there is such a wide diversity of views on liberalism is not unusual. Evans 
(1999:117) contends that “being aware of the great diversity within the liberal tradition, 
no sensible liberal would be prepared to offer a substantial and rigidly specified 
characterisation of that which makes a doctrine ‘liberal’”. Similarly, Holmes (1995:13) 
observes that “the political theorists who have most cogently articulated and defended 
liberal aspirations - Milton, Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, Beccaria, 
Blackstone, Smith, Kant, Bentham, Madison, Hamilton, Constant, Tocqueville, and J. 
S. Mill - were deeply immersed in contemporary controversies. Each spent his life 
responding to local challenges, defending specific reforms, struggling with 
circumscribed problems”. It is his contention that “their epistemologies and 
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metaphysical beliefs were sometimes diametrically opposed to each other’s. They also 
deviated from one another on a wide range of policy questions”. As a result, “none can 
be fully understood if plucked ahistorically from his political and intellectual context 
and forced to march in a canonical parade of liberal greats”.  
 
Like their predecessors above, contemporary liberal theorists are also grappling with 
contestations around various articulations of liberalism (Galston, 2005, 1991; Rawls, 
1999, 1996; Waldron, 1987; Enslin, 1986; Berlin, 1969). It is clear that liberalism is an 
“essentially contested concept” (Abbey, 2005; Gray, 1978) that is also ‘complex’ 
(Simhony, 2003:283). Therefore, I argue that South Africa’s appeal to liberalism should 
be viewed as a manifestation of the many proliferations of liberalism referred to above. 
To that end, there should not be any doubt as to whether South Africa should or should 
not be a liberal democratic state. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I explore the basic 
principles that liberals generally value. This exploration is necessary given that “South 
Africa’s new democratic order and its education system presuppose some critical 
distinguishing features of liberalism” (Enslin, 1999:175). I should indicate from the 
outset that throughout this study I shall use the term ‘liberalism’ in its classical form to 
mean a political theory that is concerned with the principle of liberty and the rights of 
people to associate, assemble, move, and to freely express themselves. In the second 
section I sketch the contestations of liberalism in South Africa with a view to 
ascertaining whether the context-specific contestations necessarily negate the 
broader value of liberalism as a political theory. Unlike scholars such as Biko (2005), 
Makgoba (1998) and Gilliomee (1995) who reject liberalism, in the third section I 
explore the plausibility of liberalism in South Africa against the backdrop of the 
country’s constitution, which has been hailed worldwide as ‘liberal’ and ‘egalitarian’. 
However, Geuss (2002:333) cautions that “in its origin, liberalism had no ambition to 
be universal either in claiming to be valid for everyone and every human society or in 
the sense of purporting to give an answer to all the important questions of human life”. 
With this in mind, it seems reasonable to argue that South African has every right to 
appropriate elements of liberalism that pertain to its socio-political and cultural 
imperatives. Given that large sections of South Africa remain rural and communal, it 
can be argued that the country might consider appropriating elements of liberalism 
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that are generally associated with the politics of consensus. As Geuss (2002:326) 
points us, “what is distinctive about liberalism isn’t ... so much its openness to pluralism 
as its view that all societies should be seen as capable of attaining consensus, despite 
a lack of homogeneity in the manners, beliefs, and habits of their members”.  
 
In the third section I grapple with the ideological challenges facing South Africa as an 
African liberal democracy whose ruling tripartite alliance is inclined to Marxism-
Leninism. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) are self-declared converts of Marxism-Leninism and 
its political strategy of ‘national democratic revolution’. The two [COSATU and the 
SACP] are in a strategic political alliance with the African National Congress (ANC). 
In the larger scheme of things this marriage is unsustainable. However, I shall argue 
that the ANC, which is the lead partner in the tripartite alliance, is more community-
oriented and less attuned to the aspirations of organised labour like COSATU and the 
SACP. Moreover, given its majority support base, the ANC has effectively 
hegemonised the alliance. Against the backdrop of these observations, it seems 
unlikely that South Africa’s liberal project will be nullified by the Marxist-Leninist stance 
of both COSATU and the SACP. In the final section I shall offer some concluding 
remarks. I now turn to the basic principles that liberals generally value. 
 
4.2  Basic principles of liberalism   
 
4.2.1 Values and assumptions of liberalism 
 
Enslin (1984:3) posits that “the necessary and most fundamental formal characteristic 
of liberal ideas is that they defend the principle of liberty or freedom”. For Waldron 
(1987:130), “liberty is a concept which captures what is distinctive and important in 
human agency as such and in the untrammelled exercise of the powers of individual 
deliberation, choice, and the intentional initiation of action”. Historically, liberal political 
philosophy is closely linked with the Enlightenment. Waldron (1987:134) posits that 
“the relationship between liberal thought and the legacy of the Enlightenment cannot 
be stressed too strongly. The Enlightenment was characterised by a burgeoning 
confidence in the human ability to make sense of the world, to grasp its regularities 
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and fundamental principles, to predict its future, and to manipulate its powers for the 
benefit of mankind”. It is Waldron’s view that “after millennia of ignorance, terror, and 
superstition, cowering before forces it could not understand nor control, mankind faced 
the prospect of being able at last to build a human world in which it might feel safely 
and securely at home”.  
 
Gray (1995:17) concurs and argues that “throughout the latter half of the 18th  century, 
the history of liberalism in continental Europe and the spread of the Enlightenment 
must be regarded as aspects of one and the same current of thought and practice”. It 
is his contention that “the sine qua non of the liberal state in all its varieties is that 
governmental power and authority be limited by a system of constitutional rules and 
practices in which individual liberty and the equality of persons under the rule of law 
are respected” (Gray,1995:71-72). This point is endorsed by Waldron (1987:130) who 
contends as follows: “in politics, liberals are committed to intellectual freedom, freedom 
of speech, association, and civil liberties generally. In the realm of personal life, they 
raise their banners for freedom of religious belief and practice, freedom of lifestyle, 
and freedom  (provided again that it is genuine freedom for everyone  involved) in 
regard to sexual practices, marital affairs, pornography, the use of drugs and all those 
familiar liberal concerns”. Thus, “liberals insist on the importance of rights, including 
the right of people to practice their religion as they see fit, to speak for and assemble 
around causes in which they believe, and to possess a significant degree of control 
over their personal livelihood” (Wolfe, 2009:11). Wolfe (2009:11) posits that “liberals 
believe that individuals live within an ordered world that necessarily constraints the 
ability of people to do whatever they want whenever they want to do it”. However, he 
is quick to point out that for liberals, “such constraints are not imposed by authorities 
over which people have no control or shaped by traditions they cannot influence; they 
are established instead by people themselves through some form of consent or social 
contract. Independence cannot exist without interdependence”.    
 
Cobbah (1987:312) contends that “the political philosophy of liberalism was largely a 
reaction to medieval thought. It was a philosophical opposition to traditional authority 
that was based on divine wisdom, religion, and the common law”. For him, it was 
Thomas Hobbes who introduced the idea of human rights as a conception of human 
nature in which individuals possess natural rights to all the objects of their desire 
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(Cobbah, 1987:313). Cobbah (1987:312) notes that Hobbes conceived of a right as 
the “liberty each man has to use his own power as he will himself, for the preservation 
of his own nature - that is to say, his own life”. In the same vein, John Locke (1993) 
rejected medieval notions of authority and envisioned individuals stripped of all 
historical loyalties and beliefs, pursuing their security, within a community in which 
they could appoint a ruler, who would govern subject to remaining acceptable to the 
community. One of my aims in this study is to highlight the plausibility for 
crosspollination or cross-purposes3 between some traditional African values and some 
liberal values.  
 
Similarly, Susser (1995:59) posits that “liberalism represented a revolt of the rising 
urban middle class of merchants and entrepreneurs against the pre-modern alliance 
of throne, sword, and alter - the absolute monarchy, the feudal aristocratic order, and 
the vast powers of the church”. Liberalism is “a theory about what makes political 
action - and in particular the enforcement and maintenance of a social and political 
order - morally legitimate” (Waldron, 1987:140). Writing on the specific South African 
liberal tradition, Welsh (1998:1-2) identifies the following as “the core values of 
liberalism”: 
 A commitment to fundamental human rights and those procedural safeguards 
known as the rule of law; 
 A commitment to constitutionalism, meaning that the state and government are 
to operate under law and that certain fundamental principles must remain 
beyond the reach of any (temporary) government;4 
 A belief in equality (whose exact parameters remain a matter of on-going 
debate, but implying at least equality before the law) and (for most liberals) the 
dismantling of entrenched political, economic, and social inequalities; 
 An emphasis on the primacy of the individual as the possessor of inalienable 
rights, though by no means, as critics allege, unmindful of the need for, and 
claims of community;  
 Tolerance of conflicting viewpoints (spelled out with force in John Stuart Mill’s 
essay On Liberty). Tolerance is perhaps the logical consequence of the right to 
                                                          
3 I borrow the notion of ‘cross-purposes’ from the work of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. See 
Charles Taylor. 1991. Cross-purposes: the liberal-communitarian debate. In Nancy Rosenblum (ed) 
Liberalism and the Moral Life, Harvard University Press: Massachusetts. 
4 Section 9 (3), chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa resonates with Welsh’s 
second core value of liberalism above as well as the view expressed by David Gray (1995) above. It 
reads as follows: “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth”.  
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freedom of expression, but its centrality in liberal thinking requires that it be 
regarded as a separate principle;  
 An optimistic belief in the possibilities of individual and social ‘improvement’  
with the implication that no individual, community, or society is irretrievably 
damned as hopeless; and  
 Compassion. 
 
Welsh acknowledges South Africa’s communal imperatives with reference to the 
importance of community in bullets four and six. It is my view that community [however 
it might be conceived] is an essential component of the liberal tradition. Indeed there 
is consensus among some liberals that “liberalism is itself a form of community” 
(Galston, 1991:43), whose members “excel in liberal virtues and as a consequence, 
flourish in a distinctively liberal way” (Macedo, 1991:278). Some liberals have 
suggested that “liberalism supplies the best interpretation of a political community” 
(Dworkin, 1989:480), that “the lives of individual people and that of their community 
are integrated”, and that “the critical success of any one of their lives is an aspect of, 
and so is dependent on the goodness of the community as a whole” (Dworkin, 
1989:491). On the contrary, others have argued that “the inseparability of rights and 
community is a consistent liberal position” (Simhony, 2003:271). As Abbey and Taylor 
(1996:3) point out, “it is possible for someone to have communitarian or holist ontology 
and to value liberalism’s individual rights”. However, in my view, Mulhall (1987: 275) 
is spot on in his endorsement of the place of the individual in a community. He argues 
that the liberal “need have no difficulty in accepting the constitutive role of community 
membership”. Mulhall further argues that “liberals must indeed affirm that the political 
community's institutions embody a vision relating to personhood, that is, they must 
affirm that such institutions protect that capacity which makes an individual citizen a 
human agent and so refer to a capacity which every citizen is supposed to possess if 
he is to be seen as a person at all”.  
 
The above-sketched liberal values presuppose development and consolidation of a 
range of virtues that are necessary for individual flourishing in a liberal society. But as 
Johnston (1994:18) cautions, “liberal values have to be interpreted, and the 
differences of interpretation that arise when these values are elaborated into a full 
theory distinguish different liberal theories from one another”. Downing and Thigpen 
(1993: 1046) contend that “the viability of a liberal society depends on its ability to 
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engender a virtuous citizenry”. Thus, liberals tend “to emphasise political virtues”. 
Some of the liberal philosophers who have contributed to the debate on the virtues 
include William Galston (1991), Steven Macedo (1991) and Amy Gutmann (1989, 
1985). A communitarian philosopher who has contributed immensely to the debate on 
virtue and who warrants mention is Alasdair MacIntyre in his book entitled: After Virtue: 
A Study in Moral Theory. The virtues can be briefly summed up as those key attributes 
and personal qualities that the citizenry needs “if democracies are to remain stable” 
(Sabl, 2005:212). The virtues are so important to most liberal nation states that they 
are deemed “most worth defending” (Sabl, 2005:208).  Below I briefly sketch 
conceptions of virtue in a liberal context, and conceptions of virtue in a communitarian 
context. 
 
4.2.2 Liberal conceptions of virtue 
 
Downing and Thigpen (1993: 1054) contend that “if liberals understand the common 
good not as a view of the good life for persons but rather as arrangements that 
enhance the lives of people generally, then the virtues may be viewed as 
predispositions that must be widely shared in order to attain the liberal common good”. 
In this respect “the liberal state may promote virtue by creating institutions and 
programmes to foster and preserve certain virtues” (Downing & Thigpen, 1993: 1057). 
But what are virtues? And why are they so important to a political order? In 1988, 
Galston published an article entitled: “Liberal virtues” in American Political Science 
Review. He later republished it as a chapter in his book entitled: Liberal Purposes: 
Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State. For my purpose in this section, I 
shall draw on the latter version to try and answer some of the questions above.      
 
Galston (1991) demarcates the virtues into general virtues - courage, law-abidingness, 
and loyalty; virtues of the liberal society - individualism and diversity; virtues of the 
liberal economy - work ethic, achievement, a mean between ascetic self-denial and 
untrammelled self-gratification, and adaptability, and virtues of liberal politics – 
citizenship, leadership, and general politics. In addition, Galston (1991:217) argues 
that “the liberal virtues are the traits of character liberalism needs, not necessarily the 
ones it has”. Galston (1991:215) argues that John Locke “teaches a set of moral 
virtues that make men able to respect themselves and be useful to one another both 
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in private and in public life”. For me this stands as the most important justification why 
we should all be committed not only to teaching about the virtues, but also to seeking 
ways of promoting them at all times.  
 
Galston (1991:221) insists that “some of the virtues needed to sustain the liberal state 
are requisites of every political community”. He posits that “individual virtue (or 
excellence - the Greek arete will bear both meanings) is knowable through everyday 
experience, definable through philosophic inquiry, and is always and everywhere the 
same” (Galston (1991:217). We should be cautious though with regard to general 
virtues such as, for example, courage and loyalty. As MacIntyre (2007:200) warns, 
“courage sometimes sustains injustice”, while “loyalty has been known to strengthen 
a murderous aggressor”.  
  
While the bulk of the above analysis covers liberal virtues as means to an end, Galston 
also explores liberal virtues as ends in themselves. For instance, he argues that “If we 
look to human nature, we are led to focus on the virtues as intrinsic goods – that is, as 
the active dispositions that constitute our good, excellence, or perfection qua human 
beings. If we look to human circumstances, we emphasise the virtues as instrumental 
goods - that is, as dispositions that enable us to perform well the specific tasks 
presented by our situation” (Galston, 2005: 76).  
 
Galston (1991:229) grapples with the question “whether there is a conception of the 
virtuous or excellent individual linked intrinsically to liberal theory and seen as 
valuable, not instrumentally, but for its own sake.” He notes that the liberal tradition 
“suggests three conceptions of the intrinsic individual excellence, overlapping yet 
distinct”. The first is “the Lockean conception of excellence as rational liberty of self-
direction”. ‘Self-direction’ is also known as ‘autonomy’ – “the capacity to form, pursue, 
and revise life plans in the light of our personal commitments and circumstances” 
(Enslin, 1993; Galston, 1991).  The second is “the Kantian account of the capacity to 
act in accordance with the precept of duty - that is, to make duty the effective principle 
of personal conduct and to resist the promptings of passion and interest in so far as 
they are incompatible with this principle” (Galston, 1991:229). The third is “adapted in 
different ways from Romanticism by John Stuart Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry 
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David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman; it is the understanding of excellence as the full 
flowering of individuality” (Galston, 1991:230). 
 
Sabl (2005:208) is concerned that advocates of virtue in the US tend to speak across 
one another. For instance, Galston stresses the bourgeois and integrative virtues; 
Macedo stresses the Millian or anti-traditionalist liberalism that praises openness to 
eccentric lifestyle choices, and explicitly calls family and career duties into doubt, while 
Gutmann assumes a Deweyan, progressive ideal, whereby the worth of liberal 
democracy lies in a constant and collective rational examination of all social practices, 
so that those that can no longer be defended may be exposed and discarded. Sabl 
(2005: 213) argues that “it is easy to imagine that some citizen virtues could be 
necessary for the survival of liberal democracy, while others might be less necessary 
but conducive to its perfection or flourishing”. But as I mentioned above, this is not 
unusual, and in fact it should be expected given that liberalism does not flourish on 
homogeneity but allows for diversity and plurality of life plans in a free society.  
 
Galston (2005:80) argues that the virtues “are guides to (or aspects of) living well”. He  
contends that “beyond the virtues needed to sustain all political communities are 
virtues specific to liberal communities - those required by the liberal spheres of society, 
economy, and polity” (Galston, 1991:222). He is convinced that “the viability of liberal 
society depends on its ability to engender a virtuous citizenry” (Galston, 1991: 217). 
He suggests that “the political community should structure its institutions and policies 
to promote virtue in its citizens, and its worth as a community depends on the extent 
to which it achieves that goal” (Galston, 1991: 217-218). This study is really about how 
South Africa’s education system can develop virtuous citizens.   
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3  Communitarian conception of virtue 
                             
I mentioned above that Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the most 
important moral philosophers who has contributed immensely to the debate on virtue. 
A brief consideration of MacIntyre’s views on virtue is necessary given that he debates 
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virtue from a communitarian point of view, which resonates with South Africa’s 
communal and interdependent socio-cultural context. The Constitution of South Africa 
has been hailed as “a model liberal democratic constitution that has few peers in the 
world community” (Jordan, 1996); that bears “the hallmarks of liberal democracy” 
(Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004:552; Dugard, 1998:23). Moreover, it “is widely hailed as 
liberal and egalitarian” (Deveaux,  2003:162) because “it values human dignity and 
frames human rights at its heart” (Robinson, 2012:2). However, the same constitution 
recognises the institution of traditional leadership, whose claim to power is by birth 
right and not by democratic processes and procedures. However, I want to argue that 
notwithstanding this seeming contradiction, South Africa seeks to build a socio-political 
future based on the amalgamation of traditional African values and liberal democratic 
values. As a result, an understanding of how the notion of virtue is conceived and 
cultivated in the traditional African polity that embraces liberal democratic values is of 
critical importance to this study. 
 
Briefly, MacIntyre (2007:191) defines a virtue as “an acquired human quality the 
possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which 
are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving 
any such goods”. For MacIntyre, this is an adequate definition that “illuminates the 
place of the virtues in human life”. Without the virtues the goods internal to practices 
are “barred to us, but not just barred to us generally, barred in a very particular way”. 
Furthermore, MacIntyre (2007:194-195) contends that “the exercise of the virtues is 
itself apt to require a highly determinate attitude to social and political issues; and it is 
always within some particular community with its own specific institutional forms that 
we learn or fail to learn to exercise the virtues”. He posits that “one of the features of 
the concept of a virtue which has emerged with some clarity… is that it always requires 
for its application the acceptance for some prior account of certain features of social 
and moral life in terms of which it has to be defined and explained” (MacIntyre, 
2007:186). To that end, “it is one of the tasks of parental authority to make children 
grow up so as to be virtuous adults” (MacIntyre, 2007:195). He elaborates: “for what 
education in the virtues teaches me is that my good as a man is one and the same as 
the good of those others with whom I am bound up in human community” (MacIntyre, 
2007: 229). 
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To summarise, I have sketched the basic principles that the liberals value. I have 
highlighted the fact that liberals generally insist on the importance of the rights of 
individuals to assemble, to associate, and to express their views under the rule of law. 
Crucially though, I underscored the importance of community to liberalism given that 
liberalism is a form of community in which members flourish in a distinctively liberal 
way. I have expounded on the notion of virtue and suggested that polities can promote 
virtue by creating institutions and programmes that foster certain virtues. This is 
because virtues constitute our good, excellence, or perfection as human beings. 
Indeed the viability of most polities is dependent on their ability to engender virtuous 
citizens. It is therefore ironic that even against the backdrop of the above analysis of 
the underlying values and assumptions of liberalism there are still contestations in 
Africa generally, and in South Africa in particular, about the viability of liberalism. I 
noted that South Africa’s liberal tradition is diffused and lacking in organisational focus; 
that it is widely derided and ignored as irrelevant to South African affairs, and that even 
the ruling African National Congress (ANC) does not regard itself as liberal. In the next 
section I sketch contestations around liberalism in South Africa with a view to 
ascertaining whether in the last instance, such contestations negate the broader value 
of liberalism as a political philosophy and theory.   
 
4.3  Contestations around liberalism in South Africa  
 
In South Africa, the liberal tradition has always been regarded as in disarray. For 
instance, it has been described as “diffused and lacking in organisational focus” 
(Welsh, 1998:1), and as “widely derided, or at best ignored as irrelevant to South 
African affairs” (Enslin, 1999:180). As also Waghid (2003:81) points out, liberalism 
“has never been a dominant force in South African politics. Yet, the liberal tradition in 
South Africa has a long and distinguished history which acquired an organised and 
political voice in the Liberal and Progressive Federal Parties since the 1950s”. How 
did it all start to fall apart for liberalism in South Africa? Liberalism was severely tested 
during apartheid, and it failed dismally. However, I should mention that this perceived 
failure should not detract from the good work of liberal leaders such as Alan Paton, 
Colin Elgin, Patrick Duncan, Zach de Beer as well as notable female leaders such as 
Margaret Ballinger and Helen Suzman, who opposed apartheid from within the 
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country’s parliamentary structures, and received wide acclaim for their efforts. Waghid 
(2003:82) sheds light on the matter in his observation that even though the white 
liberals were “committed to the creation of a liberal democracy in South Africa”, the 
Progressive Federal Party “was not the liberal or even a liberal party, although it 
inherited some aspects of South African political liberalism”. In fact “its history has 
been far too diverse and complicated simply to depict it as a pure liberal party”.  
 
Without doubt the fiercest critic of the liberal tradition in South Africa was Steve Biko, 
leader of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) who died in police custody in 
1977 while detained under the Terrorism Act of 1967. Dugard (1978:136) observes 
that “although designed to combat terrorism, the Terrorism Act has itself become an 
instrument of terror”. Biko (1972:5) argued that “the thesis, the antithesis and the 
synthesis have been mentioned by some great philosophers as the cardinal points 
around which any social revolution revolves. For the liberals, the thesis is apartheid, 
the antithesis is non-racialism and the synthesis very feebly defined”. Biko argued that 
“Black Consciousness defines the situation differently. The thesis is in fact a strong 
white racism and therefore, the antithesis to this must, ipso facto, be a strong solidarity 
amongst the blacks on whom this racism seeks to prey. Out of these two situations we 
can therefore hope to reach some kind of balance - a true humanity where power 
politics will have no place”. Biko (1972:5) argued that “the failure of the liberals is in 
fact that their antithesis is a watered-down version of the truth whose close proximity 
to the thesis will nullify the purported balance”.  
 
However, Biko’s views should be considered in the context of the BCM, which he led 
during the volatile period of the 1970s. What then is Black Consciousness (BC)? Biko 
(1972:6) defined BC as follows:  
“In essence this is an attitude of mind and a way of life. It is the most positive 
call to emanate from the Black world for a long time. Its unadulterated 
quintessence is the realisation by the Black man of the need to rally together 
with his brothers around the cause of their oppression - the blackness of their 
skin - and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that 
bind them to perpetual servitude. It is based on a self-examination which has 
ultimately led them to believe that by seeking to run away from themselves and 
to emulate the White man they are insulting the intelligence of whoever created 
them Black”. 
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With regard to liberals, Biko (2005:20) observed that “these are the people who argue 
that they are not responsible for white racism and the country's ‘inhumanity to the black 
man’. These are the people who claim that they too feel the oppression just as acutely 
as the blacks and therefore should be jointly involved in the black man's struggle for a 
place under the sun. In short, these are the people who say that they have black souls 
wrapped up in white skins”. Biko (2005:20) was contemptuous towards white liberals’ 
“insistence that the problems of the country can only be solved by a bilateral approach 
involving both black and white”. He queried that “the integration they talk about is first 
of all artificial in that it is a response to conscious manoeuvre rather than to the dictates 
of the inner soul... the people forming the integrated complex have been extracted 
from various segregated societies with their inbuilt complexes of superiority and 
inferiority and these continue to manifest themselves even in the ‘non-racial’ set-up of 
the integrated complex”. Thus “the integration so achieved is a one-way course, with 
the whites doing all the talking and the blacks the listening”.  
 
For Biko (2005:22), South Africa’s white liberals were only playing games. He argued 
that “they are claiming a ‘monopoly on intelligence and moral judgment’ and setting 
the pattern and pace for the realisation of the black man’s aspirations. They want to 
remain in good books with both the black and white worlds. They want to shy away 
from all forms of ‘extremisms’, condemning ‘white supremacy’ as being just as bad as 
‘Black Power!’. They vacillate between the two worlds, verbalising all the complaints 
of the blacks beautifully while skilfully extracting what suits them from the exclusive 
pool of white privileges”. Biko did not find any honesty in white liberals’ anti-apartheid 
protests. He argued that “their protests are directed at and appeal to white conscience, 
everything they do is directed at finally convincing the white electorate that the black 
man is also a man and that at some future date he should be given a place at the white 
man's table”. Hook (2011) describes this attitude as “an attempted demonstration of 
non-complicity”.  
 
Biko’s views above are consistent with Franz Fanon’s (1986) views on the ‘white man’, 
which he sketches in Black Skin, White Masks. Fanon (1986: 128) argues that “the 
white man wants the world; he wants it for himself alone. He finds himself predestined 
master of this world. He enslaves it. An acquisitive relation is established between the 
world and him”. It is Fanon’s (1986:133) contention that “the theoretical and practical 
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assertion of the supremacy of the white man is its thesis; the position of negritude as 
an antithetical value is the moment of negativity”. To that end, Fanon (1986:11) was 
uncompromising that “the white man is sealed in his whiteness. The black man in his 
blackness”. 
 
Biko’s anti-white liberal views have found expression in the writings of William 
Makgoba. Like Biko, Makgoba (1998:278) argues that during apartheid “there was a 
subtle but major distinction in objectives between the fight of the oppressed and that 
of the liberals, and it was this: the oppressed fought for the removal of all forms of 
racism, the crude and the molecular types (sometimes referred to as subliminal, 
subtle, or unintentional racism), while the white liberals fought to protect privilege and 
remove only the crude form of racism”. Makgoba (1998:278) insists that white liberals 
“could not fight to remove the subtle version, which is part of their life, their 
socialisation, their culture, and history”, for the simple reason that “this form is 
generally linked to privilege. Privilege, the sense of identity and culture offered by 340 
years of colonisation and apartheid, could not simply be erased by ushering in a 
genuine democracy”.  
 
My view is that Makgoba’s analysis misses the bigger picture. While white liberals 
were peripheral to the very architecture of apartheid’s obnoxious policies and 
legislation they mounted the struggle against apartheid from within the system’s 
parliamentary structures, where they had representation by virtue of being white. And 
while they might have failed dismally, their failure was not in vain. Let us take 
Makgoba’s ‘privilege’ thesis for instance. It does not explain how the multi-party 
democracy that is now in full swing in South Africa was actually ushered from within 
the ranks of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party. History will testify that it was the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Party (NP) which began negotiations with the ANC in exile for the eventual 
handover of power. Gumede (2007:31) notes that “Anglo American, which had an 
office in Lusaka, Zambia, less than a stone’s throw from the ANC’s headquarters, 
made overtures in 1985 to exiled ANC leader Oliver Tambo”. It is Gumede’s view that 
“this was the beginning of a series of meetings between the ANC and white local 
business leaders, non-governmental figures and opposition party members”. In 1988, 
PW Botha, who is FW de Klerk’s predecessor in the leadership of the NP “instructed 
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his chief of intelligence, Niel Barnard, to meet Mandela in jail and find out what the 
ANC positions were on a negotiated settlement”.  
 
As a consequence, in February 1990 when South Africa’s president de Klerk made 
the historical announcement in Parliament to unban all liberation struggle movements 
- the ANC, PAC, and SACP, and to free Nelson Mandela (Gumede, 2007; Webster, 
2000), he was only completing the political process that was started in the 1980s by 
his predecessors. The logic behind these initiatives, Gumede (2007:32) argues, was 
that “if the National Party government made the first move, the ANC alliance would be 
placed on the defensive”? Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (2013:33), senior research 
professor at the University of the Free State argues that “at a critical moment in South 
African politics, de Klerk listened to the voices that called for change. He was not blind 
to the unpalatable reality that it was time for apartheid to go – whatever pressures 
prevailed to ‘force’ him, as some might say, to release Nelson Mandela in February 
1990, and to use his power to call a referendum in March 1992 to determine white 
voters’ support for political negotiations”. The point of this lengthy historical chronicle 
is to show that it was the Afrikaners, architects of apartheid, who made a conscious 
decision to relinquish their position of privilege that was acquired and institutionalised 
during years of apartheid rule. 
 
Makgoba (1998:283) charges South Africa’s English-speaking liberals of failing “to 
engage with the system of identity, values, and culture that are central to and hold 
together the oppressed majority. They have failed to engage with African culture as 
part of their socialisation...Yet they live within a sea of Africans. Instead they have from 
a superior position tended to expect the African simply to imbibe their culture and 
language”. In an interesting twist of irony Enslin (1999), who is a staunch defender of 
liberalism,5 and Makgoba’s fiercest critic in the areas of Africanism/Afrocentrism and 
Ubuntu,6 agrees with Makgoba. Enslin 1999:180), argues that in South Africa the white 
“liberals were unable to provide the strategies and mobilisation that were needed to 
overthrow apartheid and were regarded by some as its accomplices”. 
                                                          
5 See Penny Enslin. 1986. In defence of liberal theory of education, unpublished PhD Thesis, University 
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; Enslin, P. 1999. Education for liberal democracy: universalising a 
western construct?” Journal of Philosophy of Education, 33 (2), 175-186. 
6 See Enslin, P. & Horsthemke, K. 2004. Can Ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education in African 
democracies? Comparative Education, 40 (4), 545-558. 
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It would be tempting at this stage to simply conclude, as Biko (2005; 1972), Makgoba 
(1998), Gilliomee (1995), Ake (1993), and Parekh (1993) do, that the political cultures 
and traditions of non-Western countries are not amenable to Western liberalism and 
liberal democracy, and that they are incompatible with Western liberalism and liberal 
democracy. But that would be tantamount to committing a serious error of judgement 
given that the views of these scholars are either context-specific (Biko, 2005, 1972; 
Makgoba, 1998; Gilliomee, 1995), or misjudge the trends in social theory and political 
practices in the rapidly changing global context (Parekh). There should be no doubt 
though that liberalism is an “essentially contested concept” (Abbey, 2005; Gray, 1978) 
and that it is also laden with complexities (Simhony, 2003). Some liberal commentators 
have even suggested that rather than talk about liberalism [singular] we should instead 
be talking about “a multitude of liberalisms” (McKay, 2000:627), “many liberalisms” 
(Friedman, 2003:182; Rawls, 1996:223), or “a family of liberalisms” (Simhony, 
2003:283). As Friedman (2003:182) elaborates, “equality, rights, autonomy, justice, 
and liberty are all variously interpreted by liberals themselves. Liberalism is no more 
monolithic or homogeneous than are the minority cultures that sometimes challenge 
the authority of liberal governments”. It is Friedman’s contention that “what are called 
‘liberal values and principles’ are simply values and principles that happen to figure 
prominently in many versions of liberal ideology today, but that could be defended 
from any number of philosophical points of view”.  
 
Indeed Simhony (2003:283-284) warns that “to talk of ‘standard’ liberalism is not 
helpful to appreciating the variety of liberalism”. It is his view that “complexity is lost 
when we approach the liberal argument from a discourse of simple oppositions”. The 
pertinence of Simhony’s contention above to the discourse of opposition to liberalism 
adopted by Biko (2005; 1972), Makgoba (1998), Gilliomee (1995), Ake (1993), and 
Parekh (1993) cannot be overemphasised. The five scholars treat liberalism as a 
political tradition that is opposed to, and is therefore fundamentally incompatible with 
non-Western political traditions. My view is that this position does more harm than 
good to the debate in that it obfuscates the proliferation that is manifest in the liberal 
tradition today.  
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South Africa’s appeal to liberalism should be viewed as part and parcel of this 
continuing proliferation of the liberal tradition. As Bell (2014:705) points out, “the 
history of liberalism is a history of constant reinvention”. Indeed Lumumba-Kasongo 
(2005:7) is spot-on in his observation that “liberal democracy is not the monopoly of 
Western society as struggles outside the West have shaped its content and 
contributed to its redefinition”. Abbey (2005:472) buttresses this point when she notes 
that “the liberal way of life features as one among other viable possibilities, and liberal 
politics is dedicated to finding a modus vivendi among the ways of life within society 
so that they can enjoy peaceful co-existence”. However, Lumumba-Kasongo 
(2005:13) sums up this debate nicely with respect to Africa: “a critical knowledge of 
liberal democracy and its processes can be beneficial to the African people and their 
leaders as they search for the chance to invent the developmental democracy and 
new democratic state’s paradigms needed for progressive social change”. My own 
view is that there should not be any doubt about the viability of liberalism and liberal 
democracy in South Africa. 
 
To summarise, I have sketched the contestations around South Africa’s liberal 
tradition. The liberal tradition has not been taken seriously. In fact it is generally 
regarded as irrelevant to South Africa’s social and political affairs. Unsurprisingly, 
liberalism has never been a dominant political force in South Africa. I argued that South 
Africa’s liberalism was tested by the apartheid regime and failed dismally. One of the 
fiercest critics of South Africa’s liberal tradition is BCM leader Steven Biko, who argued 
that the liberals simply verbalised all the complaints of the blacks while skilfully 
extracting what suited their exclusive pool of white privilege. Similarly, Makgoba 
argues that South Africa’s white liberals could not fight for the removal of the subtle 
version of racism because it is part of their life, their socialisation, their culture and 
history. I showed that even Enslin, who is a staunch defender of liberalism, agrees 
with Makgoba that South Africa’s white liberals failed to provide the necessary 
strategies for the overthrow of apartheid, and that they were in fact regarded as 
accomplices of the system. 
 
The questions I am grappling with, and which I pursue in detail below are whether 
these context-specific contestations necessarily negate the broader value of 
liberalism? Do they nullify the viability of liberalism in contemporary South Africa? 
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Personally I do not think so. My view is that South Africa is at liberty to decide which 
elements of western liberalism pertain to its social, political and cultural imperatives, 
and are therefore worth importing. As Geuss (2002:326) points out,  “what is distinctive 
about liberalism isn’t ... so much its openness to pluralism as its view that all societies 
should be seen as capable of attaining consensus, despite a lack of homogeneity in 
the manners, beliefs, and habits of their members”. Given South Africa’s communal 
feature, which is perceived to be amenable to the politics of consensus, it is only logical 
that it appropriates those elements of consensus in liberalism to which Geuss refers 
above. I now turn to the challenges of Marxism-Leninism to South Africa’s liberalism. 
 
4.4  The Marxist-Leninist challenge of liberalism in South Africa 
 
The questions I want to raise in this section are: how plausible is liberalism in a post-
apartheid South Africa whose ruling tripartite alliance of the African National Congress 
(ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) has strong Marxist-Leninist leanings? 
Notwithstanding existence of a clearly liberal constitution, what prospects are there for 
liberalism to flourish? I should mention though that regardless of the above-sketched 
hard line BCM’s anti-white liberal views by Biko (2005, 1972) and Makgoba (1998), 
generally there is hope that the seeds of liberalism that have been planted thanks to 
the country’s constitution can germinate, grow and flourish provided there is a 
conducive social, cultural and political environment for such germination, growth and 
flourishing (Letseka, 2013, 2012; Waghid, 2003, Enslin, 1999; Welsh, 1998). Before 
delving into the plausibility of liberalism in South Africa, I want to start by 
acknowledging that liberalism is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Abbey, 2005; 
Gray, 1978; Gallie, 1956), and that it is laden with ‘complexities’ (Simhony, 2003). I 
say more on these contestations and complexities below. I shall follow this with an 
exploration of the influence of Marxism-Leninism in South Africa. My contention is that 
unlike its alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP, the ANC has not only asserted 
its hegemony on the alliance, but it is also more community-oriented than its alliance 
partners, which effectively nullifies any potential threat of Marxism-Leninism to South 
Africa’s liberalism.  
 
4.4.1  Liberalism as ‘complex’ and ‘essentially contested concept’ 
93 
 
 
 
 
It is important to mention from the outset that liberalism does not feature in Gallie’s 
(1956) list of ‘essentially contested concepts’.7 However, Abbey (2005) is of the view 
that like art, democracy, social justice, and the Christian life, liberalism is also an 
‘essentially contested concept’. As to why Gallie omitted it from his list of ‘essentially 
contested concepts, Abbey (2005:468) argues that “with concerns about democracy 
on the ascendancy...the concept of liberty, or more accurately, of particular liberties 
deserving protection irrespective of their democratic spread or appeal, appears 
steadily to have lost ground”. But this is highly debatable. As Ware (1992:130) points 
out, “since the 1950s, political scientists attempted to develop classifications of liberal 
democratic regimes…It was commonplace to distinguish between Anglo-American 
and Continental European political systems”. Evidence from the literature points to 
vigorous debates on liberalism from the 1930s onwards through to the 1950s. Case in 
point, on 28th December 1934 a symposium was held during the meeting of the 
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at New York University 
where John Dewey, William Ernest Hocking, W. M. Pepperell Montague, Morris 
Cohen, C. M. Bakewell, Sidney Hook, and John Herman Randall, Jr., debated ‘The 
Future of Liberalism’. Some of the papers presented at this symposium were published 
in the Journal of Philosophy and the International Journal of Ethics in 1935 and in 
Western Political Quarterly in 1948. Books published on liberalism during this period 
include John Dewey’s (2000) Liberalism and Social Action; Harold Laski’s (2005) The 
Rise of European Liberalism; William Beveridge’s (1945) Why I am a Liberal, and 
Morris Cohen’s (1993) The Faith of a Liberal. In 1949, Gallie himself published the 
paper “Liberal morality and socialist morality” in the journal Philosophy, which elicited 
critical responses from T. B. Bottomore and Helen Wodehouse in the same journal in 
1950.       
 
I now want to briefly touch on Abbey’s (2005:468) view that liberalism “qualifies as an 
‘essentially contested concept’ because it approximates Gallie’s criteria as closely as 
the examples he offers do”. Abbey (2005:462) contends that “as more and more 
                                                          
7 In his formulation of “essentially contested concepts” Gallie (1956:180) lists art, democracy, social 
justice, and Christian life as ‘essentially contested concepts’. Gallie (1956:169) argues that ‘essentially 
contested concepts’ are those “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes 
about their proper uses on the part of their users”. 
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political theorists locate themselves within the liberal fold, the meaning of the term 
liberalism has widened and the construction of the liberal tradition has become 
increasingly contested”. Thus “the question of what liberalism is has become more 
intensely debated by those who consider themselves liberals” (Abbey, 2005:463). As 
Philp (1996:391) elaborates, “some liberals take preferences in the form of a utility 
function, others start from the person as having ‘reasonable’ demands upon the 
political process, still others start from an antecedent conception of the self as a rights 
bearer or moral subject, and communitarian liberals start from a view of the subject as 
embodying the values and principles of his or her community”. I want to argue that the 
route South Africa is taking is of the self as a rights bearer or moral subject, while 
embracing the values and principles of his or her community. 
 
It is Abbey’s (2005: 468-469) contention that liberalism approximates Gallie’s criteria 
in at least four ways. Firstly, “in most contemporary English-language political theory, 
the term liberalism is used in the positively appraisive way required by Gallie”. 
Secondly, “liberalism is an internally complex phenomenon”. For instance, “liberty, 
equality, rationality, individual dignity, rights, justice, autonomy, consent and the 
priority of the right over the good” are among liberalism’s constituent elements. Thirdly, 
the above elements are however, “susceptible to being ordered in different ways”. 
Fourthly, “liberalism is a vague and open-ended concept”. It offers “the possibility of 
an inherently dynamic approach to politics and society in that it provides society with 
the possibility of and justification for continuously remaking itself”. For Abbey 
(2005:469), “this dynamic quality derives from the abstract and universal nature of 
ideals that lie at the heart of liberalism - liberty, equality, autonomy and toleration”. It 
is Abbey’s contention that “by promising equal freedom to all in the shaping of their 
own lives and pursuit of their own conception of the good (subject to caveats like the 
harm principle), liberalism offers the normative resources for constant challenges to 
the status quo”. 
 
Commenting on the liberal tradition in South Africa, and on liberalism’s ability to 
accommodate multiple values, Welsh (1998:3) argues that “it is one of liberalism’s 
most attractive features that it not only tolerates but welcomes internal 
debate…Liberalism’s very flexibility and its open-endedness within the broad 
parameters of its core values have enabled it to be dynamic, adaptable, and 
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pragmatic”. In concurrence, Galston (1991:227) contends that “a general liberal 
political virtue is the disposition – and the developed capacity – to engage in public 
discourse. This includes the willingness to listen seriously to a range of views that, 
given the diversity of liberal societies, will include ideas the listener is bound to find 
strange and even obnoxious”. 
 
Abbey (2005:471) argues that the critical potential of liberalism resides in the 
immanent normative resources it supplies those who seek to change some aspects of 
social or political life. For my purpose in this study, I am persuaded by the views 
Charles Taylor on the relationship between individualist and collectivist ontologies. 
Taylor (1991:163) argues that “the portmanteau terms ‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’ will 
probably have to be scrapped because they carry the implication that there is only one 
issue here, or that someone’s position on one determines what he holds on the other”. 
His view is that “either stand on the atomism-holism debate can be combined with 
either stand on the individualist-collectivist question”. This is consistent with the basic 
position I am advocating in this study, which is that South Africa’s socio-political future 
is premised on the coexistence between traditional African values and liberal 
democratic values. 
 
Abbey and Taylor (1996:3) contend that “to get the relationship and the differences 
between liberalism and communitarianism right, it is essential to distinguish ontological 
from advocacy issues. Ontological issues have to do with how we explain social life 
while advocacy issues encompass things that we value, hold to be good and worth 
promoting”. They surmise that “at the ontological level, you could explain social life 
and personal identity in atomist terms, as liberalism traditionally has. Or you could 
explain it in terms of shared goods, of language and other factors that cannot be 
accounted for by nor reduced to individuals”. As Lehman (2006: 363) reminds us, 
Taylor’s “communitarian development of liberalism is not simply about the imposition 
of a particular ontology on communities, but involves a strong form of reconciliation 
that respects and repairs difference”. Such reconciliation “involves a dialectical 
process of mutual engagement between the ontological and advocacy levels and 
therefore does not privilege any one particular source of the self”. How then do the 
above contestations and complexities facilitate or hamper liberalism in South Africa? I 
showed above that the liberal way of life features as one among other viable 
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possibilities (Abbey, 2005), and that liberal democracy is not the monopoly of western 
society (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005). By adopting the much-acclaimed 1996 
Constitution, South Africa became “a liberal democracy” (Enslin, 1999:176). Suffice it 
to mention though that the Constitution of South Africa enshrines a wide range of 
individual rights and guarantees press freedom and free speech, as well as a non-
descriptive approach towards economic policy.  
 
The question: which liberalism should South Africa choose is as complex and 
contested as liberalism itself. There is such a wide range of views on liberalism that it 
would make little sense to envisage one single view of liberalism that defines what it 
means to be a liberal. It seems it would also not make sense to argue that liberalism 
is fundamentally incompatible with traditional African ideas and values of politics. 
Indeed Enslin (1999:175-76) does a pretty good job in her rebuttal of Parekh’s (1993) 
claim that liberal democracy is a western construct that should not be regarded as 
universalisable. She refers to the new democratic order in South Africa and its 
education system, which she argues, “presuppose some critical distinguishing 
features of liberalism”. Her rebuttal is against the backdrop of the constitution of South 
Africa, which is ‘liberal’ and ‘egalitarian’. I now turn to the influence of Marxism-
Leninism on South Africa’s post-apartheid liberal democracy. 
 
 
4.4.2  The influence of Marxism-Leninism in South Africa8 
 
There are deep ideological contestations between South Africa’s liberalism and the 
SACP and COSATU. The latter are key partners in the ruling tripartite alliance with the 
ANC. In its constitution, which was amended at the 13th National Congress in July 
2012, the SACP (2012:3-4) argues that “in leading the working class towards national 
and social emancipation, the SACP is guided by those principles of ‘Marxism-
Leninism’ whose universal validity has been proven by historical experience”. It 
declares that “in applying the general principles of ‘Marxism-Leninism’, the SACP is, 
in the first place, concerned with their indigenous elaboration and application to the 
                                                          
8This section of the chapter has been adapted into an article that has been published in an international 
journal. See Letseka, M. 2013. Liberalism vs. Marxism-Leninism and the future of education in South 
Africa. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4 (3), 67-75. 
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concrete realities of our own developing situation” (SACP, 2012:4).  
 
The SACP states that it seeks to end the system of capitalist exploitation in South 
Africa. In addition, it seeks to establish: 
 a socialist society based on the common ownership of, participation in, and 
control by the producers of the key means of production.  
 to organise, educate and lead the working class in the struggle for socialism 
and the more immediate objectives of defending and deepening the ‘national 
democratic revolution’ and of achieving national and social emancipation.  
 to organise, educate and advance women within the working class, the poor 
and rural communities in pursuit of the aims of the SACP.  
 to raise the consciousness of the working class and its allies around the integral 
and oppressive nature of gender relations within South African capitalism; to 
combat racism, tribalism, sex discrimination, regionalism, chauvinism, 
xenophobia and all forms of narrow nationalism, and to promote the ideas of 
proletarian internationalism and the unity of the workers of South Africa and the 
world.  
However, some of the SACP’s pronouncements above warrant a critical response. For 
instance, the SACP claims it endeavours to “educate and lead the working class in the 
struggle for socialism and the more immediate objectives of defending and deepening 
the national democratic revolution and of achieving national and social emancipation”. 
However, there are concerns about its leadership’s lifestyles of opulence that is 
characterised by ownership of storeyed mansions in the former white suburbs, luxury 
German cars, and first class air travel. Such lives of opulence are a direct opposite of 
the lifestyles of the poorest of the poor and ordinary rank and for workers the party 
purports to represent. UCT’s political scientist Anthony Butler (2013) observes that 
“the SACP is now in government. It is seeking not to destroy the capitalist state but 
rather to use it as an instrument of economic development. The party has therefore 
abandoned Marx”. This has led the leadership of the National Union of Metalworkers 
of South Africa (NUMSA), a former affiliate of COSATU to lament that senior members 
of the  SACP pontificate that “the South African state is not a bourgeois-democratic 
dictatorship", and yet the South African state remains "one of the most brutal and 
backward capitalist states" (Butler, 2013). 
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While the SACP states that it seeks to “advance women within the working class”, at 
its 13th National Congress where office bearers were elected for the 2012-2017 term 
of office, only one female candidate, Joyce Moloi-Moropa, was elected to the position 
of party National Treasurer. The rest of the office bearers, the General Secretary: 
Blade Nzimande, First Deputy General Secretary: Jeremy Cronin, Second Deputy 
General Secretary: Solly Afrika Mapaila, National Chairperson: Senzeni Zokwana, 
Deputy National Chairperson: Thulasi Nxesi, are all males. Even in the party’s Central 
Committee, which comprises thirty five (35) members, there are only ten (10) females 
(SACP Media Release, 14 July 2012).  Everyone who joins the SACP is required to 
take the following pledge:  
“I accept the aims and objectives of the SACP and agree to abide by its 
Constitution and loyally to carry out the decisions of the Party; I shall strive to 
live up to the ideals of communism and shall selflessly serve the workers and 
the poor and the country, always placing the interests of the Party and the 
workers and the poor above personal interests” (SACP, 2012:10). 
 
While the pledge is intended for mature working adults who are presumed to have 
read and understood the SACP constitution and made informed choices and decisions 
to join the party, one cannot help but notice close resemblance in the wording of the 
SACP’s pledge with the wording of the oath taken by 10-year-old German boys in the 
1930’s and 1940s upon joining Adolf Hitler’s Jungvolk (Young People’s) organisation. 
The Jungvolk oath read: 
“In the presence of this blood banner, which represents our Fuehrer, I swear to 
devote all my energies to the saviour of our country, Adolf Hitler. I am willing 
and ready to give up my life for him, so help me God”. (Great Events of the 20th 
Century: How They Changed our Lives, 1977, p.234).  
 
It seems odd that there is no mention of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ or ‘national democratic 
revolution’ in COSATU’s constitution (2006). However, this omission should not 
deviate from the fact that COSATU and the SACP have an ideologically symbiotic 
relationship. For instance, in public presentations at various regional forums the 
leadership of COSATU has publicly declared the labour federation’s commitment to 
Marxism-Leninism. In a speech delivered at the 4th International Police Symposium in 
Lusaka, Zambia, from 27th – 30th April 2013, the president of COSATU informed the 
delegates that “as COSATU we approach issues from a Marxist - Leninist 
perspective”. He prefaced his address “by summoning from the grave Louis Althusser 
on ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus’” (Dlamini, 2013:2). He argued that 
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Althusser’s article “captures what I consider to be the main content of our discussion 
today because we have come here to discuss Advancing Sound Labour Relations in 
Policing and Correctional Services within the African Continent. But comrades as you 
are all aware this theme is not innocent or neutral. It is about how the police also 
function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the 
‘values’ they propound externally” (Dlamini, 2013:3).  
 
In another address, to the National Union of Mineworkers’ (NUM) national congress 
which was held on 25 May 2011 at Emperor’s Palace, Johannesburg, the president of 
COSATU reiterated the federation’s commitment to Marxism-Leninism. He stated that 
“As Marxist–Leninists we should shift away from a false belief that history is made by 
‘Great Men and Women’, kings and queens, statesmen and politicians. As Marxist–
Leninists we are opposed to this unscientific approach, but we do not deny the role of 
individuals in history, their initiative or audacity (or lack of it), in the social struggle” 
(Dlamini, 2012:5). He argued that “our revolution has reached a stage where we need 
to invest our resources into building the capacity and political resourcefulness of our 
shop stewards based on advancing our class interests”. Part of this task, he 
announced, “includes building the SACP as our vanguard” (Dlamini, 2012:6). By 
declaring the SACP the vanguard of COSATU the labour federation’s president was 
echoing Lenin’s (1999:22) view on the Communist Party as the “vanguard of the 
proletariat, its class-conscious section”, which he succinctly spells out in one of his 
political treatises, Left-Wing Communism: Infantile Disorder. Lenin (1999:26) argues 
that “the united-front tactic, like all the tactics employed by the Marxists, is aimed at 
facilitating the creation of a revolutionary vanguard party capable of educating, 
organising and mobilising the working - class masses to carry out a proletarian 
revolution and the building of the classless socialist society”. 
 
It is reasonable to argue that the above-mentioned ideological contestation poses a 
challenge to the revival and consolidation of the liberalism in South Africa. For 
instance, how can it be assured that the country’s Constitution, which is widely 
recognised as ‘liberal’ and ‘egalitarian’ is sustained given that some of its custodians 
openly declare that they are “guided by the fundamental principles of Marxism-
Leninism” (Southall & Webster, 2010:138), and are committed “to build[ing] Marxism-
Leninism as a tool of scientific inquiry to search for answers in the contemporary world” 
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(Maree, 2012:64). However, COSATU and SACP’s Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism 
can be said to have been neutralised by the ANC’s community and township 
orientation.  
 
By virtue of its majority in the alliance’s National Executive Committee (NEC) the ANC 
has asserted “its hegemony over the alliance” (Southall & Webster, 2010:140).  
Southall and Webster (2010:132) recall that in 1979 the ANC triumphed and prevented 
“the attempted take-over by a group of Trotskyites of the ANC, a UK-based group of 
activists suspended from the ANC... and expelled in 1985”, for attacking the ANC 
leadership as “a right-wing faction whose aims ran contrary to the interests of the 
working class in South Africa”. The ANC has never espoused the hard-line Marxist-
Leninist leanings of its two alliance partners. Southall and Webster (2010:140) argue 
the ANC’s emphasis “on mass participation in urban warfare after 1979 made it 
increasingly community-oriented and thus by implication identified the movement with 
the townships. This community orientation gave it a social base quite different from 
that of the industrial unions, and it was ultimately township support - including 
elements of the African middle classes, most notably the civics - which would provide 
the ANC with its main source of strength”. This made the ANC “less attuned to the 
aspirations of organised labour than at any time during the previous 30 years”. 
But what could be the genesis of COSATU and the SACP’s Marxist-Leninist 
orientation? Buhlungu and Ellis (2012:274) argue that  
“For more than four decades after the Second World War, South African 
communists enjoyed the support of a superpower and espoused a political 
programme strongly influenced by the Soviet style of Marxism-Leninism. The 
immediate goal was the overthrow of apartheid through a national democratic 
revolution. As long as the Soviet Union existed, the SACP could be sure that it 
would, via its relationship with the ANC and the preponderance of its members 
in the ANC leadership, be in a position of considerable strength to embark on 
the next phase of the revolution, the transition to socialism”.  
 
Against the backdrop of the SACP’s constitution above, it is evident that the party 
“remains firmly wedded to an Orthodox Marxism-Leninism, while acknowledging some 
of the failings and excesses of the actual experience of the Soviet Union” (Buhlungu 
& Ellis, 2012:276). 
 
Should any liberal be concerned about the prospects of liberalism in South Africa? Put 
differently, is the country’s project of a political future based on the amalgamation of 
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traditional African values and liberal values potentially in vain? What are the 
implications for liberal education given that the General Secretary of the SACP also 
happens to be South Africa’s Minister of Higher Education and Training (HET)? Does 
this imply there would be a radical policy shift towards a Marxist-Leninist conception 
of education in South Africa? Such questions would be dismissed as counter 
revolutionary capitalist rhetoric in countries such as China or Russia where the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party is the all-powerful party leader who is well 
placed to influence educational policy to fit in with the party’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
My view though is that the above scenario might not pertain to South Africa for two 
reasons. Firstly, while the SACP and COSATU are key partners in the ruling alliance, 
the ANC calls the shots. And as mentioned above, the ANC is more community-
oriented and less attuned to the aspirations of organised labour like its alliance 
partners. Most importantly, the ANC has more or less “hegemonised the alliance”. 
 
Secondly, the Constitution of South Africa is the supreme law of the land by which 
everyone is bound, and with which the disparate political parties and their ideologies 
are obliged to comply. As Gray (1995:71-71) points out, the sine qua non of the liberal 
state is that governmental power and authority should be “limited by a system of 
constitutional rules and principles in which individual liberty and equality of persons 
under the rule of law are respected”. The supremacy of South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution is clearly stated in the Preamble:  
“We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this 
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic…” 
 
Three former judges of the Constitutional Court have come out in support of the 
Constitution’s robust nature in guaranteeing democratic processes and procedures. 
For instance, Chaskalson (2003:599-600) contends that “the new South African 
Constitution is a moral document. Even a cursory reading of its provisions 
demonstrates this. It is the supreme law, and law or conduct inconsistent with its 
provisions is invalid”. He notes that “the preamble to the Constitution identifies 
constitutional goals that include establishing a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights. Key to this is the Bill of Rights, contained 
in chapter 2 of the Constitution, which is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. 
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It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom”.   
 
Goldstone (1997: 454) argues that to say the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land means that “the Court's power to interpret and enforce the Constitution, guarantee 
an independent, impartial, and appropriately qualified judiciary is protected; that 
universally accepted fundamental rights are entrenched; that the independence and 
impartiality of certain state institutions are ensured; that universal adult franchise and 
proportional representation are protected; and that existing provincial powers in 
relation to the state have some protection”. Mokgoro (1997:1280) contends that “the 
new Constitution is the supreme law of the land and contains a chapter which 
guarantees fundamental human rights. However, this chapter of the Constitution, 
described as ‘the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa’, is founded on the values 
of freedom, equality and human dignity”. Mokgoro argues that “in full realisation of the 
potentially competing demands that a drastically changing society of diverse values 
and equally diverse historical experiences may place on scarce resources, the new 
Constitution contains a fully-fledged limitations clause in the Bill of Rights, which 
provides courts with sets of criteria to be applied when competing rights and interests 
have to be balanced”.   
 
South Africa’s political scene is no doubt ironic. While Marxism-Leninism might be a 
threat to liberalism, however such a threat might not result in a radical policy shift. This 
is because while Marxism-Leninism might be a commonly shared ideological view of 
some partners in the ruling tripartite alliance, it is a contested concept. For instance, 
the ANC, which holds all the aces, is not Marxist-Leninist. Commenting on David 
Welsh’s (1998) introductory remarks in the book Ironic Victory: Liberalism in Post-
apartheid South Africa, Waghid (2003:14) argues that “many liberals who believe in 
the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms, non-racialism, non-sexism, supremacy of the rule of law, 
universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-
party system of democratic government with the aim to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness, would certainly consider the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1996 as an ‘ironic victory’”. It seems that Gaus (2000:179-
180) is also right after all that despite fears that “the prospects for liberalism had 
103 
 
 
 
dimmed”; or that “liberalism could gradually sink”, or that “its days were numbered”, 
liberals at the turn of the century “may understandably feel entitled to celebrate”. 
   
In summary, I have explored the complexities and contestations of liberalism. I showed 
that Gallie omitted liberalism from his list of ‘essentially contested concepts’. However, 
liberalism qualifies as an ‘essentially contested concept’ in that it approximates Gallie’s 
criteria and the examples he offers. I indicated that even among liberals there is no 
single dominant view on what liberalism means. Instead there is agreement that there 
are ‘many liberalism; ‘a multitude of liberalisms’, and ‘a family of liberalisms’. I explored 
the plausibility of liberalism in South Africa against the backdrop of COSATU and the 
SACP being staunch supporters of Marxism-Leninism. I debated the question whether 
this hard-line Marxist-Leninist stance is a sign of a looming radical policy shift that 
might frustrate the consolidation of liberalism in South Africa. I showed that the ANC, 
which is in the majority, is more community-oriented and less inclined to the 
aspirations of organised labour like COSATU and the SACP. I argued that this nullifies 
the threat of Marxism-Leninism to liberalism. Therefore, it stands to reason that South 
Africa’s endorsement of liberalism should be seen part of this bigger picture in the 
proliferation of liberal political theory. 
 
4.5  Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I attempted to clarify what the liberals value. I briefly sketched basic 
principles that undergird liberalism. I acknowledged that liberalism is a complex and 
contested concept, and that even among the liberals themselves there is no single 
dominant view on what liberalism actually means. However, I showed that generally, 
liberals value human dignity, equality, freedom and tolerance of dissenting viewpoints. 
I highlighted the importance of virtue, understood as our good, excellence, or 
perfection as human beings, and argued that the viability of most liberal polities is 
dependent on their ability to engender virtuous citizens. With the South African context 
in mind, I highlighted the importance of community and interdependence to liberalism 
and argued that liberalism is also a form of community in which members flourish in a 
distinctively liberal way. However, I showed that in South Africa liberalism has been 
diffused, lacking organisational focus, and widely derided and ignored as irrelevant.  
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I explored the potential for coexistence between liberalism and Marxism-Leninism in 
South Africa and inquired whether the hard-line Marxist-Leninist stance of both 
COSATU and the SACP implies the possibility of a radical policy shift in South Africa’s 
education. However, I showed that as the leading partner in the tripartite alliance the 
ANC is more community-oriented and less inclined to the aspirations of organised 
labour like COSATU and the SACP. I concluded that South Africa’s endorsement of 
liberalism in a traditional African communal setting is evidence of liberalism’s 
proliferation. I now turn to indigenous African traditions and cultures in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 5 
INDIGENOUS AFRICAN EPISTEMOLOGIES: A FOCUS ON 
UBUNTU 
 
5.1  Introduction: demarcation of ubuntu 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the basic values and principles that characterise 
what it means to be a liberal, or what the liberals generally value. I argued that while 
on the surface it can be presumed that the liberals value human dignity, equality, 
individual rights, freedom, tolerance of dissenting viewpoints, and the promotion of the 
‘virtues’ - understood as our good, excellence, or perfection as human beings. But that 
as a theory or as a philosophy liberalism is essentially ‘a complex and contested 
concept’. Its complexity and contestation derive from the fact that even among the 
liberals themselves there is no consensus as to what liberalism in real terms means. I 
pointed out that values such as equality, rights, autonomy, justice, and liberty are 
variously interpreted by liberals themselves (Friedman, 2003:182). 
 
On the basis of the 1996 Constitution, South Africa has been described as a ‘liberal 
democratic state’ (Deveaux, 2003; Dugard, 1998; Enslin, 1999; Jordan, 1996; Welsh, 
1998). The Constitution enshrines a wide variety of rights and freedoms for the 
individual, and which created a politically conducive environment for the country’s 
openly contested multi-party democracy based on free and regular elections. And yet, 
the same constitution, which is widely hailed as liberal and egalitarian, also recognises 
the institution of traditional leadership, and by extension, the practice of African 
customary law. While others have found this state of affairs to be fundamentally 
contradictory (Beall, 2006; Beall, et al., 2005; Bentley, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2005), a more 
Afrocentric view would be that the Constitution’s recognition of the institution of 
traditional leadership and the practice of African customary law should be regarded as 
fait accompli given that South Africa is an African country whose “black African 
population group are in the majority (42,28 million) and constitute almost 80% of the 
total South African population” (Statistics South Africa, 2013:6). Given that South 
Africa is now part of the international community, the logic of the above Afrocentric 
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view still remains pivotal despite the pressure to embrace the global political and 
multicultural influences. However, the importance of being rooted in and of identifying 
with the local cultures and traditions cannot be sacrificed at the altar of globalisation, 
internationalism, postmodernity and cosmopolitanism. However, the upshot of these 
considerations then becomes complex. It means that South Africa needs to strike a 
healthy balance between the local/indigenous cultures and traditions and external 
socio-political and cultural influences in order to build a socio-political future that is 
based on the amalgamation of desirable aspects of traditional African values as well 
as desirable aspects of liberal democratic values.  
 
 In this chapter I pick out Ubuntu as a central piece of this jigsaw puzzle. I argue that 
Ubuntu should not only be defended against assaults that seek to cast aspersion on it 
(Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Marx, 2002), but that it should also inform conceptions 
of education in South Africa. I conceptualise Ubuntu as a multifaceted notion - as 
humaneness, as a form of personhood, as a form of morality or a normative concept, 
as a pedagogical principle, and as a potential public policy (Letseka, 2013a, 2013b, 
2012, 2000); as a notion of African communal justice (Letseka, 2014a), or African 
jurisprudence (Mahao, 2010). In the same vein, Waghid and Davids (2014) opine that 
the notion of Botho or Ubuntu is constitutive of African political, social and ethical 
thought, often illuminating the communal interdependence of persons geared towards 
the cultivation of human flourishing in indigenous African societies.  
 
My own view is that Ubuntu can add value to the education of young people by 
immersing them in the values of humaneness and caring. I therefore recommend the 
inclusion of Ubuntu in the school curriculum as well as in the extra-curricular activities. 
It is worth mentioning that Ubuntu already features in some education policy 
documents of the Department of Education (DoE), although only superficially. These 
include, Understand School Leadership & Governance in the South African Context 
(2008); Revised National Curriculum Statement Grades R-9 (Schools) (2002), and 
Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001). However, there is no 
evidence that Ubuntu has gained traction as far as its implementation on the ground 
is concerned. 
I centre Ubuntu as the conceptual heart of this chapter with a view to sketching specific 
ways in which Africanist scholars have written about Ubuntu as a philosophical basis 
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for framing the social, political, cultural and democratic direction of South Africa. 
Ubuntu is particularly important to South Africa’s fledgling democracy given that its 
underlying values are also consistent with the values implicit in the country’s 
Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights (Motha, 2009; Tshoose, 2009; Keevy, 2008; 
Mokgoro, 1988). Indeed Ubuntu has the potential to enable South Africans to attain a 
common understanding on how to live lives that are characterised by a deep yearning 
for reconciliation. This is necessary given that the country has only just emerged from, 
and is beginning to come to terms with its apartheid past (Gibson, 2006, 2002; Gibson 
& Gouws, 2003).  
 
Ubuntu articulates a sense of communal interdependence and a rootedness in one’s 
community (Chichane, 2008). It is consistent with the maxim on African communal 
interdependence articulated by Mbiti (1989, 1975) in, I am, because we are; and since 
we are, therefore I am. I shall explore the view that Ubuntu is a moral theory, or ‘a 
theory of right action’ (Metz & Gaie, 2010; Metz, 2007; Letseka, 2013b; 2012, 2000; 
Shutte, 1994; Teffo, 1994), and argue that Ubuntu implies an interactive ethic in which 
our humanity is shaped by our interaction with others as co-dependent beings 
(McCluskey & Lephalala, 2010; Cornell & van Marle, 2005). It is my considered view 
that Ubuntu has the potential to serve as public policy (Nkondo, 2007) and as a notion 
of communal justice in African communities (Letseka, 2014a; Keevy, 2008). 
 
Throughout the chapter I shall use the terms Ubuntu, African, and democracy. I now 
briefly clarify how I understand each of these terms and elaborate on how I shall use 
them in the chapter. Generally, Ubuntu is conceived of as humaneness, personhood 
and morality. It has been described as the philosophical foundation of African practices 
among the Bantu speaking peoples of Africa (Keevy, 2008), and as a comprehensive 
ancient African worldview based on the values of humanness, caring, sharing, respect, 
compassion and associated values (Broodryk, 2002). In my earlier publication I argued 
that Ubuntu has normative implications in that it encapsulates moral norms and values 
such as altruism, kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and 
respect and concern for others (Letseka, 2000). Similarly, retired South African 
Constitutional judge, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro (1998) has argued that Ubuntu is a 
humanistic orientation towards fellow beings. It is Mokgoro’s contention that Ubuntu 
envelops key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect and human dignity. She 
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opines that the spirit of Ubuntu emphasises respect for human dignity and marks a 
shift from confrontation to reconciliation. My own view is that Ubuntu’s pertinence to 
the education of young people is such that it cannot, but be promoted by the country’s 
public schooling system. This is necessary given that South Africa is currently 
grappling with its past, which was marred by civil strife, racial segregation, 
discrimination, relations of subordination and domination, and exclusion of the majority 
blacks from all conceivable opportunities. 
 
I shall use the term Africa in its geographic sense to pick out the continent as different 
from Europe, Asia, Oceania, North America or South America. In this regard, the 
adjective African has geographic, political and cultural slants built into it. Given Africa’s 
enormous diversity (Appiah, 1997), I shall use the term democracy in the context of 
Africa but with a deeper sense of contemplation. The reason for this is that democracy 
is one of the concepts listed by Gallie (1956) as ‘essentially contested’. This is not 
unusual. Over the years, the concept of democracy has been variously described by 
political theorists and political philosophers (Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Dahl, 2000; 
Davis, 2005; Held, 1987; Laurence, 1997; Macpherson, 1966). As Collier and Levitsky 
(1997:430-31) neatly sum these various descriptions, there has been “a proliferation 
of alternative conceptual forms, including a surprising number of subtypes involving 
democracy ‘with adjectives’. Examples from among the hundreds of subtypes of 
democracy that have appeared include ‘authoritarian democracy’, ‘neo-patrimonial 
democracy’, ‘military-dominated democracy’, and ‘proto-democracy’”. This suggests 
that the term democracy does not consist of a single unique set of institutions. Rather, 
there are many types of democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly 
varied set of effects (Schmitter & Karl, 1991).  
 
Finally, I shall also use the term democracy to mean a socio-political order that is 
based on clearly defined political principles and procedures, and that supports the 
freedoms and rights of individuals to participate in decision-making processes, and to 
exercise choice. In his book, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, 
Benjamin Barber (2003) calls this type of democracy a ‘strong democracy’. Barber 
(2003:132) defines a ‘strong democracy’ as  
“Politics in the participatory mode where conflict is resolved in the absence of 
an independent ground through a participatory process of ongoing, proximate 
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self-legislation and the creation of a political community capable of transforming 
dependent, private individuals into free citizens and partial and private interests 
into public goods”. 
 
It is Barber’s (2003:118) view that a ‘strong democracy’ envisions politics “not as a 
way of life but as a way of living9 – as, namely, the way that human beings with variable 
but malleable natures and with competing but overlapping interests can contrive to live 
together communally not only to their mutual advantage but also to the advantage of 
their mutuality”. 
 
I shall argue that there is no democracy where there is no liberty for individual self-
expression or for expression of choice. Concomitantly, there is no democracy where 
there is no equality because socio-economic and political inequalities reduce human 
relations to subordination and domination (Ake, 1987). And while regular elections 
might be welcomed as a preferable mode for the exercise of political rights, in and by 
themselves elections do not necessarily equate to democracy (Diamond, 2002; Leiva 
and Veltmeyer, 1994). In what Larry Diamond (2002:23) describes as ‘hybrid regimes’ 
or ‘political grey zone,’ some countries conduct regular elections but they are either 
full-fledged democracies or outright dictatorships. Diamond (2002:22) contends that a 
system is democratic when its most powerful collective decision makers are selected 
through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for 
votes. However, great care should be taken given that these are only the criteria for 
describing an ideal democracy. Dahl (1998:29) reminds us that the criteria only 
describe an ideal or perfect democratic system. They provide us with standards 
against which we can compare the achievements and the remaining imperfections of 
actual political systems and their institutions, and they can guide us towards solutions 
that would bring us closer to the ideal.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, I briefly sketch the criticisms of 
Ubuntu and Africanism/Afrocentrism with a view to offering responses where I deem 
it necessary. Secondly, I explore the potential for Ubuntu to serve as a moral theory 
or as ‘a theory of right action’ (Metz, 2007), and briefly comment on the possibility for 
                                                          
9 There is strong resonance between Barber’s (2003) characterisation of ‘a strong democracy’ as a way 
of living and John Dewey’s (1966) characterisation of education in chapter one of Democracy and 
Education, as ‘a necessity of life’. 
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Ubuntu to serve as public policy (Nkondo, 2007), as well as a conception of communal 
justice (Letseka, 2014a; Keevy, 2008). The point I make is that Ubuntu can be linked 
to the imperatives of democracy and social order. Thirdly, I expound on the value 
Ubuntu ought to add in conceptions of education in South Africa. This is a very 
important point given that some of the values that are implicit in Ubuntu can also be 
said to be implicit in the Constitution of South Africa, and that the country’s public 
school system is required to promote them. Fourthly, in the final section I offer some 
concluding remarks. I now turn to some of the criticisms of Ubuntu and 
Africanism/Afrocentrism. 
 
5.2  Criticisms of Ubuntu  
 
In the article entitled “Can Ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education in African 
democracies?”, which appears in the international journal, Comparative Education, 
Enslin and Horsthemke (2004:546) take issue with the view that education for 
democratic citizenship should be based on local or regional foundations. Their 
challenge is directed at an essay written by Malegapuru William Makgoba (1996) 
which appeared in the weekend newspaper, the Sunday Times. Enslin and 
Horsthemke (2004:545-546) object to Makgoba’s characterisation of classical 
Western democracies and liberal philosophy, the account of Ubuntu he gives, and its 
purported usefulness as a principled action guide. Their challenge revolves around 
several related claims - the claim that democracy is essentially ‘embedded’, that is, it 
is a local, indigenous phenomenon whose manifestations differ according to social 
and cultural context; that African democracy is distinct and unique; that Afrocentrism 
is a valid perspective from which to view democracy and citizenship education; that in 
the context of (South) Africa, only Ubuntu, the African principle of human 
interdependence, provides a suitable democratic model; that African cultures and 
identity are ill-served by other democratic models; that the community has priority over 
the individual, and that African traditional education provides an adequate and fertile 
ground for democratic citizenship. 
 
Enslin and Horsthemke (2004:546) do acknowledge that democracy and democratic 
citizenship education necessarily involve sensitivity to (local) contexts. They argue that 
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without such concern or awareness of local contexts democracy and democratic 
citizenship education are dry and colourless, if they have any practical value or 
application at all. However, they contend that the fundamental principles and tenets of 
democracy and democratic citizenship education are universal, and that failure to 
acknowledge this carries a substantial price. I have no qualms with the universal 
nature of democracy and democratic citizenship education. However, I have serious 
qualms when that ‘universal’ nature appears to presume that such notions are 
unproblematic, and therefore uncontested. We should not lose sight of the fact that 
democracy is one of the concepts that Gallie (1956) describes as ‘essentially 
contested concepts’. In the introduction above, I alluded to the fact that democracy 
has been variously described by political theorists and political philosophers. Case in 
point, democracy has been described as muddled (Macpherson, 1966), as paradoxical 
(Dahl, 2000), fuzzy (Davis, 2005), vexed (Laurence, 1997), confusing and unsettled 
(Held, 1987), and as marked by numerous adjectives (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). 
 
It seems odd that Enslin and Horsthemke (2004) chose to critique a newspaper article 
that makes pronouncements on Ubuntu when there is a plethora of Africanist scholars 
who have published their views on the issue in various scholarly journals and books 
of repute (Ramose, 2002b; Broodryk, 2002; Tutu, 1999; Mokgoro, 1998; Sindane, 
1994). I now turn to some of the criticisms of African democracy, Ubuntu, communality, 
and African traditional education, and offer responses where I deem it necessary.  
 
5.2.1  Democracy as essentially embedded in communities 
 
I start with the criticism of democracy as essentially embedded, as a local, indigenous 
phenomenon whose manifestations differ according to the social and cultural context. 
Like liberalism, whose ‘essential contestation’ I debated at length in section 4.4 above, 
democracy is also one of the concepts that Gallie (1956) described as ‘essentially 
contested’. I shall therefore not dwell on the nuts-and-bolts of what it means to say 
that a concept is ‘essentially contested’ in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. It is 
worthwhile mentioning though that other theorists have drawn on Gallie’s formulation 
to debate among others, whether the following are ‘essentially contested concepts’: 
democracy (Collier, Hidalgo, & Andra, 2006; Baker & Hughes, 2000), philosophy and 
politics (Newey, 2001), liberalism (Abbey, 2005; Gray, 1978), the rule of law (Waldron, 
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2002), education (Enslin, 1993), citizenship (Carr, 1991), freedom (Day, 1986), power 
(Lukes, 2005), rape (Reitan, 2001), abortion (Gibson, 2004), and medicine (McKnight, 
2003).  
 
If we accept Gallie’s formulation above as unobjectionable, it then becomes clear that 
whether democracy is essentially embedded or not is itself a necessary feature of the 
essential contestation of social science concepts. I have highlighted above that 
democracy has been widely described. These disparate descriptions suggest that 
democracy means different things to different people (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:108). 
As Dieltiens and Enslin (2003:7) point out, various formulations of democracy exist 
with some theorists claiming to be true democrats according to the relative weight they 
give to particular indices. Appiah (1996:24) argues that even “the institutions of 
democracy - the election, the public debate, the protection of minority rights - have 
different meanings to different subcultures”. This should not be surprising given that in 
their research on the concept of democracy Collier and Levitsky (1997:430-31) found 
a proliferation of alternative conceptual forms of democracy, including a surprising 
number of subtypes involving democracy ‘with adjectives’.  
 
It seems that in principle, Enslin and Horsthemke (2004:550) do not dispute the view 
that democracy is embedded. For instance, they acknowledge that communitarians 
and defenders of Ubuntu as an appropriate underpinning for both democracy and 
education have a point in their concern that institutions like schools, and the values 
they reflect, should cohere with the cultures of those they serve. The need for cultural 
coherence requires that citizens should feel at home in the institutions that serve their 
needs. This implies that the everyday practices of schools and politics should be 
welcoming and familiar rather than exclusionary and alienating (Enslin & Horsthemke, 
2004:551). Enslin and Horsthemke (2004:550) endorse Levinson’s (1999) view that 
individuals must be able to feel embedded within a culture or a set of cultures, and to 
mediate their choices via the norms constitutive of such cultures.  
 
In her book entitled: The Demands of Liberal Education, Levinson (1999:31) contends 
that cultural coherence aids individuals’ sense of identity and hence agency. In 
addition, cultural coherence helps to limit individuals’ range of choices to a 
manageable level so as to prevent their development of anomie - paralysis as a result 
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of massive anxiety and indecision about the choices one should make in the absence 
of binding commitments. She makes the point that civic identity is ‘thick’ and 
encompasses or gives life to a complex combination of commitments, practices, 
beliefs, rituals, et cetera. This helps to shape the lives of individuals and communities 
with the state (Levinson, 1999:133). It is Levinson’s (2004:231) view that it is 
impossible to have a school grounded in the civic culture that is fully detached from 
local commitments. Interestingly, the view that individuals are embedded in a set of 
cultures is acknowledged by liberal theorists such as Dworkin (1988:12), who writes: 
“We know that all individuals have a history. They develop socially and psychologically 
in a given environment with a set of biological endowments. They mature slowly and 
are, therefore heavily influenced by parents, peers, and culture”. Similarly, British 
liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1969:124) argued that “men are largely 
interdependent that no man is so completely private as never to obstruct the lives of 
others in any way”. 
 
For Turner (1995:722), the individual “is born into a world where political and social 
ideas are already performed into patterns that have a structure which is independent 
of the individual. Our views and experiences about reality are part of a collective 
political culture which shapes and gives expression to our own unique life 
experiences”. Etzioni (1999:94) is of the view that individuals are embedded in the 
social fabric. Their ability to make rational choices, to be free, is presumed in their 
embeddedness in a social fabric. Our views and experiences about reality are part of 
the collective political culture which shapes and gives expression to our own unique 
life experiences (Turner, 1999: 722). Levinson (1999:98) opines that membership in a 
community and embeddedness within a cultural and normative framework is a primary 
need of individuals - and an essential prerequisite for autonomy. One cannot act 
autonomously if one has no firm structure of beliefs on which to act. “We are initiated 
into a given set of meanings, which is sustained by a community, and which we not 
only are compelled to use to express what is ‘our own’, but which relevantly constitutes 
what is most ‘our own” (Ramaekers, 2010:61). For me Michael Walzer (2004: x) offers 
a compelling summary of the views mentioned above. He writes that “most of us are 
born into, or find ourselves in what may well be the most important groups to which 
we belong – the cultural and religious, the national and linguistic communities within 
which we cultivate not only identity, but character and whose values we pass on to our 
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children”. A few pages later, Walzer (2004:14) asks: “Can we really imagine individuals 
without any involuntary ties at all, unbound by class, ethnicity, religion, race, or gender, 
unidentified, utterly free?” These are potent arguments to finally put the final nail on 
Enslin and Horsthemke’s (2004) objection to social embeddedness. Therefore, it is my 
submission that there is really no anomaly in the view that democracy can be a local 
and indigenous phenomenon that is embedded in a particular social fabric. However, 
I must caution that embeddedness in a particular social fabric that precludes openness 
to other views on democracy would be insular and parochial, and therefore not worth 
supporting.   
 
5.2.2  African democracy as distinct and unique 
 
Enslin and Horsthemke (2004:547) take issue with Makgoba’s (1996) claim that 
Ubuntu seems logical in our [South African] situation because our democracy is unique 
in that it must evolve from the beginning within a multiracial and multicultural context 
and deliver freedom with opportunities while addressing values and cultural systems. 
They argue that the idea that the transcending philosophy of African Ubuntu could 
provide a distinctive underpinning for democracy in South Africa presents an 
immediate anomaly (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004:552). But they do not explicitly state 
the nature of the anomaly with which they are concerned. Instead they go on to 
contrast the values implicit in Ubuntu with the values implicit in the South African 
Constitution - its strong emphasis on freedom and equality; its bearing all the hallmarks 
of a liberal democracy; its Lockean requirement that the powers of the legislature, 
executive and judiciary be separated; its protection of a range of rights, including 
privacy, freedom of religion, belief and opinion, expression, assembly and association, 
as well as freedom and security of the person, children’s rights and the right to basic 
education; its conferment of a universal adult franchise on citizens who are protected 
by it against infringements of their rights by the state, and its provision for public 
consultation by the national and provincial legislatures to gather a range of opinions 
on proposed legislation. They then highlight the link between the Constitution and the 
deliberative mode of democracy, with reference to the work of Benhabib (1996).  
 
Let me briefly comment on the view that Ubuntu has a constitutional value in the South 
African context (Motha, 2009; Mokgoro, 1998). Ubuntu is an Nguni word for Botho - 
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its Sesotho equivalent. Ubuntu is a worldview of African societies and a determining 
factor in the formation of perceptions which influence social conduct (Mokgoro, 1998). 
In addition, Mokgoro (1998:18) opines that Ubuntu should be incorporated into 
mainstream jurisprudence by harnessing it carefully, consciously, creatively, 
strategically, and with ingenuity so that age-old African social innovations and 
historical cultural experiences are aligned with present day legal notions and 
techniques in order to create a legitimate system of law for all South Africans. What I 
glean from Mokgoro’s writings on Ubuntu is the need to revisit traditional African 
values, borrow those aspects that are deemed desirable for shaping human conduct 
in contemporary African communities, and fashion those borrowed aspects to be 
responsive to our contemporary lifestyle. It seems though that the greatest challenge 
will be how to get the current generations – the generation ‘X’, the generation ‘Y’, and 
‘Millennials’, which are symbiotically attuned to modern electronic technologies - smart 
phones, tablets and laptops, and various social media – twitter, facebook, Mix It, or 
Google+, to recognise and embrace the imperatives of Ubuntu as they go about their 
daily hustle and bustle.    
 
Ubuntu was invoked by the Constitutional Court of South Africa as one of the sources 
for authorising the unconstitutionality of capital punishment (Motha, 2009:318). 
Therefore, it can be reasonably argued that Ubuntu reveres life. And as Motha 
(2009:319) cogently points out, “a ‘rigorous jurisprudence’ would want to engage with 
specific norms inspired by Ubuntu and the profile of punishment in African cultures 
before reaching any conclusions on the meaning of Ubuntu for the question of the 
constitutionality of capital punishment”. Against this backdrop, it seems reasonable to 
rule out any suggestion of an anomaly with respect to the view that the normative 
values of Ubuntu have the potential to provide a philosophical basis for democracy in 
South Africa.  
 
Enslin and Horsthemke (2004:549) argue that there is no distinctly or uniquely African 
democracy. I beg to differ. And let me explain. For me, there should be no doubt about 
the uniqueness of African democracy. Ake (1993:243) makes a compelling case for 
the uniqueness of African democracy. He argues that democracy has to be recreated 
in the context of the given realities in political arrangements which fit the cultural 
context, without sacrificing its values and inherent principles. This latter point is of 
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critical importance in that it suggests that Ake (1993) would have no problem with a 
conception of democracy that draws on the imperatives of local cultures and traditions 
without necessarily compromising democracy’s universally accepted fundamental 
principles and tenets.  Ake (1993:244) cautions that an analysis of democracy in Africa 
must acknowledge the con-societal arrangement and the use of ethnic groups, 
nationalities and communities as the constituencies for representation. He posits that 
such a con-societal arrangement would be a highly decentralised system of 
government with equal emphasis on individual and communal rights. This last point is 
consistent with the thrust of my argument in this study, which is coexistence between 
liberal democratic values and traditional African values. 
 
Ake (1993:241) argues that “in order for African democracy to be relevant and 
sustainable, it has to de-emphasise abstract political rights and stress concrete 
economic rights because the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its 
impetus from the prevailing economic conditions”. This is because generally, Africans 
do not separate political democracy from economic democracy, or for that matter, from 
economic well-being. Instead they regard political empowerment as an essential part 
of getting the economic agenda right and ensuring that development projects are 
managed better, and their rewards are evenly distributed. For Ake (1993:244), a 
unique African democracy is not something that would emerge from a rational 
blueprint. Rather it should emerge from practical experience and improvisation in the 
course of a hard struggle. It must be shaped by the singular reality that those whose 
democratic participation is at issue are ordinary peoples, many of whom are illiterate, 
poor, rural dwellers in essentially pre-industrial and communal society. Africa remains 
predominantly communal. It is this communality which defines the people’s 
perceptions of self-interest, their freedom and their location in the social whole (Ake, 
1993:244). South Africa is an upper middle income country. And yet millions of blacks 
are illiterate, poor, rural or informal settlement dwellers, which is why South Africa is 
one of the most unequal societies in the world. Its Gini coefficient - the best-known 
measure of inequality in which 0 is the most equal and 1 the least, stands at over 0.63 
(The Economist, 2012). 
 
Mbeki (1998:71-72) drew on Sir Benjamin Disraeli’s 1845 novel Sybil, or Two Nations, 
to make a case for South Africa as ‘Two Nations’. He wrote:  
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“We therefore make bold to say that South Africa is a country of two nations. 
One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or 
geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economy, physical, 
educational, communication and other infrastructure. This enables it to argue 
that, except for the persistence of gender discrimination against women; all 
members of this nation have the possibility to exercise their right to equal 
opportunity, the development opportunities to which the constitution of 1993 
committed our country. 
 
The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst 
affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general 
and the disabled. This nation lives under conditions of a grossly 
underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other 
infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility to exercise what in reality amount to 
a theoretical right to equal opportunity, with that right being equal within this 
black nation only to the extent that it is equally incapable of realisation”. 
 
For making such an important observation Mbeki was berated and vilified. Nattrass 
and Seekings (2001a, 2001b) accused him of ‘reducing inequality to race’. That is, of 
implying that black equals poor and white equals rich. Nattrass and Seekings 
(2001a:474) argued that South Africa was not simply a society comprising a rich, 
capitalist minority and a homogeneous, poor majority dependent on the sale of uniform 
labour. Instead the country’s social structure comprised three broad groupings: at the 
top was the upper class, comprising people with incomes well above the mean, and 
assets and skills that are internationally transferable. Below this was a large group 
comprising the urban industrial working class, a range of public sector employees, and 
some workers in the formal private service sector. This group had income ranging 
around the median up to above the mean. At the lowest rank were predominantly 
households that either had no working members, or were in the most marginal sectors 
of the working class, especially domestic and agricultural employment. Nattrass and 
Seekings (2001b:47) insisted that by emphasising interracial economic inequality, 
Mbeki misunderstood the changing nature of inequality in South Africa. For them, 
inequality was driven by two income gaps between an increasingly multiracial upper 
class and everyone else, and between a middle class of mostly urban, industrial, or 
white-collar workers and a marginalised class of black and rural poor.  
 
My own view is that Nattrass and Seekings simply glossed over South Africa’s racially 
skewed labour market in which a minority of whites continue to hold most skilled 
occupations and senior and executive management positions, while the majority of 
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blacks continue to swell the ranks of junior and support staff (Econometrix Ecobulletin, 
2007; Moleke, 2006, 2005; Pauw Oosthuizen., and van der Westhuizen, 2008; Bhorat, 
2004). Moleke (2005:2) rightly observes that because of discrimination and acquired 
human capital, South Africa’s labour market is characterised by racial job segregation 
both between sectors and between occupational categories. Drawing on labour market 
analyses she conducted for the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Moleke 
(2006:4) argues that whites are still overrepresented in skilled occupations and their 
representation at senior-management level is also relatively high. Her findings are 
confirmed by Econometrix, one of South Africa’s independent macro-economic 
consultancies. 
 
Here is a brief illustration of the enduring racial job segregation between sectors and 
between occupational categories. While the proportion of Africans in top management 
increased from 6.2% in 2000 to 11.3% in 2006, the proportion of whites was 87.5% 
and 74.4% respectively (Econometrix Ecobulletin, 2007). African senior management 
positions increased from 8.7% in 2000 to 13.4% in 2006, while for whites it was 81.6% 
and 70.9% respectively. The proportion of professionally qualified Africans declined 
from 32.8% in 2000 to 20.2% in 2006 while the proportion of professionally qualified 
whites increased from 56.1% in 2000 to 61.2% in 2006. Unemployment rates for 
whites during 2001-2007 ranged between 5% and 4.8%, which was way below the 
national average of 31.5%. Shockingly, unemployment rates for Africans ranged 
between 30% and 37%. As it can be noticed, these rates were well above the national 
average at some stage.  
A critical question that should be raised at this stage is, has the situation changed 
since the 2006 data above were made public? The answer is, unequivocally, not much. 
The Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) released its 2010-2011report which 
paints a gloomy picture. The CEE report notes that the proportion of Africans in top 
management remains unchanged at 11.3% while the proportion of whites in top 
management improved from 74.4% to 74.9%. The proportion of Africans in senior 
management positions remains unchanged at 13.4%. Similarly, the proportion of 
whites in the same category remains unchanged at 70.9%. The proportion of 
professionally qualified Africans increased from 20.2% to 31% while the proportion 
professionally qualified whites declined from 61.2% to 47.7%. Disparities between the 
upward mobility of whites and blacks in the value chain are astounding. Some labour 
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market analysts have projected that it would take over 100 years to transform the top 
management level and over 30 years to transform the senior management level in 
terms of African and Coloured representation (Matsha, 2011, Ray, 2008). It is a matter 
of concern to Africanist economists and policy makers that in a country where Africans 
constitute the majority some employers and their managers can still claim that they 
cannot find qualified blacks (Mabokela, 2000:102).  
 
To reiterate Ake (1987) above, there is no democracy where there is no equality 
because inequality reduces human relations to subordination and domination. Political 
rights cannot be divorced from the economic well-being of the individual persons. A 
person may be free to express his/her political ideas and still not be free to pursue or 
realise his/her chosen purpose in life because they are denied the necessary 
conditions for realising such a purpose (Gyekye, 1997:142-3). In the same vein, 
economic well-being should not be relentlessly pursued to the total disregard of the 
political rights of the individual. It is my view that Ubuntu as humanness, caring, 
sharing, respect, compassion (Broodryk, 2002:13) and as kindness, generosity, 
benevolence, courtesy, and concern for others (Letseka, 2000:180), is a useful tool 
for understanding the deep and enduring socio-economic inequalities that continue to 
plaque South Africa. A discussion of socio-economic inequalities that is premised on 
the above Ubuntu values and principles has the potential for a candid pursuit for 
dignified solutions. 
 
 
5.2.3  Whether community is prior to the individual 
 
The issue of whether community has priority over the individual or whether 
communalism is ethically superior to individualism dominated social science debates 
in the 1980s when the liberal-communitarian debate burst into the open. In this study 
I make a case for the amalgamation, or crosspollination between some traditional 
African socio-political and cultural practices and some liberal socio-political and 
cultural practices. I am drawn to the work of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor 
(1991:161), who argues that often the choice is not simply between a close, family-
like community and a modern, impersonal society. Rather it is possible to have 
communitarian or holist ontology and to value liberalism’s individual rights. By this, 
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Taylor means that someone can subscribe to communitarianism at the analytical level 
and still advocate certain liberal goods, such as freedom of speech and religion at the 
ontological level. Taylor (1996:3) contends that to get the relationship and the 
differences between liberalism and communitarianism right, it is probably necessary 
to distinguish ontological from advocacy issues. Ontological issues have to do with 
how you explain social life while advocacy issues encompass things that are valued, 
held to be good and worth promoting. For Wiredu (1996:72), the distinction between 
communalism and individualism is one of degree only. A considerable value may be 
attached to communality in individualistic societies, just as individuality is not 
necessarily trivialised within communalism. In fact the two orientations can co-exist in 
different sectors of the same society. 
 
5.2.4  Ubuntu and African democratic education 
 
Enslin and Horsthemke (2004:553) question attempts to establish a suitable 
educational discourse or philosophy of education for South Africa. They are critical of 
the viability of African traditional education, especially the assumption that an 
indigenous African epistemology should constitute the basis for an African version of 
both democracy and conceptions of education. Moreover, Enslin and Horsthemke 
(2004:554) are particularly critical of Adeyemi and Adeyinka’s (2003) notion of 
indigenous African education which is anchored on the principles of:  
 ‘Preparationism’: learning and teaching that equip boys and girls with the skills 
appropriate to their gender in preparation for their distinctive roles in the 
society’; 
 ‘Functionalism’: learning through imitation, initiation ceremonies, work, play, 
oral literature; 
 ‘Communalism’: an environment in which all members of the society own things 
in common and apply the communal spirit to life and work; 
 ‘Perennialism’: a conception in most traditional African communities by which 
education is a vehicle for maintaining or preserving the cultural heritage and 
status quo; and 
 ‘Wholisticism’: multiple learning in which young people are provided with the 
skills they would need for their future occupations. 
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Enslin and Horsthemke (2004: 554) contend that these principles are either not 
particularly or uniquely African or do not constitute obviously ‘sound’ foundations. They 
pick out preparationism, perennialism and wholisticism and argue that they are not 
obviously sound in that they endorse a strict gender-based division of labour and 
existing power structures while discouraging critical and independent thinking. 
Personally, I would be appalled by a socio-cultural arrangement that puts a gendered 
stigma to certain roles or privileges one gender over the other. Such a privilege would 
no doubt be inconsistent with my own upbringing. I was born into a family of eight (8) 
siblings – five (5) boys and three (3) girls. Given the size of my family, the siblings 
studied and completed their qualifications in turns. For instance, after completing my 
primary school-leaving examinations in 1970, I stayed out of school for two years - 
during 1971-72, so that my two elder sisters could complete their Cambridge Overseas 
School Certificate (COSC) at a boarding school in Maseru, the capital town of Lesotho. 
I returned to school in 1973 to begin my studies towards the Junior Certificate (JC), 
which I completed with a second class pass in 1975. In 1976, I had to miss out on 
schooling so that my younger brother and a sister could enrol at a secondary school 
for their JC. Out of frustration, in 1976 I got recruited to work as an underground winch 
driver at Western Areas gold mine, near the town of Westonaria, South of 
Johannesburg, South Africa. While the above-mentioned breaks in my formal 
education may seem unfair to champions of children’s’ rights, in hindsight I can 
understand the challenges my parents faced to ensure that each of their eight children 
obtained at least a school exit certificate, even if it meant others had to make huge 
sacrifices in the process. My view is that the maxim: I am because we are. And since 
we are, therefore I am, appropriately captures the sacrifices some of us had to make 
so that educational opportunities for all the siblings could be equitably distributed. 
  
Masolo (2010:52-53) cautions that if our cultures teach us from childhood that males 
are more valuable than females, we are likely to grow up believing that such a 
statement of gender inequality is a true description of the social order, and if we are 
males, it may lead us to believe that we are justified in treating women as unequals in 
the family and in the workplace. Masolo (2010:251) is unequivocal that a person is 
morally good when he strictly observes the rules that separate gendered spaces in 
society and where such separation is made out of respect rather than to discriminate. 
To that end, I believe my parents were morally good in their observance of rules that 
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separate gendered spaces to which Masolo refers above. Reminiscing about his own 
experiences of gender relations in his hometown of Mombasa, Kenya, Masolo 
(2010:132) recalls that everyone knew that at the taxi stop, mothers, people of the 
female gender, children, and the elderly boarded and alighted first, and no one pushed 
anyone else. These mores were so well known that no one needed to be reminded of 
them. Masolo informs us that in Swahili this is known as ustaarabu - social civility. 
 
In Chapter 2 above I noted that the central cultural fact of Africa’s life is not the 
sameness of Africa’s cultures, but their enormous diversity. It seems to me that Enslin 
and Horsthemke take Adeyemi and Adeyinka’s views on indigenous African education 
to be a representative conception of indigenous education across the entire continent 
of Africa. I am afraid that such a position misses the focus of Appiah’s (1997) argument 
with respect to Africa’s enormous cultural diversity. Appiah (1997:47) argues that 
“Africa’s forms of life are too diverse to capture in a single ideal type. The central 
cultural fact of Africa’s life remains not the sameness of cultures, but their enormous 
diversity”. Appiah picks out among others, the diversity in religion, politics, clothing 
and cuisine. Taking cue from Appiah’s argument above, it seems that instead of 
referring to ‘African culture’ [as a homogeneous entity], we should be referring to 
‘African cultures’ [as heterogeneous entities]. It follows therefore that while Adeyemi 
and Adeyinka (2003) may be Africans, they are writing about specific conceptions of 
indigenous education in Nigeria, which are not even representative of the diverse 
traditions and cultures found in Nigeria. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation, with 
a population of over 150 million peoples, and “over 250 ethnic groups and languages, 
each having a number of distinguishing characteristics” (Falola, 2001:4). Adeyemi and 
Adeyinka’s views on indigenous African education cannot therefore be regarded as 
broadly representative of conceptions of indigenous African education on the continent 
of Africa as a whole. To regard them as such would simply amount to ‘reductionism’. 
Nagel (1998:3) argues that according to the ‘reductionist idea’, “all of the complex and 
varied and apparently disparate things and processes that we observe in the world 
can be explained in terms of universal principles that govern the common ultimate 
constituents out of which, in many different combinations, those diverse phenomena 
are really composed”. Nagel explains that “the idea is that there exists, in principle, a 
theory of everything, in the form of a theory governing the one thing or few things of 
which everything else consists”. An often used expression which passes as 
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reductionist is when someone tries to explain another person’s misfortune in order to 
reach closure by declaring: “it is God’s will”. Often reducing sad human experiences 
to ‘God’s will’ suggests there should be no further discussion on the matter given the 
omnipotence of God. 
 
In this final part of the section I shall share some conceptions of the Basotho 
indigenous education, with qualification of course. Lesotho is one of Southern African 
countries in which there is one official language - Sesotho. Generally, all the Basotho 
people are Sesotho speakers. However, there are those Basotho who live along the 
border between Lesotho and the border towns of South Africa’s Eastern Cape 
Province, who are Sesotho speakers first, but also speak Isi-Xhosa as a second 
language, and out of necessity for interacting with their Xhosa neighbours. I grew up 
in a traditional Sesotho homestead in a rural Lesotho village. I could, if I would, share 
understandings of Zulu indigenous education, Pedi indigenous education, Tsonga 
indigenous education, or for that matter Xhosa indigenous education. But I cannot do 
that, notwithstanding that these are all regarded as Bantu-speaking peoples. 
Realistically therefore I can only offer my readers an account of Basotho indigenous 
education because it is my own native knowledge with which I can claim familiarity, 
and about which I can write uninhibitedly. Having said that, it would be naive of me to 
presume that the notion of Basotho indigenous education I shall describe is 
representative of other Sotho indigenous education among the Basotho people found 
in Southern Africa. For to do so would imply that I am painting all Sotho-speaking 
peoples of Southern Africa with a single paint brush that presumes cultural 
homogeneity regardless of their vast cultural diversity.  
  
Basotho indigenous education strove for some form of social civility. As Matšela 
(1979:159) points out, the education of a Mosotho child entailed cultural values, 
philosophy, personal and family responsibilities and duties to the clan and the people, 
or what in modern politics is known as civic responsibility. Basotho indigenous 
education aimed to create citizens that are immersed in the kind of personhood that 
was regarded as essential for ‘good’ human conduct among Basotho communities.10 
                                                          
10 I borrow the idea of ‘creating citizens’ from Eamonn Callan’s (1997) book, Creating Citizens: Political 
Education and Liberal Democracy. Callan (1997:3) advocates a political culture in which there is an 
active commitment to the good of the polity, confidence and competence in judgements regarding how 
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Matšela (1990-53-56) argues that through lebollo or initiation school, Basotho 
indigenous education aimed to equip youngsters with competencies that were 
essential for adulthood. These included bohloeki (purity), which is advocacy for 
cleanliness both in its literal form as it relates to hygienic living and in its metaphorical 
form as it relates to the purity of mind and inner self. Lebollo sought to instil 
competencies such as thuto-kelello (cognitive engagement) - the ability to think 
strategically and at the highest level. For instance, the initiates were exposed to a 
problem-based education where they were presented with problems pertaining to real 
life situations in society and challenged to develop solutions. They were instructed on 
makhabane (virtues) such as industry or hard work, respect for persons, humility, 
perseverance, service to the nation, patriotism, leruo (wealth), makunutu a sechaba 
(national secrets or classified information), bonatla (warriorship), and boqapi le 
bokheleke (creativity and eloquence). It is therefore debatable to suggest, as Enslin 
and Horsthemke (2004) do, that indigenous African education discouraged critical and 
independent thinking. 
 
My own initiation into responsibility began as a herd boy tasked to look after my father’s 
cattle in the early 1970s. Herding then was a serious duty and responsibility which 
every herd boy was expected to carry out with distinction regardless of whether the 
weather outside was glorious sunshine, pouring rains, freezing winters, hail storms or 
snow. A herd boy who excelled in his duties and responsibilities was revered and 
honoured throughout the village. He was known as a Motjodi – or the Euplectes progne 
– the long-tailed widowbird, which implies one who leads with distinction. Mapesela 
(2004:322) contends that Basotho indigenous education inculcated good ethics, 
morals and values such as humaneness (Ubuntu), neighbourliness, responsibility, and 
respect for self and others. He posits that Basotho indigenous education “can still be 
used to encourage people to become better members of society, as well as to help 
curb certain social problems.... a lack of neighbourliness (leading to heartlessness, 
theft, killing and rape), a lack of Ubuntu (resulting in an uncaring and unpatriotic 
society); as well as a lack of good ethics (leading to an irresponsible, lazy and poor 
society)”. 
                                                          
that good should be advanced, and a respect for fellow citizens as well as a sense of common fate with 
them that goes beyond the tribalisms of ethnicity and religion and is yet alive to the significance these 
will have in many people’s lives. 
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Elsewhere I have commented on the important aspect of letsema, or cooperative 
community farming in Basotho indigenous education. I show that “four or more families 
would come together and agree on a duty roster that would allow them to cultivate 
each of their fields on agreed days to make them ready for the planting season” 
(Letseka, 2000:183). Letsema was not simply a cooperative community effort. On the 
contrary, through letsema members of the community recognised that it would be 
difficult and slow for individual families to complete the cultivation of their fields on time 
if each family was to go it alone (Letseka, 2000:184). Adeyinka and Ndwapi (2002:18) 
observe that part of the purpose of African traditional education was the development 
in children of a communal spirit, by which each individual saw himself/herself as part 
of a bigger unit, working and living together for the common good. In this regard, it can 
be argued that African traditional education inculcated in young people feelings of 
belonging to a community as well as the interdependence that existed between 
members of the community. Masolo (2010:240) calls this “a life of cohesion, or positive 
integration with others”.  
 
To sum up, I have sketched the criticisms of Ubuntu vis-à-vis conceptions of education 
and democracy in South Africa. I underscored the fact that invoking Ubuntu calls for 
the embeddedness of African democracy in indigenous social and cultural contexts. I 
argued that African democracy needs to be recreated in the context of the realities in 
political arrangements of the African cultural context. I sketched the Basotho 
indigenous education and argued that it aimed to create citizens who are initiated in 
the kind of personhood that was regarded as essential for ‘good’ human conduct 
among the Basotho people. I acknowledged though that given Africa’s enormous 
diversity of cultures, a particular peoples’ indigenous education cannot be generalised 
as representative of all African cultures. In the next section I explore the potential for 
Ubuntu to serve as a moral theory, a public policy, and a notion of African communal 
justice. I shall make brief remarks on the coincidence between some of the values that 
are implicit in the Constitution of South Africa and some of the values that are implicit 
in Ubuntu, and close by highlighting the educational upshot of Ubuntu.  
 
5.3  Ubuntu as a moral theory and a public policy  
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Mudimbe (1988:194) raises important questions pertaining to current debates on 
Ubuntu in South Africa, and are also central to perceptions of the value of Ubuntu to 
African communities. He asks: “What is an African and how does one speak of him or 
her and for what purpose? Where and how can one gain the knowledge of his or her 
being? How does one define this very being, and to what authority does one turn for 
possible answers?” In section 3.2.1 above I referred to Mudimbe’s (1988) view that 
Western interpreters as well as some African analysts have continued to use 
categories and conceptual systems which depend on a Western epistemological 
order. And that even in the most explicitly ‘Afrocentric’ descriptions, models of analysis 
explicitly or implicitly, knowingly or unknowingly, refer to the same order.  
 
Oladipo (1995:26) picks out a European discourse on Africa that tends to 
underestimate and denigrate African cultures and identities and to deny that reason 
played a significant role in the development of society and cultures in Africa as it did 
in Europe. This discourse is an aspect of the myth that was designed as an ideology 
of legitimation of the colonial enterprise. Oladipo (1995:27) argues that Africans are, 
and always have been regarded as backward and barbaric people who have never 
been able to establish a civilised society of their own. To the colonisers Africans were 
an inferior race of people whose religions, where there were any, were without any 
abiding values. They [the Africans] were perceived as lacking the intellectual and 
moral resources of the Europeans, whose mission in Africa was a ‘civilising mission’. 
Fatton (1990:458) reminds us that at the height of African nationalism and the drive 
for independence from colonial rule, the “Africans were treated as children who had 
yet to acquire the necessary maturity required for considered judgment and political 
decision making. They were socially dead and removed from history”. 
 
There are glaring similarities between the above-mentioned views on Africa and the 
African people and the assumptions of the Christian National Education (CNE) policy 
- the apartheid philosophy on which Bantu education during apartheid in South Africa 
was based. The CNE stated that ‘on the grounds of cultural infancy’ of the native, it 
was the right and task of the Afrikaner state, in collaboration with Afrikaner Christian 
churches, to give and control native education and training of the native teaching 
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forces (Rose & Tunmer, 1975). Article 15: African (Bantu) Teaching and Education of 
the CNE policy stated as follows: 
“We believe that the calling and task of white S.A. with regard to the native is 
to Christianise him and help him on culturally, and that this calling and task has 
already found its nearer focusing in the principles of trusteeship, no equality 
and segregation …in accordance with these principles we believe that the 
teaching and education of the native must be grounded in the life and world 
view of the white, most especially those of the Boer nation as the senior trustee 
of the native, and that the natives must be led to a mutatis mutandis yet 
independent acceptance of the Christian and National principles in our 
teaching” (Rose & Tunmer, 1975: 128). 
 
As a consequence of the above ideological stance, the education of the Africans was 
taken over by the Afrikaner state bent on gaining ideological control over the black 
intelligentsia (Terreblanche, 2002: 335). In my view, central to the debate on Ubuntu 
should be the imperative for South Africans to clarify their conceptions of ‘an African’ 
identity. As Keevy (2008:319) puts it, Ubuntu represents a ‘recovery of the logic of 
brotherhood in ethno-philosophy’ because it [Ubuntu] is the collective personhood and 
collective morality of the African people. I use ‘conceptions of an African identity’ here 
to clarify that individuals do not have a singular identity, but a repertoire of identities 
(Ross, 2007: 287). Identities are composed of several, and sometimes contradictory 
or unresolved affinities. Hall (1992:292) argues that identity has two distinctive 
connotations: one of ‘being the same as others’ and having continuity with them, and 
the other as identity that brings with it a sense of being different from the other. Thus 
for Jamieson (2002: 34), identity is an elastic and inference-rich concept that bundles 
together complex social processes. The term identities can also be used to 
encompass facets of the self that are only at play in some social contexts, and not 
others. Ubuntu is therefore a ‘counter discourse’ which aims to reclaim African 
humanity (Oladipo, 1995: 27). 
 
As an educationist I find Wa Thiongo’s questions regarding the inherited colonial 
education systems and the consciousness they inculcated in the African mind, most 
compelling for thinking about education and its aims in South Africa. Wa Thiongo 
(1994:101-102) asks: What directions should an education system take in an Africa 
wishing to break with neo-colonialism? What should be the philosophy guiding it? How 
does it want the ‘New Africans’ to view themselves and their universe? From what 
base: Afrocentric or Eurocentric? What are the materials they should be exposed to: 
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and in what order and perspective? Who should be interpreting that material to them: 
an African or non-African? If African, what kind of African? One who has internalised 
the colonial world outlook or one who is attempting to break free from the inherited 
slave consciousness? 
 
When Thabo Mbeki (1998a:32) described himself as ‘an African’: as the grandchild of 
the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led; the patriots that 
Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle; the soldiers Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane 
taught never to dishonour the cause of freedom, he was not merely appealing to 
nationalistic populism that comes with the overvaluing of the golden past (Odora 
Hoppers, 2002). Instead he was expressing a perception of his African identity. 
Mbeki’s fascination with the concept of African identity should be viewed within the 
context of his African renaissance project (Mbeki, 1998b). The African renaissance 
project was an attempt to interrogate the manner in which Africa has been 
represented, cast, or stereotyped as the Other by Western colonial and imperial 
literature. Since the colonial and imperial eras, the West has been “a locality of power 
and a centre distinctly demarcated from the Other as the subject of knowledge and 
inevitably subordination” (Ahluwalia, 2002:267). In order to turn the situation in favour 
of Africans defining their destinies, Mbeki (1998b) makes a case for ‘Africa’s renewal’. 
He argues that Africa's renewal demands that her intelligentsia must immerse itself in 
the all-round struggle to end poverty, ignorance, disease and backwardness, inspired 
by the fact that the Africans of Egypt were, in some instances, two thousand years 
ahead of the Europeans of Greece in the mastery of such subjects as geometry, 
trigonometry, algebra and chemistry.11 
 
I was brought up in a rural African homestead in Lesotho which identifies itself with the 
totem group of the Bafokeng. The Bafokeng totem group is associated with the wily 
rabbit, which in Sesotho cultures and traditions is known for its trickery to get out of 
difficult situations. I was socialised to proudly assert my Bofokeng through recitation 
                                                          
11See Obenga, T. 2004. Egypt: Ancient History of African Philosophy. In Kwasi Wiredu (ed) A 
Companion to African Philosophy, Blackwell Publishing: Malden, California, pp.31-49; Karenga, M. 
1998. Black Studies and the Problematic of Paradigm: The Philosophical Dimension.  Journal of Black 
Studies, 18 (4), 395-414; Critchley, S. 1995. Black Socrates? Questioning the philosophical tradition. 
Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, 86:79-98; Assante, M. K. 1992. Kemet, Afrocentricity 
and Knowledge, African World Press: Trenton, New Jersey. 
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of specific Bafokeng praise poetry. It is the norm among the Basotho people of Lesotho 
to dare one another to praise one’s totem group when they meet up. Totem group 
praises take the form of oral historical and poetic recitation of one’s family lineage. The 
poems are carefully preserved and passed from generation to generation by word of 
mouth by lineage elders. Their knowledge is highly regarded and is perceived to signify 
one’s cultural identity.  
 
Having said that, and while I am proud of, and hold my cultural identity in high esteem, 
I am not shackled to it. This is because I have other identities that I have adopted as I 
evolved from a Mosotho village herd boy to a university academic, educational 
researcher, scholar and cosmopolitan citizen. The latter identities are as equally 
valuable to me as my Bofokeng identity. For instance, as a university academic, 
education researcher, scholar and cosmopolitan citizen, I travel widely on the African 
continent, across Europe and North America where I interact with fellow academics, 
education researchers, scholars and cosmopolitan citizens at international 
conferences or other scholarly forums. The defining feature of cosmopolitan 
citizenship is that it embraces the cosmos (Gitlin, 2006:130). Cosmopolitanism is not 
just a belief. It is also an experience. It rests on sociological realities such as 
inexpensive travel, comfort with multiple languages and a thick mesh of contact with 
people of other nations who affiliate by professional and political interest (Gitlin, 
2006:130). The world that cosmopolitans inhabit is not confined to fixed national 
boundaries. This is because cosmopolitanism is premised on a fluid set of 
relationships which are often lived out as network extensions. Cosmopolitanism invites 
connections with people who happen to live in other countries. Hence for 
cosmopolitans, nations are not natural, organic, objective, or anything of that sort but 
are the inventions - ‘constructions’ - of intellectuals and the stories that they tell about 
history and culture (Gitlin, 2006:131). 
 
While a cosmopolitan allegiance is to the global community of human beings to be a 
citizen of the world, but it does not necessarily mean one should give up one’s local 
identifications, which can frequently be a source of great richness in life (Nussbaum, 
2002:9). One should not think of oneself as devoid of local affiliations, but as 
surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first one is drawn around the self; the 
next takes in one’s immediate family; then follows the extended family; then one’s 
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neighbours or local group, one’s fellow city-dwellers, one’s fellow countrymen – and 
we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, 
professional, gender and sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest of 
them all, that of humanity as a whole (Nussbaum, 2002:9). Nussbaum (2002:8) makes 
a compelling case for education for world citizenship on three grounds. Firstly, the 
study of humanity as it is realised in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: 
we see ourselves more dearly when we see our ways in relation to those of other 
reasonable people. Secondly, only by making our fundamental allegiance to the world 
community of justice and reason can we avoid the dangers of local allegiances and 
partisan loyalties. Thirdly, cosmopolitan politics recognises in people what is especially 
fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgment: their 
aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacities for reasoning in this 
connection.  
  
Against this backdrop, my view is that central to the debate on Ubuntu should be how 
the African peoples perceive Ubuntu as a worldview that embodies their notions of 
morality, their views on personhood, and their notions of the good life. The reason for 
this is that Ubuntu encapsulates the value systems that acknowledge people as social 
and co-dependent beings (McCluskey & Lephalala, 2010:23). In this regard, Ubuntu 
has been described as a form of African communitarianism (Keevy, 2008; Biko, 1987), 
or Afro-communitarianism (Metz & Gaie, 2010). I should mention that the adjectives 
‘African’ and ‘Afro’ should not be misconstrued to imply that Ubuntu is merely a locally 
insulated worldview that has no international relevance. This is because some of the 
values that Ubuntu encapsulates can be traced to various Eurasian philosophies. As 
Louw (2001: 28) rightly points out, it would be ethnocentric and, indeed silly to suggest 
that the Ubuntu ethic of caring and sharing is uniquely African. I shall come back to 
the above-mentioned Eurasian philosophies with more details below. I now turn to the 
view of Ubuntu as a moral theory.  
 
5.3.1  Ubuntu as a moral theory    
 
A common thread running through the work of Africanist scholars of Ubuntu is the view 
that Ubuntu is a normative concept or a moral theory that has a cohesive value (Metz 
& Gaie, 2010; Metz, 2007; Bessler, 2008; Broodryk, 2002; Ramose, 2002b; Letseka, 
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2000; Sindane, 1994; Tutu, 1999; Shutte, 1994; Teffo, 1994). The above-mentioned 
scholars agree that the defining features of Ubuntu include among others, caring, 
compassion, respect for others, and concern for the well-being of others. British 
philosopher Joseph Raz (1994, 1988) has written extensively on the philosophical 
aspects of the concept of ‘personal well-being’. His view is that the definition of ‘well-
being’ sees life as active. He argues that the concept of ‘personal well-being captures 
one crucial evaluation of a person's life: how good or successful is it from his point of 
view (Raz, 1988:289). In a later publication, Raz (1994:3) contends that the promotion 
and protection of ‘well-being’ ought to be the central task of political action. He 
surmises that ‘personal well-being’ and personality or character, are the two most 
basic (and deeply inter-connected) dimensions by which people understand and judge 
themselves and others.  
 
I want to argue a case for resonance between Raz’s (1994, 1988) position on ‘personal 
well-being’ and Ramose’s (2002a) philosophical insights on Ubuntu. For instance, 
Ramose (2002a:230) argues that Ubuntu is the wellspring flowing with African 
ontology and epistemology. He posits that a persuasive philosophical argument can 
be made that there is a ‘family atmosphere’ - a kind of philosophical affinity and kinship 
among and between the indigenous people of Africa, which is captured in the maxim: 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, whose English translation approximates something like: 
“a person is a person through other persons”. My view is that umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu articulates a deeper communal interdependence and a concern with the 
‘well-being’ of others in the traditional African worldview.  
 
It can therefore be reasonably argued that as a moral theory that is concerned with 
the well-being of others, Ubuntu is the capacity to express compassion, justice, 
reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building, maintaining and 
strengthening the community (Bessler, 2008:43). Ubuntu articulates our inter-
connectedness, our common humanity and the responsibility we owe to each other. It 
commands us to care for each other and to embrace the principle of reciprocity and 
mutual support (Elechi, Morris & Schauer, and 2010:75). The maxim: umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu has a much deeper meaning. It articulates social 
interdependence or a deep rootedness in one’s community (Chichane, 2008; Adonis 
2008). Thus to utter the phrase umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu inspires us to expose 
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ourselves to others, to encounter the difference of their humanness so as to enrich our 
own (Sindane, 1994:8-9). As Louw (2006:161) puts it, umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu 
articulates a basic respect for compassion. It is both a factual description and a rule of 
conduct or social ethic that not only describes human beings as being-with-others, but 
also prescribes how human beings should relate to others: that is, what being-with-
others should be all about.  
 
While French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre is known for his views on existentialism, 
he has attempted to establish the link between existentialism and humanism.12 As 
Flynn (2006:91) points out, central to Sartre’s humanism is the view that if we are to 
pursue freedom in the concrete rather than merely dream of it in the abstract, we must 
address the alienated situation of others because we cannot be free until they too have 
been liberated. Sartre (2007:51-52) notes that the word ‘humanism’ has two different 
meanings. On the one hand, it might mean a theory that takes man as an end and as 
the supreme value. But Sartre rejects this meaning of humanism, for, as he points out, 
existentialism will never consider man as an end, because man is constantly in the 
making. He argues that we have no right to believe that humanity is something we 
could worship, in the manner of Auguste Comte, for the cult of humanity leads 
ultimately to an insular Comteian humanism, or to Fascism. It is Sartre’s contention 
that this type of humanism is undesirable. On the other hand, the other meaning of 
humanism is one that sees the existence of the universe as human. As Sartre 
(1966:55) writes:  
“Man is all the time outside himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond 
himself that he makes man to exist: and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing 
transcendence aims that he himself is able to exist. Since man is thus self-
surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is 
himself the heart and centre of his transcendence. There is no other universe 
except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity”.   
 
Sartre (2007:53) calls this ‘existentialist humanism’. He argues that this type of 
humanism reminds man that there is no legislator other than man himself. And that 
man must therefore make his own choices, and seek goals outside of himself in the 
form of liberation in order to realise himself as truly human. For Sartre (1966:60), in 
                                                          
12 See Sartre, J. 2007. Existentialism is a Humanism, Yale University Press: New Haven; Sartre, J. 
1966. Existentialism and Humanism, translated and introduction by Phillip Mairet, Methuen & Co. Ltd: 
London.  
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the final analysis, humanism is a philosophy that is concerned with human dignity and 
the eminent value of personality.    
 
In Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, Sartre 
(2003:413) argues that we discover ourselves not in conflict with the other but in 
community with him. He opines that the ‘we’ includes a plurality of subjectives which 
recognise one another as subjectivities. Moreover, the ‘we’ is a certain particular 
experience which is produced in special cases on the foundation of being-for-others 
in general. The being-for-others precedes and founds the being-with-others (Sartre, 
2003:414). Thus “the nature of my body refers me to the existence of others and to 
my being-for-others” (Sartre, 2003:218). Sartre (2003:238) observes that finally in my 
essential being I depend on the essential being of the Other, and instead of holding 
that my being-for-myself is opposed to my being-for-others, I find that being-for-others 
appears as a necessary condition for my being-for-myself. Sartre’s views above 
resonate with the fundamental principles of Ubuntu which dictate that if we are to be 
human, we need to recognise the genuine otherness of our fellow citizens; to 
acknowledge the diversity of languages, histories, values, and customs, all of which 
constitute the South African society (Louw, 2006:167).  
 
It should be getting clearer by now that central to Ubuntu is the notion of human dignity. 
Metz (2007:340) argues that Ubuntu is “a theory of right action”. He contends that the 
most justified normative theory of right action that has an African pedigree is the 
requirement to produce harmony and to reduce discord. In this regard, Ubuntu is 
fundamentally a matter of reverence of human life. Thus valuing human life or thinking 
of others as worthy of human flourishing is part of loving others or promoting harmony. 
Metz (2007:329) cites a Constitutional Court of South Africa judgement by Justice 
Yvonne Mokgoro in which she states that life and dignity are like two side of the same 
coin. But the concept of Ubuntu embodies both.  
 
The notion of human dignity is at the heart of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, 
especially Chapter 2 - Bill of Rights. Section 9 (1) states that “everyone is equal before 
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. Section 9 (2) 
conceptualises equality as “the full enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”, while section 
9 (3) protects these rights and freedoms. Even the state may not breach these rights. 
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For instance, “the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth”. Sections 10 and 11 affirm the right to 
respect and protection of everyone’s dignity, and the right to life. By the same token, 
Ubuntu accords all human beings a moral status. It considers everyone in principle to 
be potential members of an ideal family based on loving or friendly relationships (Metz 
& Gaie, 2010:281). I want to submit that Ubuntu has the potential to foster a shared 
moral discourse which is a characteristic feature of a cohesive society (Morrow, 
2007:6). In this regard, the struggle for Ubuntu is a philosophical struggle for people 
trying to heal the brutality and desperateness of a deeply ruptured society. In heart-
felt terms, the struggle for Ubuntu is the struggle for the dignity and soul of South Africa 
(Swanson, 2005:4).   
 
To come to the point I made earlier regarding resonance between Ubuntu and some 
Eurasian philosophies, it is my view that Ubuntu can be compared with Eurasian 
concepts such as Bildung, which is prevalent among Germanic philosophies, and the 
concept of Jen, which is prominent in Confucian philosophy. Siljander and Sutinen 
(2012:2) are certain that “the term Bildung is typically a German term and is often 
regarded in the German language area as a fundamental concept of educational 
science”. Drawing on the work of Immanuel Kant, Siljander and Sutinen (2012:4) argue 
that “Bildung is the realisation of the idea of a humanity, of a human becoming a 
human”. German scholar and intellectual Wilhelm von Humboldt outlined the notion of 
Bildung in his book, Theory of Bildung. Von Humboldt argued that Bildung is about 
linking the self to the world in the most general, most animated and most unrestrained 
interplay. He conceived of Bildung as mimetic. That is, as non-teleological, 
undetermined and uncertain, and aimed at the reconciliation between outer historico-
social and inner individual conditions (Wulf, 2003:247-48). For Humboldt, Bildung 
requires interchange between individuals. It is a political and social harmony which 
must be achieved in the modem state (Sorkin, 1983:60). Sorkin (1983:68) notes that 
for Humboldt, there is always an internal moral imperative which makes Bildung the 
basis of politics. And as Luèth (1998:57) sums it up, Bildung is an ‘ideal of humanity’ 
that is only possible as a communal effort.  There is a sense in which Luèth’s summary 
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here can be regarded as consistent with Ubuntu‘s inclination for communal 
interdependence.  
 
Løvlie and Standish (2002:319) note that in the world of Bildung the self is never a 
lonely wanderer, but always already involved, such that the opposition between the 
self and the world is not a contingent one but expresses a necessary relation. In other 
words, Bildung starts with the individual as embedded in a world that is at the same 
time that of the differentiated other. For Gert Biesta (2002:380), the modern conception 
of Bildung articulates an educational ideal that, through the Enlightenment, has gained 
a political significance in that it has become intimately connected with an emerging 
civil society and with a specific conception of the ideal citizen in such a society. It is 
Biesta’s (2002:383) contention that the aim of critical education should be acquisition 
of the capacity to decipher the operations of power behind the status quo, that is, 
behind what presents itself as necessary, natural, general and universal. Thus, the 
aim of a critical approach to Bildung becomes specified in terms of demystification.  
 
Considering that among the Bantu-speaking peoples of Southern Africa Ubuntu 
translates to humanness, in Confucian philosophy the concept of Jen “has been 
variously translated as ‘love’, ‘benevolence’, ‘human-heartedness’, ‘man-to-manness’, 
‘sympathy’, and ‘perfect virtue’” (Ma:1988:202). Walker and Dimmock (2000:168) point 
out that “the concept of Jen verifies that individuals should not be considered as 
separate entities but as inextricably bound to social context, the family, and the 
organisation”. In the same vein, Shun (1993:457) posits that Jen (humanness, 
goodness) is used “to refer to an all-encompassing ethical ideal which includes all the 
desirable qualities” such as “love for fellow human beings”. In Chinese philosophy 
Confucius is regarded as a thinker of merit about moral ideals such as humanness, 
tolerance and impartiality (Dong, 1992:33). Dong (1992:41) argues that historically 
human-heartedness referred to filial piety, or clan fidelity. “The intimate feeling among 
close members of the family – to attend to one’s parents and fellow older brothers, et 
cetera – was what the ‘human-heartedness’ aimed to apply to all social relationships”. 
Thus ‘human-heartedness’ was regarded as universal human nature. “Human beings 
are inherently good; everyone has feelings of human-heartedness, righteousness, 
propriety and wisdom” (Dong, 1992:42). Justice amounts to practicing human-
heartedness and is under the claw of human-heartedness” (Dong, 2002:44).   
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Given that Bildung is taken to imply an unrestrained interplay linking the self to the 
world (Wulf, 2003) and requires interchange between individuals (Sorkin, 1983); and 
that the “Confucian’s notion of Jen can be best described as love based on humanity” 
(NG, 2000:48), and an ideal that encompasses ‘love’, ‘benevolence’, ‘human-
heartedness’, ‘man-to-manness’, ‘sympathy’, and ‘perfect virtue’” (Ma:1988:202), a 
case can therefore be made for parallels between Bildung, Jen and Ubuntu given that 
Ubuntu also implies a humanistic orientation towards fellow beings (Mokgoro, 1988); 
a theory of right action (Metz, 2007); a philosophical affinity and kinship among and 
between the indigenous people of Africa (Ramose, 2002), and a conception of 
communal justice (Keevy, 2008). I now broach the idea of Ubuntu’s potential to serve 
as public policy and a conception of communal justice in traditional African societies. 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2  Ubuntu as public policy and communal justice 
 
Nkondo (2007:88) makes a case for building Ubuntu into South Africa’s national policy. 
He argues that Ubuntu can be connected with the imperatives of political power and 
democracy. As public policy, Ubuntu has the potential to contribute significantly to the 
development of an ethical disposition that can enable South Africans to reach out 
beyond narrow racial and ethnic identities (Nkondo, 2007: 94). Given some of the 
values that are implicit in Ubuntu, for example altruism, kindness, generosity, 
benevolence, courtesy, and respect for others, Nkondo argues that Ubuntu has the 
potential to deepen our disposition for compassion and caring. The political ideal of 
Ubuntu, associated with communalism seeks to reconcile two ideas: First, the idea 
that society possesses a morally privileged status that should be enshrined and 
protected by certain inviolable rights and freedoms against exploitation and domination 
(Nkondo, 2007:95). And second, the idea that the rights and freedoms of the individual 
should not be in conflict with the common good.  
 
The Ubuntu-based political ideal is founded on the idea that we live in a moral space 
mapped by strong values, that one’s social world provides a framework which defines 
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the shape of a life worth living (Nkondo, 2007:95). Thus under Ubuntu conditions 
political thinking would involve interpretation of shared understandings and meanings 
bearing on the political life of one’s community. Persons would realise themselves in 
the process of acting with others, in social practice (Nkondo, 2007:96). Elsewhere I 
have argued that persons living in communities that embrace Ubuntu would be marked 
by a commitment to treating others with a sense of Botho or Ubuntu, which entails 
treating them with justice and fairness (Letseka, 2000:188). 
 
Given its resonance with the country’s Constitution the concept of Ubuntu can also be 
said to pertain to notions of justice in South Africa. I mentioned above that Ubuntu 
reveres human life. Within the context of social order, Ubuntu regulates traditional 
African societies through customs, laws, traditions and taboos that ought to be 
observed. For Keevy (2008:288-89), justice can only be done if Ubuntu laws are based 
upon Ubuntu values. In this regard, the primary function of Ubuntu is to create a social 
order in which a person can realise the promise of becoming human. Ubuntu law is 
community-oriented, based on traditions and customs to resolve disputes through 
mediation. Keevy (2008:401) opines that the ultimate goal of Ubuntu justice is to 
restore win-win situations of peace between individuals in the community. As a result, 
justice in Ubuntu legal philosophy involves perpetual exchange and sharing of the 
forces of life to restore peace, harmony and balance within the community. The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa acknowledges that Ubuntu recognises a person’s 
status as a human being and demands unconditional respect, value, dignity and 
acceptance of the person towards other members of the community (Keevy, 
2008:278). An important point emerging from this brief analysis is that beyond its 
potential to serve as social policy, Ubuntu can also potentially provide a framework for 
a communally based conception of justice in traditional African societies. 
 
To sum up, I have underscored that respect for human life and dignity is not only at 
the heart of the Constitution of South Africa, but also that Ubuntu accords all human 
beings a moral status. This implies that Ubuntu has the potential to foster a shared 
moral discourse. I argued that the struggle for Ubuntu is therefore the struggle for 
people trying to heal the brutality and desperateness of a society that is deeply 
ruptured by its past history of segregation and racial discrimination. I made a case for 
Ubuntu’s connections with the imperatives of political power and democracy, and 
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showed that Ubuntu has the potential to contribute to the development of an ethical 
disposition that can enable all South Africans to reach out beyond narrow racial and 
ethnic identities. Furthermore, I argued that Ubuntu has the potential to frame a 
communally based conception of justice in traditional African societies. Finally, I 
highlighted parallels between Ubuntu and some Eurasian philosophical concepts such 
as Bildung among the Germans, and Jen in Confucian philosophy. In the final section 
below, I briefly touch on the educational implications of Ubuntu in South Africa. 
 
5.4  Ubuntu as an educational value in South Africa 
 
Nkondo (2007:98) contends that South Africa’s public education system needs to play 
a more effective role in the political, social and economic reordering of the state and 
society. What is needed is for the public education system to articulate a methodology 
for developing an Ubuntu social disposition. It is Nkondo’s (2007) view that an Ubuntu-
oriented framework could be the engine and elixir for transformation, particularly if a 
clear methodology existed for the integration of its principles into a national system of 
education and training. I shall explore the South African education in more detail in 
Chapter Seven below. Here I shall only make cursory remarks on the place of Ubuntu 
in South Africa’s education policy framework.  
 
The Department of Education’s (DoE) (2001:7) report, Manifesto on Values, Education 
and Democracy identifies 10 fundamental values in the constitution of South African 
that pertain to education. These are democracy, social justice and equity, equality, 
non-racism and non-sexism, Ubuntu (human dignity), an open society, accountability, 
the rule of law, respect, and reconciliation. The report states that Ubuntu embodies 
the concept of mutual understanding and the active appreciation of the value of human 
difference (DoE, 2001:14). It posits that out of the values of Ubuntu and human dignity 
flow the practices of compassion, kindness, altruism and respect, which are at the very 
core of making schools places where the culture of teaching and the culture of learning 
thrive (DoE, 2001:14). 
 
Another DoE (2000:10) report, Values, Education and Democracy, which precedes 
the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy above,  proposes that education 
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should equip young people with values such as honesty, integrity, tolerance, diligence, 
responsibility, compassion, altruism, justice and respect, which are deemed essential 
for a democratic livelihood. These are the values that the literature broadly associates 
with Ubuntu (Metz & Gaie, 2010; Nkondo, 2007; Swanson, 2005; Broodryk, 2002; 
Letseka, 2000). The report states that the public schooling system should actively 
promote these values. It posits that an educational philosophy of a democracy should 
develop intellectual abilities and critical faculties among children and young adults in 
schools. Firstly, this is necessary because a democratic society flourishes when its 
citizens are informed by a grasp of their history and of current affairs, where nothing 
is beyond question, and where ideas are explored to their fullest extent (DoE, 
2000:14). Emphasis on the grasp of one’s history cannot be overemphasised 
especially in the wake of attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa, some of whom 
come from countries that supported South Africa’s liberation struggle unconditionally, 
often at the risk of invasion by the apartheid military. Secondly, such an educational 
philosophy should be inclusive of all learners irrespective of their backgrounds. 
Inclusion is critical for the promotion of cultural and political tolerance, as well as 
appreciation of difference. Thirdly, such an educational philosophy should equip 
learners with the tools to resolve the many problems that come with being human.  
 
One example of the tools that are necessary to equip learners to resolve problems 
that come with being human is the mind-set to regard problems as challenges that 
need to be resolved through knowledge and understanding rather than to be regarded 
as unbearable burdens that are to be endured without solution (DoE, 2000:12). I want 
to argue that this state of mind can be attained when people, especially young people, 
are taught to embrace the value of deliberation and when they are equipped with 
critical thinking dispositions. Nussbaum (2002:7) invites us to regard our deliberations 
as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular 
concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether 
unlike those of others. She argues that in educational terms, students must learn to 
recognise humanity whenever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange 
to them, and be eager to understand humanity in its ‘strange’ guises.  
 
Development of critical thinking dispositions in learners is one of the central aims of 
South Africa’s national education policy. For instance, section 17 of the White Paper 
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on Education and Training (1995) requires the curriculum, teaching methods and 
textbooks at all levels and in all programmes of education and training to encourage 
independent and critical thought, the capacity to question, enquire, reason, weigh 
evidence and form judgments, achieve understanding, recognise the provisional and 
incomplete nature of most human knowledge, and communicate clearly. Kuhn 
(1991:2) conceives of critical thinking as a type of reasoned argument. For her, the 
‘skills of argument’ presuppose the ability to propose opinions alternative to one’s own 
and to know what evidence would support these, to provide evidence that 
simultaneously supports one’s own opinions while rebutting the alternatives and to 
weigh the goodness of one’s own evidence and that of others.  
 
In this regard, critical thinking can be regarded as reasonable, reflective thinking that 
is focused on deciding what to belief and what to do (Ennis, 1996). However, on or by 
itself critical thinking is not sufficient. Instead, it requires critical thinking dispositions. 
Ennis (1996:166) defines a disposition as the tendency to do something, given certain 
conditions. When the notion of disposition is applied to conceptions of critical thinking, 
it implies an inclination to reasonable, reflective thinking. Ideally critical thinkers are 
inclined to (1) caring that their beliefs are true, and that their decisions are justified, (2) 
presenting a position honestly and clearly, and (3) caring about the dignity and worth 
of every person (Ennis, 1996:171). Evidence from the literature suggests that in its 
current form South Africa’s public schooling system does not have the requisite 
capacity to deliver on this very important policy mandate (Howie, van Staden, Tshele, 
Dowse & Zimmerman, 2012; DBE, 2011; Spaull, 2011). As Spaull (2011: 23-24) 
observes, “in a league table of student performance, South Africa ranks 10th out of 
the 15 Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality 
(SACMEQ) countries for student reading performance and 8th out of 15 for student 
maths performance”. The SACMEQ country report on South Africa also confirms that 
“the proportion of students who are classified at the ‘acceptable’ level of reading is 
strikingly low at 30.8%. The vast majority (69.2%) of South African Grade 6 students 
have not acquired ‘acceptable’ reading skills” (DBE, 2011a).   
 
The reason for the above systemic failure is that South Africa’s public schooling 
system is dysfunctional (Bloch, 2009; van der Berg, 2008, 2007’ South African Human 
Rights Commission, 2006; Taylor, 2006), and continues to be serviced by large 
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proportions either of unqualified and/or under-qualified teachers (Chisholm, 2009; 
Arends & Makola, 2009; Paterson & Arends, 2009). South Africa’s education system 
faces the challenge of supply and demand for teachers, as well as the challenge of 
attrition and retention of teachers (Diko & Letseka, 2009; DoE, 2008). The system 
loses an estimated 20000 teachers annually through resignation, retirement and 
death, and yet only 6000 to 8000 new teachers graduate from the higher education 
sector each year (DoE, 2008:16). The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) 
(2011:21) has fervently argued that South Africa needs to produce about three times 
more teachers a year than it currently produces. The country’s higher education 
system responsible for initial professional teacher needs to inject around 15000 or 
more new teachers a year into schools.   
 
The consequence of the failure of the supply side to produce the requisite number of 
newly qualified teachers annually is that the public schooling system is forced to 
content with employing unqualified and/or under-qualified teachers (Chisholm, 2009; 
Arends & Makola, 2009; Paterson & Arends, 2009). Chisholm (2009:5) argues that 
among supply-led approaches there are short-term quick fix solutions and longer-term, 
more sustainable solutions. Short-term quick fix solutions may - and in practice often 
do - involve the employment of unqualified teachers or substitute teachers. 
Conversely, longer-term policies include improving teacher preparation programmes; 
providing incentives that improve the attractiveness of teaching, such as scholarships 
and loans for students who otherwise would not afford to go into teacher education; 
and improving teacher salaries, benefits and working conditions.  
 
Chisholm (2009:23) points out that the main priorities of the DoE during 2004-2008 
were short-term supply-side interventions – upgrading unqualified teachers and 
improving the quality of existing, employed teachers rather than planning for future 
cohorts. She cites the DoE’s (2005) report which laments that the country faces a 
dilemma in which the employment of unqualified teachers would become the norm. 
Employing unqualified teachers has the unintended consequence of compromising the 
quality of teaching and learning. Notwithstanding these major challenges I want to 
argue that development of critical thinking dispositions among learners at school level 
is crucial for the promotion of Ubuntu-oriented attributes and dispositions. 
Concomitantly, a public schooling system that is expected to drive the above policy 
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imperatives will have to be one that is serviced by cohorts of highly qualified, 
knowledgeable and dedicated teachers. 
 
To sum up, I showed that the notion of Ubuntu is already built into South Africa’s 
education policy frameworks. For instance, the DoE (2001) report, Manifesto on 
Values, Education and Democracy identifies Ubuntu (human dignity) as one of the 
fundamental values that ought to be promoted by the country’s public schooling 
system. In the same vein, the White Paper on Education and Training makes it 
mandatory for the public education system to promote the development of 
independent and critical thought, the capacity to question, reason, weigh evidence and 
form judgements. The DoE (2002) recognises Ubuntu as an important educational 
value that that schools should promote. I highlighted the challenges facing South 
Africa’s education system – the challenges of supply and demand for teachers, and 
the failure of the initial professional teacher development sector to produce the 
requisite number of teachers annually in order for the public schooling system to 
function optimally.  
 
5.5  Conclusion  
 
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to defend the notions of Ubuntu and 
Africanism/Afrocentrism against criticisms. I argued that Ubuntu articulates communal 
interdependence and a deep rootedness in one’s community. I highlighted the 
consonance between values implicit in the Constitution of South Africa and values 
implicit in Ubuntu. I argued that Ubuntu has the potential to serve as a moral theory, a 
public policy, and a notion of communal justice. On the one hand, the Constitution of 
South Africa enshrines a wide range of rights and freedoms for the individual and 
affirms the democratic values of equality and human dignity. On the other hand, 
Ubuntu reveres human life, dignity, respect, caring and compassion. Thus, understood 
as human dignity, Ubuntu is critical to South Africa’s education in general, and to the 
public schooling system in particular, and the schooling system should therefore 
promote Ubuntu values.  
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The type of learner envisaged by the South African government is one who will act in 
the interests of a society based on respect for democracy, equality, human dignity, life 
and social justice. To that end, the public schooling system is under pressure to 
develop lifelong learners who are confident, independent, literate, numerate, multi-
skilled, and compassionate, with the ability to participate in society as critical and 
active citizens (DoE, 2002:8). I pointed out though, that South Africa’s initial 
professional teacher development institutions produce between 6000 and 8000 new 
teachers a year while an estimated 20000 teachers leave the profession annually 
through resignations, retirement and death. The number that graduates annually is 
short of the required number of newly qualified teachers that should be injected into 
the public schooling system annually in order for the system to function optimally.  
 
Some scholars have expressed doubts on the viability of liberal democracy in Africa 
in general, and in South Africa in particular (Biko, 2004; Makgoba, 1998; Gilliomee, 
1995; Ake, 1993). For instance, Ake (1993:243) has argued that the familiar 
assumptions and political arrangements of liberal democracy make little sense in 
Africa. While Gilliomee (1995:97-98) has expressed doubts that South Africa 
represents enough of a common society to provide a sufficiently stable base for a well-
functioning liberal democracy. Regardless of these doubts South Africa is a liberal 
democracy courtesy of its 1996 Constitution, which has been widely hailed as liberal 
and egalitarian (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Deveaux, 2003; Vilakazi, 2003; Gibson, 
2001; Jordan, 1996; Robinson, 2012). I explored the notion of liberal democracy in 
Chapter Four above where I argued a case for coexistence between some liberal 
democratic values and some traditional African values. My considered view is that 
such coexistence is necessary given that post-apartheid South Africa seeks to build a 
socio-political future that is based on the amalgamation of both liberal democratic 
values and traditional African values. In the next chapter I flesh out the political and 
philosophical implications of attempting to amalgamate traditional African values and 
liberal democratic values in an aspirant African liberal democracy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
AMALGAMATION OF TRADITIONAL AFRICAN VALUES 
AND LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I explore the potential for the amalgamation of traditional African values 
and liberal democratic values in South Africa. Such an exploration is necessary as 
South Africa has a Constitution that enshrines a wide range of rights and freedoms for 
the individual, and casts the new democratic order as the antithesis of its predecessor, 
the apartheid regime, which was declared ‘crime against humanity’ by the international 
community.13 Conversely, the same Constitution recognises the institution of 
traditional leadership.14 Some commentators have taken issue with the above position 
(Beall, 2006; Beall, et al. 2005; Bentley, 2005; Biko, 2005, 1972; Ntsebeza, 2005; 
Makgoba, 1998; Ake, 1993). Their argument is that liberal democratic values and 
traditional African values are not only incompatible, but they are also fundamentally 
contradictory in that the institution of traditional leadership’s claim to power is by birth 
right and not through open democratic processes. In this chapter I challenge the above 
position. I shall argue (a) that such a position does not necessarily preclude the 
potential for the amalgamation of liberal democratic values and traditional African 
values, and (b) that existence of chieftaincy in a liberal democracy is not peculiar to 
South Africa. Therefore, there is no compelling ground to suggest incompatibility 
and/or contradiction in coexistence between liberal democracy and the monarchy. 
 
This chapter is structured around six sections. Firstly, I attempt to conceptualise the 
relationship between tradition, as in the institution of traditional leadership in South 
                                                          
13 See the United Nations Security Council Resolution 134 (1960) of April 1960 [S/4300], Resolution 
181 (1963) of 7 August 1963 [S/5386], Resolution 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963 [S/5471], Resolution 
190 (1964) of 9 June 1964 [S/5761], and Resolution 392 (1976) of 19 June 1976 titled “The situation in 
South Africa: killings and violence by the apartheid regime in South Africa in Soweto and other areas”. 
14 See sections 211 and 212 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, annotated 
version.   
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Africa, and modernity, as in the notion of liberal democracy (Mungwini, 2011; Hallen, 
2006, 2002, 1995; Ciaffa, 2008; Gyekye, 1997, 1992; Wallerstein, 1995; Bodunrin, 
1981). I shall argue that the two are contested in so far as they tend to invoke 
contrasting, and even conflicting versions of the African Weltanschauungen. 
Secondly, I respond to claims that traditional African societies were authoritarian and 
were, as a result, incompatible with liberal democratic values. Thirdly, I theorise the 
notion of authoritarianism. My view is that those who claim that traditional African 
societies were authoritarian seem to presume that the notion of authoritarianism is 
uncontested, and that its meaning is self-explanatory. This, I argue, is debatable. 
Fourthly, I tease out the socio-political fabric of some Southern African traditional 
societies with a view to arguing that they were characterised by communality and the 
preponderance of norms of moral ethnicity. I shall argue that their political practices 
were informed by some elements of the deliberative model of democracy given that 
their members deliberated on matters of socio-political importance and moral 
disagreement and were required to ‘talk until they agreed’ (Gyekye, 1997; Mandela, 
1995; Busia, 1967). Fifthly, I draw on the works of Hanna Pitkin (1967), Jane 
Mansbridge (2003) and David Runciman (2007) to unpack the notion of representation 
as it pertains to traditional African societies. I shall argue that in the traditional African 
polity women were consulted on internal political matters and on most governmental 
affairs. In the final section I offer some concluding remarks. I now turn to a 
conceptualisation of the notions of tradition and modernity. 
 
6.2 Conceptualising tradition and modernity  
 
In post-colonial African philosophy, “the subject of ‘tradition-modernity’ divide is a very 
sensitive one” (Hallen, 2006:16). This is because both concepts invoke contrasting, 
and often conflicting versions of the African Weltanschauungen. The term “tradition” 
is often perceived as pejorative especially when it is used in association with the well-
established stereotype of Africa as a continent stuck in its dark past (Conrad, 1999), 
or a continent with no history (Hegel, 2001). Hallen (2006:175) reminds us that when 
used with reference to Africa the term “tradition” tends to imply a place where people 
do not “assign a high priority to reason, to critical thinking, in formulating their views of 
the world”. He argues that “African systems of thought are portrayed as placing 
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minimal emphasis upon rigorous argumentation and criticism in a search for truth that 
provides for discarding the old and creating the new. Tradition somehow gets 
portrayed as antithetical to innovation” (Hallen, 1995:383). Mudimbe (1985:150) 
wonders whether “the African Weltanschauungen and African traditional systems of 
thought are unthinkable and cannot be made explicit within the framework of their own 
rationality”. He opines that thus far the ways in which the African Weltanschauungen 
and traditional African epistemologies have been evaluated and the means used to 
explain them relate to theories and methods whose constraints, rules, and systems of 
operation suppose a non-African epistemological locus.  
 
When “used to cut a strict cultural or metaphysical divide between evolutionary stages 
of social advancement, the purported binary or polarity between tradition and 
modernity misrepresents the African life and experience” (Mungwini, 2011:3). For 
instance, in his book The Philosophy of History, German philosopher Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel (2001:109) described Africa as “the land of childhood that is enveloped 
in the dark mantle of night”. He lamented that “the peculiarly African character is 
difficult to comprehend for the simple reason that in reference to it, one must quite give 
up the principle which naturally accompanies one’s ideas of universality”. Hegel 
(2001:110-111) argued that in ‘Negro’ life the characteristic point is the fact that 
consciousness had not yet attained the realisation of any substantial objective 
existence. He then proposed that for a better understanding, Africa should be divided 
into three parts: one which lies south of the Sahara desert, which he labelled ‘Africa 
proper’, ‘the Upland’, almost entirely unknown to Europeans, with narrow coast-tracts 
along the sea; the second, which is found north of the desert, and which he regarded 
as ‘European Africa’, with its immaculate coastland; and the third, which was the river 
region of the Nile, the only valley-land of Africa which was connected to Asia. Hegel 
(2001:109) was unrepentant that Africa, and by this he meant ‘Africa proper’, “need 
not be mentioned again because it was not a historical part of the world. It had no 
movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in its northern part 
belonged to the Asiatic or European World”.  
 
In the 1970s Joseph Conrad’s celebrated novel Heart of Darkness was heavily 
criticised by among others, Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe (1978) for projecting the 
image of Africa as ‘the other world’; the antithesis of Europe and therefore of 
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civilisation; the place where man’s vaunted intelligence and refinement are mocked by 
triumphant bestiality. While Conrad’s book is a work of fiction, Achebe’s (1978:7) main 
concern was that Conrad is “a narrator behind a narrator” – Marlow, the protagonist. 
Achebe argued that through Heart of Darkness white racism against Africa is such a 
normal way of thinking that its manifestations go completely undetected. He posited 
that Conrad portrays Africa as setting and backdrop which eliminates the African as a 
human factor. He argued that Conrad’s novel calls into question the very humanity of 
black people. Africa becomes a metaphysical battlefield devoid of all recognisable 
humanity, and into which the wandering European enters at his peril. Achebe (1978:9) 
wondered why a “novel which celebrates this dehumanisation, which depersonalises 
a portion of the human race, can be called a great work of art”. His position was that it 
should not be celebrated at all. He worried “why it is today perhaps the most commonly 
prescribed novel in 20th literature courses in our own English Department”, and 
suggested that time was “long overdue for a hard look at things” (Achebe, 1978:11). 
Through Heart of Darkness, Africa is a continent to be avoided. It is a continent trapped 
in primordial barbarity. The message conveyed by the novel to European travellers is 
simple: ‘Keep away from Africa, or go there at your own peril’. 
 
Taiwo (2004: 244) argues that “one of the pylons of colonial rule was denial by 
colonisers of the humanity of Africans”. This view is confirmed by Rorty (2004:70) who 
observes that history is written by victors. He writes, “victors get to choose their 
ancestors in the sense that they decide which among their all too various ancestors to 
mention, write biographies of, and commend to their descendants”. In the same vein, 
Wolf (2010:229) argues that a history written by slavers and their beneficiaries has 
long obliterated the African past, portraying Africans as savages whom only the 
Europeans brought into the light of civilisation. Such history denied both the existence 
of a complex political economy before the advent of the Europeans and the 
organisational ability exhibited by Africans in pursuit of the trade once begun. Wolf’s 
(2010:230) view is that “the task of writing a realistic account of African populations is 
not to justify one group as against another, but to uncover the forces that brought 
Europeans and Africans (and others) into connection with one another in the 
construction of the world”. This is an important observation vis-à-vis attempts by 
previously colonised communities such as those on the African continent to reclaim 
their humanity and reassert their own senses of identity.  
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Coming back to modernity, Hallen (2002:44) is of the opinion that modernity is 
ambiguous in that “it must combine, at least in the African context, European 
(economic and cultural) imperialism, colonialism, and the varieties of neo-colonialism 
that are local manifestations of the global competition between capitalism and 
socialism”. While for Mungwini (2011:12), “modernity is a complex phenomenon in that 
the experiences of modernisation across the world have been varied and multifarious, 
yielding a host of modernities such as first world modernities, third world modernities, 
Indian modernities and African modernities, among others”. Traditionally, to be 
modern implied being anti-medieval, in an antinomy in which the concept ‘medieval’ 
incarnated narrow-mindedness and dogmatism. To that extent, Wallerstein (1995:472) 
opines that modernity was “the presumptive triumph of human freedom against the 
forces of evil and ignorance”. It was the modernity of liberation, of substantive 
democracy, of the rule of the people as opposed to the rule of the aristocracy, the rule 
of the best, of human fulfilment. The “modernity of liberation was not a fleeting 
modernity, but an eternal modernity. Once achieved, it was never to be yielded”.  
 
Wallerstein (1995:474) suggests that “one way of resuming Enlightenment thought 
might be to say that it constituted a belief in the identity of the modernity of technology 
and the modernity of liberation”. For him, the French Revolution, the decolonisation of 
the Americans, and the struggles for liberation throughout Europe and around its 
edges - from Ireland to Russia, and from Spain to Egypt, these were all indications of 
aspirations for the modernity of liberation. He argues that “the key to the operation was 
the elaboration of the ideology of liberalism, and its acceptance as the emblematic 
ideology of the capitalist world-economy” (Wallerstein, 1995:475). It is Wallerstein’s 
(1995:476) contention that liberalism became the central justification for the 
strengthening of the efficacy of the state machinery because liberals saw the state as 
essential to achieving the furthering of the modernity of technology. Technology was 
viewed as panacea for all the socio-economic hardships that gripped Europe at the 
time. For instance, when Benjamin Disraeli published his novel Sybil, or the Two 
Nations in 1845, he marketed it as the book about the ‘the Condition of the People’, 
the ‘Two Nations of England’, ‘the Rich and the Poor’. For Wallerstein (1995:478), “the 
great programme of liberalism was not to make states out of nations, but to create 
nations out of states ... the strategy was to take those who were located within the 
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boundaries of the state – formerly, the ‘subjects’ of the king - sovereign, now the 
sovereign ‘people’ - and turn them into ‘citizens’, all identifying with their state”.    
 
Important questions that I grapple with in this study are: How plausible is the perceived 
polarity between tradition and modernity? How sustainable is the view that tradition is 
necessarily antithetical to innovation? In a way, if we were to focus the argument on 
traditional African values and liberal democratic values how fundamentally 
incompatible and contradictory are they? My task is to mount a rebuttal of this 
perceived incompatibility and contradiction. I agree with Hallen’s (2006:302) 
observation that “tradition and modernity are not ‘opposed’ (except semiotically), nor 
are they in ‘conflict’”. This is an important observation that resonates with the case I 
am to make in this study, which is that South Africa seeks to build a socio-political 
future that is based on the amalgamation of traditional African values and liberal-
democratic values. A traditional culture may possess values that are congruent with 
values inherent in a perceived modern state while another culture may cling more 
tenaciously to its old ways.  
 
Gyekye (1997:218) argues that “societies that are called ‘modern’ also recognise 
traditions as relevant, and not as obstacles, to their development”. He contends that 
“modernity inevitably contains elements that are clearly traditional, inherited, and 
appropriated from previous generations of the European civilisational trajectory” 
(Gyekye, 1997:269). Similarly, Volet (1999:190) points out that “traditional wisdom 
inherited from the past is reconstructed day after day, year after year, generation after 
generation, in order to fit the requirements of new circumstances”. Thus, “tradition and 
modernity do not coexist side by side but overlap to the extent that it is often difficult 
to decide what is ‘traditional’ and what is ‘modern’ except by way of very crude and 
idiosyncratic means” (Volet, 1999:190). 
 
Gusfield (1967:355) reminds us that “Japan is unlike the Western societies in the ways 
in which ‘feudalism’ and industrial development have been fused to promote economic 
growth”. For the Japanese, “tradition is not something waiting out there, always over 
one's shoulder. It is rather plucked, created and shaped to present needs and 
aspirations in a given historical situation” (Gusfield, 1967: 358). What lessons can be 
learned from Japan’s appropriation of tradition with respect to South Africa? In Chapter 
150 
 
 
 
1 I showed that while the Constitution of South Africa has been widely hailed as liberal 
and egalitarian, it also recognises the institution of traditional leadership. This is an 
indication that South Africa is an African liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped 
in local traditions and cultures.  
 
In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, South Africa is an 
economic power house that accounts for over 70% of the entire SADC’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). South Africa is also one of Africa’s wealthiest states in total 
GDP, having recently conceded its African leadership spot to Nigeria. But more, South 
Africa is a member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa block, or the 
BRICS countries, and Africa’s representative in the G-20 – the premier global 
economic policy forum (European Commission for Africa and African Union, 2011:71). 
How South Africa succeeds in mediating these multifaceted global identities without 
losing its identity as an African state will be instrumental to managing the 
amalgamation between traditional African values and liberal democratic values.  
 
To summarise, what I have attempted to do in this section is to unpack the contested 
cleavages between the notions of tradition and modernity. I have argued that the 
perceived polarity between the two is in fact a fallacy. One traditional culture may 
possess values that are congruent with modernisation in the same way as a modern 
culture may contain elements that are clearly traditional and inherited from previous 
generations. The point here is that “no human culture is absolutely unchanging, totally 
refusing to take advantage of possible benefits that often accompany encounters with 
other cultures” (Gyekye, 1997). I suggested that South Africa should harness tradition 
and modernity to fashion a new socio-political culture that is responsive to the 
challenges of the current era. In the next section I tease out claims that traditional 
African societies were authoritarian, and by implication, did not cohere with liberal 
democratic values. I shall argue that the political fabric of some traditional African 
communities can be said to have been informed by some elements of the deliberative 
model of democracy given that important national decisions were arrived at through 
lengthy deliberations that were anchored by the principle of consensus. 
 
6.3 Traditional African societies and authoritarianism   
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Wiredu (1980) laments that traditional African society was deeply authoritarian; its 
social arrangements were shot through and through with the principle of unquestioning 
obedience to superiors. Commenting on the political fall-out between Nelson Mandela, 
the former President of South Africa, and Pallo Jordan, then Minister of 
Communication, and the disappearance of the talented Cyril Ramaphosa into political 
wilderness, Beresford (1996) expresses concern with the iron of an authoritarian 
streak which he argues, may be a tradition founded on tribal authoritarianism. Other 
political commentators have argued that most African countries possess political 
cultures that are embedded under authoritarian regimes in the pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-colonial periods (Bratton, 1994). For instance, Ramphele (2008) is 
concerned that the legacy of authoritarianism, from both pre-colonial and colonial 
African culture lies deep within African governance systems. She worries that people 
have no time for caring and practise an authoritarian system in their homes. There is 
tyranny in schools, homes and in the streets (Ramphele, 1995). Similarly, Nguru 
(1995) argues that the classroom in African nations is characterised by unilateral 
teacher authority, the use of fear, sarcasm, repression and intimidation.  
 
To avoid being misconstrued as fomenting “a reactionary ploy to resurrect traditions” 
(Ayana, 2002: 26), I should state from the outset that I share Goduka’s (2005:60) view 
that indigenous ways of knowing are by no means a romanticism and, a nostalgic 
yearning for the long gone past, nor a movement to go back to the ‘caves’ and 
‘bushes’. Neither are they a rigid understanding of culture as static, archaic, 
exclusionary, and frozen in space and time. Cultures are dynamic and adaptive, and 
have evolved over time to integrate other ways of knowing. For Mudimbe (1988:189), 
the view of cultures as static and archaic stems from “the episteme of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries that invented the concept of a static and prehistoric 
tradition. Travellers’ reports localise African cultures as ‘beings-in-themselves’ 
inherently incapable of living as ‘beings-for-themselves’”. In this study I support 
Gyekye’s (1992:501) view that “the ideas and values in the traditional African system 
of politics must be thoroughly and critically examined and sorted out in a sophisticated 
manner so that those that appear unclear and woolly must be explored, refined, 
trimmed and given a modern translation”. Gyekye argues that “what needs to be done, 
in pursuit of democracy and stability, is to find ingenuous ways and means of 
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hammering these autochthonous democratic elements in the anvil of prudence, 
common sense, imagination, creative spirit, and a sense of history into an acceptable 
and enviable democratic form in the setting of the modern world”.  
 
Secondly, I am persuaded that societal cultures are highly complex and contested 
(Sewell, 2005; Limerick, 1997; Said, 1994; Bhabha, 1994). In his attempt to clarify the 
concept of culture in contemporary academic discourse, Sewell (2005:77) argues that 
“trying to clarify what we mean by culture seems both imperative and impossible”. He 
sketches two concepts of culture, namely; culture as a system of symbols and 
meanings, and culture as practice, and argues that “most analysts insist on culture as 
a sphere of practical activity shot through by wilful action, power relations, struggle, 
contradiction, and change” (Sewell, 2005:83). It is his view that systems and practices 
tend to be complementary concepts, each presupposing the other. In this regard, to 
engage in cultural practice implies utilising existing cultural symbols to accomplish 
some end. For instance, the employment of a symbol can be expected to accomplish 
a particular goal only because symbols have more or less determinate meanings - 
meanings that are specified by their systematically structured relations to other 
symbols (Sewell, 2005:85).  
 
Sewell (2005:85) makes a case for the autonomy of culture. He argues that the cultural 
dimension of practice is autonomous from other dimensions in two senses. Firstly, 
culture has a semiotic structuring principle that is different from the political, economic, 
or geographical structuring principles that also inform practice. Secondly, the cultural 
dimension is autonomous in that the meanings that make it up are shaped and 
reshaped by a multitude of contexts. Sewell (2005:86) argues that “the meaning of 
symbols always transcends any particular context, because symbols are freighted with 
their usage in a multitude of other instances of social practice”. For him, culture may 
be thought of as a network of semiotic relations cast across society, a network with a 
different shape and different spatiality than institutional, or economic, or political 
networks. To that extent, cultures are contradictory, loosely integrated, contested, 
subject to constant change, and weakly bounded.  
 
Edward Said (1994: xii), known for his ground-breaking book, entitled: Orientalism,  
advances a view on culture (s) that resonates with the argument I am making in this 
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study, and that is: societal cultures are a contested terrain about which simplistic 
assumptions and judgements should be eschewed. Said argues that “peoples’ 
cultures are too complex to simply pass generalised judgement about them”. It is his 
contention that culture means all those practices, like the arts of description, 
communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from economic, 
social, and political realms, and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose 
principal aims is pleasure. For him, culture includes a refining and elevating element, 
each society’s reservoir of the best that has been known and thought. It is a source of 
identity, a sort of theatre where various political and ideological causes engage one 
another. By the same token, Oyĕwùmi (1998:1050)  argues that “culture captures the 
idea that people have their own historically sedimented frames of reference, and come 
at events [the social world] with their own ways of thinking and feeling, which means 
that people of different cultures organise their world in distinct ways”.  
 
However, Said (1994: xiv) warns that culture can be a battleground on which causes 
expose themselves to the light of day and contend with one another. Similarly, Suny 
(2002:1485) argues that culture can be “a field of play with borders far less clear than 
in earlier imaginations, its internal harmonies less apparent, in which actors and 
groups contend for positions and power, sometimes in institutions, sometimes over 
control of meaning”. In his celebrated book, entitled, The Location of Culture, Homi 
Bhabha (1994:218) notes that cultures abhor simplification. He argues that “how 
culture signifies, or what is signified by culture is a complex issue” (Bhabha, 1994:247). 
For Limerick (1997: A76), “while culture can be a powerful lens for scrutinising society 
and a tool for understanding, equally it can hinder our understanding of human thought 
and action”. There is always a chance that culture can be reified.15 Once it is reified, 
“its surface becomes opaque, more effective at absorbing light than at directing it. 
Instead of being usefully employed as an explanation or causal factor, culture can 
develop a startling ability to bring critical inquiry to a halt”.  
                                                          
15 See Lukács, G. 1971. History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, Merlin Press: 
London; Pitkin, H. 1987. Rethinking reification. Theory and Society, 16 (2), 263-293; Colignon, R. 1989. 
Reification: the ‘holistic’ and ‘individualistic’ views of organisations. Theory and Society, 18 (1), 83-123; 
Litowitz, D. 1999. Reification in law and legal theory. South California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, 9: 
401-427. 
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Against the backdrop of the above analysis of culture (s), I should mention that African 
cultures are also characterised by diversity and complexity. Appiah (1997:47) notes 
that “the central cultural fact of Africa’s life remains not the sameness of Africa’s 
cultures, but their enormous diversity”. In another publication, Appiah (1992:26) 
argues that whatever Africans share, “they do not have a common traditional culture, 
a common language, a common religious or conceptual vocabulary. They do not even 
belong to a common race”. And yet despite this range of differences, an underlying 
unity and continuity ties the diversity of the African peoples. Within the variations 
between the African peoples is the understanding that co-operation and social 
harmony are valued over competition and individualism; that the community comes 
before the individual. Verhoef and Michel (1997:395) argue that “in all African societies 
an orientation exists towards a communal way of life, an understanding grounded in 
the belief that an individual is naturally connected to, as opposed to separate from, 
others and the universe”. As Sewell (2005:52) neatly sums it up, “culture should be 
understood as a dialectic of systems and practices, as a dimension of social life 
autonomous from other such dimensions both in its logic and in its spatial 
configuration, and a system of symbols possessing a real but thin coherence that is 
continuously put at risk in practice and therefore subject to transformation”.  
 
A question that might arise at this stage is: how can the above-mentioned claims of 
authoritarianism be reconciled with the literature which attests that traditional African 
cultures were inclusive (Ayana, 2002); characterised by consensual politics 
(Makumbe, 1998), and open public debate (Gyekye, 1997; Mandela 1995; Guy, 1994; 
Sparks, 1991)? My view is that a major flaw running through the above claims of 
authoritarianism is that they are highly generalised and not supported by the literature. 
For instance, the notions of culture (s) and authoritarianism are not theorised. Instead 
they are presented as unproblematic, and therefore uncontested. None of the 
proponents of the claims of authoritarianism attempts to mount a compelling 
theorisation of cultures, tradition or authoritarianism. As a result, they all tend to portray 
traditional African societies and their cultures as forms of socio-political order that are 
devoid of an autonomous internal morality, which is highly debatable.  
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In summary then, I have debated the claims that traditional African societies and their 
cultures were authoritarian. I have attempted to theorise the notion of culture (s) and 
underscored that cultures are contradictory, loosely integrated, contested, subject to 
constant change, and therefore weakly bounded. I have argued that without a 
compelling analysis of cultures, tradition or authoritarianism the proponents of the 
claims of authoritarianism simply present these notions as uncontested and 
unproblematic, as if their meanings are self-explanatory. In the next section I broach 
the notion of authoritarianism, focusing on authoritarian regimes. I shall argue that 
governance in authoritarian regimes is centralised, and that there is forcible prevention 
of political expression by certain sections of society. However, I shall argue that the 
political fabric of some traditional African societies was characterised by deliberation 
and collective decision-making, which begs the question whether they were 
authoritarian. 
 
 6.4  Conceptualising the notion of authoritarianism 
 
The notion of authoritarianism has been widely delineated (Linz, 2010; Purcell, 1975, 
1973). Here I focus on authoritarian regimes with a view to getting clearer on how 
authoritarianism plays itself out in politics. I draw on Purcell’s work on Mexico in the 
1970s, which she describes as a patently authoritarian regime. Generally, 
authoritarian regimes are characterised by limited, and not responsible pluralism. They 
neither have elaborate guiding ideologies nor intensive or extensive political 
mobilisation in which leaders exercise power. Linz (2010:146) defines authoritarian 
regimes as those that lack the capacity “to satisfy the expectations of society, to solve 
pressing problems, whether internal or external”. He opines that authoritarian regimes 
cannot translate efficacy into political legitimacy in the way that democracies are able 
to. Critically though, founders of authoritarian regimes tend to personalise their 
positions of power to the extent that they “consider themselves indispensable, are 
unwilling to relinquish power while still alive, and are fearful of naming their heir 
apparent”.16 Purcell and Purcell (1980:204) argue that “an authoritarian system 
                                                          
16 North Korean leader Kim Jung-un, known in his country to as the ‘Supreme Leader’ is a classic case 
of an authoritarian leader. While on thirty-two years of age, in 2014 he ordered the execution of his 
uncle Jang Song-Thaek on suspicion that his uncle was planning a coup. In May 2015 Kim Jung-un is 
reported to have ordered the execution of Jang Song-Thaek’s children, brothers and grandchildren, to 
prevent ‘mutiny’ (Parry, 2015). 
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emphasises the centralisation of power, the flow of decisions from top down rather 
than of demands from bottom up, deference to authority, limited pluralism, and the use 
of violent repression when other methods of co-optation and control fail”. 
 
Purcell (1975, 1973) writes that in Mexican decision-making processes “all important 
decisions were formally initiated by the president, and the president both claimed and 
received full credit for the decision, whether or not the idea for the decision was 
originally his” (Purcell, 1975:136). In the first stage, the president committed himself 
to a particular idea that he may or may not have originated. The actual origin of the 
idea was immaterial. What mattered was the president’s commitment to it. For Purcell 
(1973:30), “limited political pluralism is defined as a situation in which interest groups 
are partially tied to, and dependent upon the regime. The leaders of groups owe their 
primary allegiance to the regime’s elite and are only secondarily dependent on the 
support of their followers”. This contrasts sharply with the responsible political 
pluralism in democratic regimes where interest groups are independent, and the 
continued survival of the leaders or the groups is not contingent upon their acceptance 
or sustenance by the government. Low subject mobilisation implies politicised 
individuals possess a ‘subject’ rather than a ‘participant’ (or independent) attitude. 
Citizens are mobilised on temporary basis to ratify the decisions of the authoritarian 
elite and to demonstrate support for the regime. And yet much of the time the regime 
does not encourage participation.  
 
 
Purcell (1975:4) argues that “the predominant style of rulership in an authoritarian 
regime is patrimonial or clientelist. The population is organised into interwoven vertical 
chains of patron-client relationships”. The patrons and clients are of unequal status, 
with the result that vertical chains are multiclass. The multiclass chains are held 
together through the higher status member’s distribution of particularistic rewards such 
as political patronage, money, privileged information, and the likes to the lower status 
member. In return, the individual recipients (clients or subjects) acknowledge the 
authority of the ruler and defer to him. As a result of receipt of benefits, the recipients 
are put in a position analogous to that of the ruler. They are able to bestow a portion 
of their grant upon others below them who, in return, are deferential and obligated to 
their ‘patron’ (Purcell, 1973:30-31). Furthermore, Purcell (1975:3-4) argues that “the 
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executive in an authoritarian regime shapes and manipulates demands emanating 
from below while enjoying substantial leeway in the determination of the goals that the 
regime will pursue”. Authority flow “is the reverse of what supposedly characterises 
democratic polities”, where officers are subject to the rules governing the exercise of 
those offices’ authority and might not “appropriate the offices in the sense of private 
property that can be sold and inherited” (Purcell, 1973:31). Invariably, “authoritarian 
regimes have found themselves severely constrained by their absence of legitimacy, 
in terms of their ability to activate commitments in support of the regime” (Linz, 
2010:147). 
 
In summary, I have attempted to conceptualise the notion of authoritarianism, with a 
focus on authoritarian regimes. I have argued that authoritarian regimes penetrate the 
life of society by forcibly preventing the political expression of certain group interests 
or shaping them by interventionist policies; emphasising the top down flow of decisions 
rather than of demands from the bottom, and using repressive means when other 
methods of co-optation and control fail. In the next section I explore the socio-political 
fabric of some traditional African societies with a view to rebutting their 
characterisation as authoritarian. 
 
 
 
 
6.5  The social and political fabric of traditional African societies  
 
6.5.1 The social fabric 
  
One of the most enduring features of traditional African societies and their cultures is 
the notion of communality. As Ake (1993:243) rightly puts it, “communality defines the 
African people’s perceptions of self-interest, their freedom and their location in the 
social whole”. Verhoef and Michel (1997:394) posit that “morality within Africa is that 
which evolves from the process of living and is grounded in the context of communal 
life”. Mbiti (1989:106) argues that in African communal life “the individual cannot exist 
alone except corporately. She owes her existence to other people, including those of 
past generations and her contemporaries”. The opening lines of English poet John 
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Donne’s famous poem ‘No Man is an Island’ neatly capture the notions of communality 
and interdependence in traditional African societies:  
“No man is an island, 
Entire of itself. 
Each is a piece of the continent, 
A part of the main”. 
 
Commenting on traditional life among the Kikuyu of Kenya, Kenyatta (1965:296) notes 
that “according to Kikuyu ways of thinking, nobody is an isolated individual. Rather, 
their uniqueness is a secondary fact about them; first and foremost they are several 
people’s relatives and several people’s contemporaries. People are closely 
interconnected with one another in a lifestyle oriented to the other”. This resonates 
with Mbiti’s (1989:106) view that the cardinal point in the understanding of the African 
view of man is captured by the belief that whatever happens to the individual happens 
to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the 
individual. “The individual can only say: I am, because we are; and since we are, 
therefore I am”. In section 2.4 above, I alluded to the fact that in the African ethos the 
‘we’ “is a shared experience, a body of collective experience, an understanding that 
one's experiences are never entirely one's own” (Verhoef & Michel, 1997:396). 
Kenyatta (1965) and Mbiti’s (1989) views above are echoed by Scottish philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre whose stance on human relations in a communitarian social setting 
is that   
“I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a 
citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong 
to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good 
for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past my family, my 
city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations 
and obligations. This constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. 
This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity” (MacIntyre, 
2007:204-05). 
 
According to this logic, “one’s ties to family, friends, and lovers are among those 
carrying the most weight in social life. Each such relationship generates a set of 
imperatives with legitimate claims to oblige” (Boyd, 2001:296). As Holder and 
Corntassel (2002:145) point out, “one’s relations with others are primarily defined by 
social or kinship networks. As a corollary to this, members are not forced to comply, 
but rather a consensus is sought”. Interestingly, American philosopher of education 
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John Dewey (1966:143) was also persuaded that “what one is as a person is what one 
is as associated with others, in a free give and take intercourse”.  
 
Communal interdependence in traditional African societies found expression in the 
extended family. Lauras-Lecoh (1990:480) argues that “worldwide Africa is seen as 
one of the sanctuaries of the extended family. It is the continent where the nuclear 
family, reduced to a couple and their offspring, is still a rarity". For Ayisi (1992:16), the 
extended family forms the raison d’être of all social co-operation and responsibility. 
Mbiti (1975:176) contends that the extended family is a microcosm of the wider 
society. It embodies a broad spectrum of personal associations between great-grand 
parents, grandparents, fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts, children (sisters, brothers, 
cousins, nephews, and nieces), a host of maternal and paternal relatives, as well as 
the departed members. For Gyekye (1997:292-293), “one outstanding cultural value 
of the traditional African society that is a feature of ever-present consciousness of ties 
of kinship is the emphasis on the importance of the family - the extended family”. Thus, 
the extended family is the medium for the concrete and spontaneous expression of 
communal values such as love, caring, cohesion, solidarity, interdependence, mutual 
sympathy, responsibility and helpfulness.  
 
In traditional African societies, the extended family is the forum for infusing norms of 
moral ethnicity. Norms of moral ethnicity encourage collective activity in the public 
sphere. That is, a form of political participation and a vision of good citizenship (Orvis, 
2001:25). Mbiti (1975:178) picks out the following moral vices that the individual in 
traditional African societies ought to eschew - robbery, murder, rape, lying, stealing, 
cruelty, swearing, disrespect, practising sorcery or witchcraft, interfering with public 
rights, backbiting, laziness, greediness, selfishness, and breaking promises. Contrary 
to the above vices, the following are desirable virtues that the family and the 
community are expected to promote - kindness, politeness, respect, truthfulness, 
honesty, reliability, keeping promises, hospitality, altruism, hard work, looking after 
one’s homestead, practising justice in public life, and keeping to the good traditions 
and customs of one’s society.  
 
It might be argued that the above-mentioned virtues are simply Mbiti’s wish list that 
can only be pursued, but never attained. I would counter such an argument by 
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indicating that some of the above-mentioned virtues are subsumed in the normative 
values of Ubuntu. I defend Ubuntu in Chapter 5 above and therefore here I shall only 
make cursory remarks. Ramose (2002a:231) argues that “a persuasive philosophical 
argument can be advanced that there is a family atmosphere, a kind of philosophical 
affinity and kinship among and between the indigenous people of Southern Africa, 
which is captured in the expression: motho ke motho ka batho (Sotho), or its Nguni 
variation: umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”. Thus, according to Ubuntu, to be fully a 
human being is to affirm one’s humanity by recognising the humanity of others, and 
by so doing, establishing humane relations with them. Ubuntu inspires us to expose 
ourselves to others to encounter the difference of their humanness in order to inform 
and enrich our own (Sindane, 1994:8-9). It illuminates our communal embeddedness 
and interconnectedness to other persons (Letseka, 2000:183), and contrasts sharply 
with the view advocated by French philosopher Rene Descartes in: I think, therefore I 
am. 
 
This is because Ubuntu is the African worldview based on the values of humanness, 
caring, sharing, respect, compassion and associated values. Let me briefly break each 
of these values down. Caring is associated with a loving attitude. It manifests in the 
respectful and humble way people treat one another (Broodryk, 2002:13). Sharing 
resonates with traditional African societies’ guiding maxim of umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu. Respect - inhlonipho (in Nguni languages), or hlompho (in Sotho 
languages) resonates with customary rules that govern relationships at different levels 
of society in that it entails conventions regulating and controlling posture, gesture, 
dress code and other behavioural patterns (Rudwick, 2008:155).  
 
For Carton and Morrell (2012:33), respect or hlompho “includes the injunction that 
personal ego be subordinate to homestead hierarchy, which quarantines toxic conduct 
in tightly regulated peer activities and gender obligations. It stipulates the authority of 
elders over younger people, parents over children and leaders over followers”. It 
resonates with humility, understood as “respectfulness and considerateness of others” 
(Hare, 1996:241), or as “taking oneself no more seriously than one should” (Richards, 
1988:258). In this regard, “humility promotes the stability of a progressive and civilised 
society. It is indirectly an aid to individual and communal self-realisation” (Newman, 
1982:282). It requires “an appraisal of oneself combined with a reasonably generous 
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appraisal of others” (Newman, 1982:283). In effect, “humility coexists with appropriate 
feelings about oneself, feelings founded not in error, but in self-knowledge” (Richards, 
1988:285).   
 
It is my considered view in this study that young people ought to be brought up in 
communities that embrace the norms and values implicit in Ubuntu and humility. I have 
argued that “persons living in communities that embrace Ubuntu would be marked by 
a commitment to treating others with fairness at all times” (Letseka, 2000:188). In 
closing this subsection I want to submit that the social fabric sketched above should 
have the capacity to engender a political culture in which reasonable persons can live 
lives that are marked by civil political engagements undergirded by Ubuntu values and 
principles. In the next subsection I tease out the political fabric of some traditional 
African societies with a view to continuing with my rebuttal of the claims that they were 
authoritarian.  
 
6.5.2  The political fabric 
 
Political practices of some traditional African societies can be said to have been 
informed by elements of the deliberative model of democracy.  Makumbe (1998:306) 
notes that “some African societies can be argued to have had consensual political 
systems which required that major decisions be made only after widespread 
consultation among the people”. I shall show below that some Southern African 
communities had indigenous public representation institutions known as the imbizo 
and the khotla, where matters of socio-political importance and moral disagreement 
were openly debated and resolved. I shall further show that chiefs and kings in those 
communities would not make any decisions of national importance without the advice 
of the izikhulu or community elders.  
 
I am mindful that democracy is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1956). 
Westheimer and Kahne (2004: 238) caution that “conceptions of democracy and 
citizenship have been and will likely always be debated – no single formulation will 
triumph”. They argue that “there exists a vast and valuable array of perspectives on 
the kind of citizens that democracies require and the kinds of curricula that can help 
to achieve democratic aims (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004: 239). I comment on the 
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essential contestation of concepts in section 4.4 above and shall therefore not 
belabour the issue here. Suffice to mention though that “the contested status of any 
given concept opens up the possibilities for understanding each meaning within its 
own framework” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997:433). For instance, in the specific context of 
South Africa, contestations around democracy revolve around the majoritarian 
framework and fears that given its unassailable majority in Parliament, the ruling party 
has effectively reduced South Africa to a one-party democratic state (Southall, 2004; 
Lodge, 2002; Giliomee, 1998; Mattes, 2002). I shall say more on this later.  
 
In his book, entitled: Democracy in America, French political thinker and historian 
Alexis de Tocqueville (2010:410) highlighted the threat of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ 
or the “unlimited power of majority, and its consequences”, whereby the majority is the 
all-powerful section of society against which individuals in the minority are rendered 
helpless in instances where the majority abuses its strength. De Toqueville (2010:402) 
argued that “in our time, the right of association has become a guarantee against the 
tyranny of the majority”. He cautioned that “arbitrariness must be carefully 
distinguished from tyranny. Tyranny can be exercised by means of the law itself, and 
then it is not arbitrary; arbitrariness can be exercised in the interests of the governed, 
and then it is not tyrannical. Tyranny usually makes use of arbitrariness, but if 
necessary it knows how to do without it” (de Tocqueville, 2010: 415-416). When 
tyranny becomes arbitrary it has the potential to cause ‘harm’. Echoing John Stuart 
Mill’s (1991) notion of the ‘harm principle’, Schmitter and Karl (1991: 79) caution about 
occasions when “numbers meet intensities”, that is, when a properly assembled 
majority (especially a stable, self-perpetuating one) regularly makes decisions that 
harm some minority (especially a threatened cultural or ethnic group). 
 
Concerns about the ‘tyranny of the majority’ have arisen in South Africa as a result of 
the ruling tripartite alliance of the African National Congress (ANC), the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU)’s command of almost two-thirds majority in the country’s Parliament. There 
are concerns that the tripartite alliance might use its unassailable majority to change 
the constitution, design policies and pass laws that might harm the interests of minority 
Afrikaners while privileging the interests of the majority blacks who were historically 
163 
 
 
 
marginalised during apartheid.17 Lodge (2002:154) argues that in South Africa, 
representative politics is overwhelmed by one large party to the extent that “the 
prospect of any alternation of parties in government is rather remote”. Indeed in 2008 
the ANC and its alliance partners flexed their political muscles to pass the National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Bill and the South African Police Service 
Amendment Bill. The two bills paved the way for the disbanding of the Scorpions, a 
then investigative unit that had a credible crime and fraud busting success record 
(Asmal, 2008; Gumede, 2008). Again in 2011 the alliance partners resorted to their 
majority to canvas for the passing of the Protection of State Information Bill, otherwise 
known as the ‘Secrecy Bill’. Upon becoming law, the ‘Secrecy Bill’ would ensure that 
some members of the ruling party avoid prosecution by classifying information that 
might incriminate them. Breach of the ‘Secrecy Bill’ by whistle-blowers or members of 
the media may result in conviction and imprisonment for up to five years18.  
 
To ensure that the above status quo prevails, in September 2011 the South African 
President announced the appointment of the country’s new Chief Justice. Njabulo 
Ndebele, renowned author, critic and former UCT Vice Chancellor noted that “a 
process of judicial succession that required wise and sensitive management divided 
the country and rendered the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) vulnerable”. Despite 
the seemingly impressive interrogative performance of many interviewers, “it did not 
take much of an imagination to sense the direction in which things would go in the total 
scheme of things given that there was only one candidate” (Ndebele, 2011). Ndebele 
lamented the erosion of the values of justice and fairness, which he argued, are 
distributive values19. He argued that justice and fairness follow a simple ethical law: 
do unto others as you would have them do unto you. He counselled that “if we put the 
country above party politics, we will appreciate the fullest import of this ethical law, 
                                                          
17 See Southall, R. 2004. Party dominance: Is ANC’s gain democracy’s loss? Business Day, 1 June; 
Lodge, T. 2002. Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki, David Philip: Cape Town; Giliomee, 
H. 1998. South Africa’s emerging dominant-party regime. Journal of Democracy 9 (4), 128-142; Mattes, 
R. 2002. South Africa: Democracy without the people. Journal of Democracy, 13 (1), 22-36.  
18 See sections 38 and 39 of Protection of State Information Bill, Government Gazette No. 32999 of 5 
March 2010. 
19 See Letseka, M. 2014. Ubuntu and justice as fairness. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5 
(9), 544-551; Kelly, E. (ed) 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement/John Rawls, Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts; Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts; Rawls, J. 1958. Justice as fairness. The Philosophical 
Papers, 67 (2), 164-194. 
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which gives us the basis on which to build a shared public life”. He noted that “this law 
is the source of public solidarity. It makes every political party, every business, and 
every institution a subset of the national community. It inspires public confidence. It 
widens loyalty to public office, particularly the office of the president, beyond sectarian 
loyalties that exclude”. In the same vein, Schmitter and Karl (1991:80-81) caution that 
“for democracy to thrive certain procedural norms must be followed and civic rights 
must be respected. Any polity that fails to impose restrictions upon itself, that fails to 
follow the ‘rule of law’ with regard to its own procedures, should not be considered 
democratic”.  
 
Against the backdrop of the above analysis, my stance on democracy is neither ‘anti-
electoral’ nor ‘anti-majoritarian’. As I alluded to in Chapter 5 above, I support the notion 
of a ‘strong democracy’ as sketched by Barber (2003). To reiterate,  a ‘strong 
democracy’ is premised on the participatory mode where conflict is resolved through 
a participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the creation of a 
political community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals into free 
citizens and partial and private interests into public good. Barber (2003) contends that 
in a ‘strong democracy’ politics is something done by, not to, citizens. In this regard, 
the theory of ‘strong democracy’ envisions politics “not as a way of life but as a way of 
living – as, namely; the way that human beings with variable but malleable natures 
and with competing but overlapping interests can contrive to live together communally 
not only to their mutual advantage but also to the advantage of their mutuality” (Barber, 
2003:118).  
 
By the same token, Held (1992:17) advocates “a cluster of rules and institutions that 
permit the broadest participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of 
representatives, and that also recognises the political equality of all mature 
individuals”. Such political equality helps not only in securing an environment in which 
people would be free to pursue their private activities and interests, but  also in 
engendering a state in which, under the watchful eye of the electorate, would do what 
is best in the general or public interest (Held, 1992: 15). My own view is that the above 
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envisaged environment is realisable in societies that value, and are committed to the 
promotion of the deliberative model of democracy.20 
 
In the deliberative model of democracy, “deliberation is a procedure of being informed. 
The deliberative model proceeds not only from a conflict of values, but also from a 
conflict of interests in social life” (Benhabib, 1996:71). Deliberative democracy 
“privileges a plurality of modes of association in which all the affected parties can have 
the right to articulate their points of view” (Benhabib, 1996:73). Gutmann and 
Thompson (1997:4) argue that “deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens 
collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about 
the processes by which policies should be adopted”. For Cohen (1996:99-100), “the 
outcomes are democratic and legitimate only if they are the object of a free and 
reasoned agreement among equals”. In another publication, Cohen (1998:221) 
contends that “what makes the deliberative conception of democracy compelling is the 
idea that decisions about the exercise of state power are collective, which gives added 
impetus to legitimacy”.  
 
Coming back to Barber (1994:46), he notes that a strictly political construction of 
democracy focuses on active citizenship and on-going practical deliberation. This 
assumes a regime in which citizens “make common decisions, choose common 
conduct and create or express common values in the ever-changing practical context 
of conflicting interests and competition for power”. In this kind of environment, Barber 
further argues, “there is no necessary agreement on prior goods or certain knowledge 
about justice or rights”, and citizens “must proceed on the premise of base equality 
both of interests and of the interested”. He contends that “democratic rules, the 
definition of citizenship, and the character of rights, become legitimate only when 
                                                          
20 See Thompson, D. F. 2008. Deliberative democratic theory and empirical political science.  American 
Review of Political Science, 11: 497-520; Ryfe, D. M. 2005. Does deliberative democracy work? Annual 
Review of Political Science, 8:49-71.; Cohen, J. 1996. Procedure and substance in deliberative 
democracy. In Seyla Benhabib (ed) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the boundaries of the 
political, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey; Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. 1997. 
Democracy and Disagreement, Harvard University Press: Massachusetts; Benhabib, S. 1996. Toward 
a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy. In Seyla Benhabib (ed) Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the boundaries of the political, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. 
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subjected to democratic deliberation and decision” (Barber, 1994:48). In concurrence, 
Enslin and Horsthemke (2009:218) argue that “in deliberative theory it is widely 
accepted that all affected by decisions must be allowed to participate freely and 
equally in making them, in making calls for justice, in debating the terms and the 
agenda of the discussion”.  
 
Questions that might arise at this point are: Does deliberative democracy work in 
practice? Who should participate in the deliberative processes? How should such 
participants be contacted? How are they required to talk to one another? Is there a 
deliberative talk tool that should guide discussions? What would it look like? And 
finally, what should be done with the product of deliberative encounters? Ryfe 
(2005:51) argues that “civic participation is strongly correlated with belonging to the 
social networks that privilege civic identities and make access to the political process 
relatively easy and frequent”. In some cases, civic participation is linked to educational 
levels.21 As a result, those who participate in political processes are likely to be white, 
college-educated, or of middle-class background. Conover and Searing (2005:269) 
observe that “average citizens have fewer opportunities to deliberate rigorously in 
formal institutional settings”. As a result, most of their political discussions are quite 
unstructured. They tend to be hesitant deliberators, preferring to ‘pass the buck’ when 
they can. This might explain why participation in deliberation may produce greater 
anxiety and frustration than other choice-making processes. Ryfe (2005:56) argues 
that “it is unsettling to have one’s cognitive script disrupted, and it is even more 
frustrating to recognise that no new script is forthcoming since decisions about public 
issues are necessarily complex and admit to no easy answers”.  
 
Enslin and Horsthemke (2009:218) are concerned about the likelihood of dominance 
by others in deliberative contexts. They cite Iris Marion Young, who emphasises the 
importance of including the marginalised by broadening deliberations to be more 
communicative, accommodating speaking styles of marginalised groups through 
                                                          
21 See Milligan, K., Moretti, R., & Oreopoulos, P. 2004. Does education improve citizenship? Evidence 
from the United States and the United Kingdom. Journal of Public Economics, 88: 1667-1695; Putnam, 
R. D. 1995a. Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6 (1), 65-78; 
Putnam, R. D. 1995b. Turning in, turning out: the strange disappearance of social capital in America. 
Political Science and Politics, 28 (4), 664-683. 
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greeting, rhetoric and narrative, and  in the making of policy. Ryfe (2005:62) contends 
that individuals succeed and are motivated to overcome historical, structural, and 
psychological impediments to intentional reflection. He acknowledges that while 
deliberation is difficult and fragile, it is attainable. It requires a mixture of knowledge, 
skills, motivation, and civic identity. How does the above analysis pertain to the political 
fabric of some traditional African societies? 
 
The literature suggests that some traditional African societies and their cultures were 
characterised by elements of the deliberative model of democracy and consensual 
decision-making (Williams, 2003; Dong’Aroga, 1999; Gyekye, 1997; Guy, 1994; 
Mandela, 1994). For instance, Gyekye (1997: 118) points out that when faced with 
matters of political and moral disagreement elders in Nyasaland (present day Malawi) 
would “sit under a big tree and talk until they agreed. This talking until you agree is 
essential to the traditional African concept of democracy”, or what is known as “the 
African custom of debate and palaver” (Dong’Aroga, 1999:150). Commenting on 
governance among the Akan communities of Ghana, Gyekye (1997:126) notes that 
“in the assembly, whether in the council of the chief, or in the palace of the chief –
where general assemblies of all the people usually take place - or in the house of a 
councillor. (that is, head of a clan), there is free expression of opinion”.  Gyekye argues 
that “no one was hindered from fully participating in the deliberations of the councils 
or general assemblies and thus from contributing to the decisions of these 
representative bodies”. The chief would never act without the advice and concurrence 
of his councillors, who acted as representatives of the people. My view is that in the 
context of traditional African societies and their cultures, the notion of representation 
was probably understood in paternalistic terms and not as it is conceived in modern 
day electoral politics. I shall come back to this issue in more detail below where I 
explore the notion of representation. 
 
Remarking on the imbizo in his native Thembuland in the former Transkei, Mandela 
(1995:24) notes, like Gyekye (1997) above, that “everyone who wanted to speak did 
so… There may have been a hierarchy of importance among speakers, but everyone 
was heard: chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, 
landowner and labourer. People spoke without interruption and the meetings lasted 
for many hours”. This is consistent with Schmitter and Karl’s (1991:79) view that 
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“democracy’s freedoms should encourage citizens to deliberate among themselves, 
to discover their common needs, and to resolve their differences without relying on 
some supreme central authority”. Schmitter and Karl argue that “in contemporary 
political discourse, this phenomenon of cooperation and deliberation via autonomous 
group activity goes under the rubric of ‘civil society’”.  
 
In a useful account of Zulu history, David Omer-Cooper (1966:36), historian and author 
of The Zulu Aftermath attempts to debunk the myth that Shaka, who was Zulu king in 
the 1820s was an absolute despot. He argues that Shaka’s position as king “depended 
on the loyalty of his troops and their commanders, the indunas, who held positions 
traditionally occupied by the territorial chiefs and were treated as counsellors”. Indeed 
Shaka’s portrayal as an ‘execrable monster’, an ‘inhumane mutilator’, or a cruel tyrant 
who frequently attacked smaller tribes for no reason except for some sadistic purposes 
(Biko, 1972:7) has been dismissed as a patently absurd exaggeration that only “suited 
colonial superiorist notions of black self-destructive violence”, and revelled at “the 
captivating image of a landscape littered with human bones” (Wylie, 1994:9).  
 
Jeff Guy, author of The Destruction of the Zulu Empire, argues that Cetshwayo [who 
was Zulu king in the 1870s] ruled with the elders of the kingdom, or the izikhulu, who 
comprised the ibandla - the highest council of the state. Guy (1994:29) notes that 
“without the izikhulu, the king would not make any decisions of national importance”. 
Omer-Cooper (1966) and Guy’s (1995) views above are consistent with John Locke’s 
(1993) observation in the Two Treatises of Government that the authority of the king 
originates in the consent of the people (paragraph 105), and that the king only rules 
“for the public good and safety” (paragraph 110). In the same vein, in his book entitled: 
Liberalism, Leonard Hobhouse (1911:25) argues that “the people are sovereign and 
government is merely their delegate.22 Government functions to maintain the natural 
rights of man as accurately as the conditions of society allow, and to do naught 
beside”.  
                                                          
22 See Raz, J. 1994. Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, especially chapter 15, “Government by Consent”. However, I am inclined to disagree 
with Raz that “the idea that the legitimacy of government rests on consent is deeply embedded in 
Western thought” (Raz, 1994:339). The idea of government by consent of the people has been a key 
feature of some traditional African societies and their cultures. See Dong’Aroga, 1999; Makumbe, 1998; 
Gyekye, 1997; Mandela, 1995; Guy, 1994; Ayisi, 1992.  
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In his account of the history of the Basotho nation, historian Leonard Thompson 
(1975:204) observes that until his death in 1870 Moshoeshoe, king of the Basotho 
“attracted and retained the services of able advisers. His councillors (matona) resided 
at Thaba-Bosiu and were his most intimate associates. Representing different interest 
and points of views, they kept him informed on the various currents of opinion and they 
were sufficiently talented to exert considerable influence over the territorial chiefs”. 
Thompson (1975:209) argues that Moshoeshoe “used the pitso to sound out public 
opinion. A letona [a councillor] would introduce the subject and then there would be a 
general debate, in which any man had the right to speak and to make forthright 
criticism of the authorities, even of the king himself”. Indeed in 1841 Moshoeshoe was 
strongly criticised by his people for paying too much attention to European 
missionaries and neglecting the views and resolutions of his people. Thompson 
(1975:210) argues that among the Basotho, the pitso “was a socialising and nation-
building institution. In the absence of a literary culture, it was a vital forum for political 
communication and education”, and “it promoted concerted action, which was 
particularly important since Moshoeshoe and his matona had scarcely any means of 
exerting physical coercion over the territorial chiefs”. 
  
Curtin, Feierman, Thompson, and Vansina (1980:325) note that Moshoeshoe and his 
councillors “heard appeals from the decisions of their local courts and from time to 
time he (Moshoeshoe) summoned all the initiated men to Thaba-Bosiu, where he 
discussed public affairs with them and announced his decisions”. It is Curtin, et al.’s 
(1980: 328) contention that the case of Moshoeshoe and the Southern Sotho 
illustrates the importance of the style of African political leadership, the condition of 
the African society in the moment of the first substantial contact with Europeans, and 
the class of Europeans who provided contact. 
 
Consultation of elders by chiefs and kings was common practice in most traditional 
African societies and their cultures. This suggests that most of these societies can be 
said to have been ‘gerontocratic’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines gerontocracy 
as ‘government by a council of elders’/ ‘a governing body consisting of old people’/ ‘a 
state or government in which old people rule’. As Ayisi (1992:69) observes, “The elders 
are usually the oldest men in the society and constitute a gerontocratic core of the 
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political structure”. For Mandela (1995:24), the elders [or the izikhulu] “were wise men 
who retained the knowledge of tribal history and custom in their heads and whose 
opinions carried great weight”. Canadian philosopher of education Kieran Egan 
(1992:641) argues that “oral cultures place significant emphasis on memory to 
preserve knowledge, lore, and customs”. This probably explains why in oral cultures 
the elders and memory are of such considerable socio-political and cultural 
importance. The elders tell stories that articulate conceptions of identity, morality, and 
social order. The ultimate force of storytelling is both moral and constitutional. Moral 
in the sense that storytelling tells not only what happened but also what ought to have 
happened. And constitutional in the sense that storytelling produces the conditions for 
self-identification. As a result, the elders are deemed “qualified to speak authoritatively 
on public matters and to mediate on socio-political and cultural issues because they 
articulate the meaning of life” (Egan, 2001:294).  
 
Dahl (1998: 10) posits that tribal elders “see themselves as about equal in being well 
qualified to have a say in governing the group”. For Ryfe (2005:63), the elders “anchor 
reality by organising experience and instilling a normative commitment to civic 
identities and values”. But herein lies the problem. Invariably, gerontocracy presumes 
male elders. This presumption is a major bone of contention contested by feminist 
critics who charge that gerontocracy perpetuates patriarchy by excluding women from 
key decision-making structures (Reddy, 2008; MacPherson, 1995). Let me explore 
this issue further. Traditional African societies and cultures referred to in this study 
were dominated by male elders. The term elders as used by Mandela (1995) and Ayisi 
(1992); izikhulu as used by Guy (1994); indunas as used by Ommer-Cooper (1966), 
or matona as used by Thompson (1957), all presume male elders. As a consequence, 
the imbizo and the khotla have come under fire for being patriarchal (Good, 1996; van 
Binsbergen, 1995; McGregor, 1994). For instance, in Swaziland the ibandla, which is 
equivalent to the khotla, is only “open to all male members of the chieftaincy” 
(McGregor, 1994:559). Commenting on the kgotla in Botswana, Kenneth Good 
(1996:47) notes that   
“While the kgotla was a unique indigenous political forum, participation within 
it, in the decades proceeding and just after independence, was limited to 
influential Tswana men, with women and such as the San either excluded or 
silent. Its powers were advisory only, and it essentially functioned to facilitate 
social control by the leadership.” 
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Van Binsbergen (1995:24) argues that in Botswana the kgotla is perceived to be 
“manipulated by the elite to produce populist authoritarianism through symbolic 
engineering”. 
 
Boafo-Arthur (2003:135) notes that in Ghanaian chieftaincy “none of the members of 
the National House of Chiefs is female”. Therefore, there is a compelling case to be 
made for a feminist critique of traditional African societies and their cultures. In fact, 
Okin (1999:14) is unequivocal that “many of the world’s traditions and cultures, 
including those practised within formerly conquered or colonised nation-states – which 
certainly encompass most of the peoples of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and 
Asia – are quite distinctly patriarchal”. She argues that they have “elaborate patterns 
of socialisation, rituals, matrimonial customs, and other cultural practices (including 
systems of property ownership and control of resources) aimed at bringing women’s 
sexuality and reproductive capabilities under men’s control”. Similarly, Enslin and 
Horsthemke (2004:55) argue that “in all cultures, ‘western’, ‘eastern’ or ‘African’, there 
have been oppressive practices, such as racism and gender oppression, that require 
alteration as part of the evolution of democracy”.  
 
In her book entitled: Justice, Gender, and the Family, Okin (1987:47) argues that even 
in the liberal tradition, despite its supposed foundation of individual rights and human 
equality, “liberals have assumed that the ‘individual’ who is the basic subject of their 
theories is the male head of a patriarchal household”. In another publication Okin 
(2004:1543) cites Linda McClain (1992), who argues that  
“Liberalism has been viewed as inextricably masculine in its model of separate, 
atomistic, competing individuals establishing a legal system to pursue their own 
interests and to protect them from others' interference with their rights to do so. 
Hence, it is said that liberal, masculine jurisprudence has exalted rights over 
responsibilities, separateness over connection, and the individual over the 
community.” 
 
Okin (1989:14) makes a case for ‘gender as an issue of justice’ on three counts. Firstly, 
it is the obvious point that women must be fully included in any satisfactory theory of 
justice. Second, equality of opportunity, not just for women but for children of both 
sexes, is seriously undermined by the current gender injustices of societies. Thirdly, 
the family – currently the linchpin of the gender structure – must be just if we are to 
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have a just society, since it is within the family that we first come to have that sense of 
ourselves and our relations with others that is at the root of moral development.   
 
For Shvedova (2005:35), “men largely dominate the political arena; largely formulate 
the rules of the political game; and often define the standards for evaluation”. She 
argues that in theory, the right to stand for election, to become a candidate and to get 
elected is based on the right to vote. However, in reality, women’s right to vote remains 
restricted, principally because the candidates are mostly male. “This is true not only 
for partial and developing democracies, but for established democracies as well” 
(Shvedova, 2005:34). She argues that the low level of women’s representation in 
some European parliaments should be considered a violation of women’s fundamental 
democratic right and, as such, a violation of their basic human rights. Echoing Okin’s 
view above that many of the world’s traditions and cultures are quite distinctly 
patriarchal, Shvedova (2005:34) posits that the unequal rate of representation in 
legislative bodies signifies that women’s representation, rather than being a 
consequence of democratisation, is more a reflection of the status quo. It is evident 
from the above analysis that patriarchy and the exclusion of women are a global 
phenomenon. As Amartya Sen (2001:35) points out, “they exist in most parts of the 
world, from Japan to Morocco, from Uzbekistan to the United States”. Norris and 
Inglehart (2001:127) go further to argue that “women have not achieved equal 
representation with men in any country”.  
 
Historically, Greece is regarded as “neither a model, nor just one historical specimen 
among others, but the seedbed of western democracy” (Hartog, 1994:41). The 
Greeks, most conspicuously the Athenians, are generally taken to have been the 
architects and early practitioners of democracy (Barber, 1994; Kyrtatas, 1994; Ober, 
1994; Harrison, 1993; Dhal, 1989). And yet Athenian political culture was a patently 
adult male culture. Held (1987:19) argues that “only Athenian males over the age of 
20 were eligible for full citizenship. Ancient democracy was a democracy of the 
patriarchs; women had no political rights and their civic rights were strictly limited 
(although married women fared rather better in this latter respect than single women)”. 
Kyrtatas (1994:44) notes that Athenian decision-making by majority rule was strictly 
located within the limits of a citizen body. It was “full citizens [men] who were entitled 
to participate ‘in judgement and authority... Slaves and foreigners, including those with 
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permanent residence, were ineligible - and so were of course, women and children”. 
Kyrtatas (1994:44) notes that “this simple fact, acknowledged theoretically by most 
scholars, though forgotten thereafter in their investigations, is deeply problematic”. If 
Athens was interested in securing the unity of its total population, not just of its 
privileged elite, then “the citizens of Athens had no reason to question the loyalty of 
their women and children, and the same held true for resident foreigners, called 
metics”.  
 
It follows therefore that Athenian society was far from being completely egalitarian. 
Raaflaub (1996:154) attributes the exclusion of women, foreigners and slaves in Greek 
political culture to restrictive enfranchisement policies. He argues that Sophistic 
theories about the essential equality of humankind had no impact on human life, let 
alone politics. Comic fantasies about the women’s political takeover were so funny 
precisely because they dealt with the impossible. Thus, on the one hand, Athenian 
political culture was punted as the form of social order that did not discriminate among 
citizens of diverse backgrounds, birth or wealth. And yet on the other hand, “its citizens 
rigidly excluded women, immigrants, resident aliens, allies of the polis, and slaves” 
(Manville, 1996:382).  
Fast forward centuries later and the exclusion of women around the world remains a 
major bone of contention. Markoff (2003:90) observes that when Alexis de Tocqueville 
described the extension of men’s rights in the United States in 1835 as ‘universal 
suffrage’, the irony of this description was that “no women were part of that universe”. 
Field (2001:113) argues that in the United States in the 1840s, white male citizens 
aged 21 years were enfranchised, but there was no stage of life equivalent to manhood 
for women.23 Oyzerman (2003:96) reminds us that “even the first programme of the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany adopted in 1869 and fully approved by the 
founders of Marxism called for universal suffrage only for men to the exclusion of 
women”. Most western nation states only recognised women’s right to vote after New 
Zealand became the first nation state to enact women’s suffrage in national elections 
in 1893. Subsequently, Australian women gained voting rights in national elections in 
1902. Finland granted suffrage for both sexes to vote for parliamentary deputies in 
                                                          
23 Notice the similarity here between Field’s (2001) observation regarding the enfranchisement of male 
citizens of a particular age in American and the point David Held (1987) makes on the eligibility of 
Athenian males over the age of 20 for full citizenship. 
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1906. British women were only able to vote for the House of Commons in 1918, the 
same year that “Canada enfranchised women at the national level” (Markoff, 2003:92). 
These historical accounts beg the questions: why were women’s right to political 
participation not treated as integral to these so-called Western liberal democracies all 
along? And, why did not these Western nation states provide for women’s participation 
in political decision making processes in their constitutions?  
 
Markoff (2003:103) clarifies that “the exclusion of women seemed eminently 
reasonable and natural to those who first constructed the institutions that were to make 
democracy real, so reasonable and natural that in many places constitutions and 
electoral codes did not even have to specify that only men were to vote”. It seems to 
me that one way of making sense of this phenomenon is to acknowledge the validity 
of Okin’s (1999) view above that most of the world’s traditions and cultures “are quite 
distinctly patriarchal”. Most patriarchal societies tend to adopt a politically paternalistic 
attitude towards women. There is a taken-for-granted assumption in such societies 
that men would represent women in public decision-making processes. But as 
indicated above, such an assumption is contested by feminist political theorists (Okin, 
1999, 1989, 1987; Harding, 2006).  
 
The above criticisms of the imbizo and the khotla (Good, 1996; van Binsbergen, 1995; 
McGregor, 1994) underlie contestations around issues of power, power relations and 
how power ought to be exercised. Foucault (1998; 1980, 1977) studied and analysed 
institutions like the prisons, mental institutions, military barracks, factories, and schools 
to try and understand who has power? How power is exercised? And what are the 
effects of such an exercise? For Foucault, “power is diffuse; it is exercised by 
everyone; it forms a complex mosaic in which each local piece plays its relatively 
autonomous role” (Shiner, 1982: 390). Thus “power relations are rooted deep in the 
social nexus” (Faubion, 2002: 343). That is, they are “rooted in the whole network of 
the social” (Faubion, 2002: 345). To live “in society is to live in such a way that some 
can act on the actions of others. A society without power relations can only be an 
abstraction” (Faubion, 2002:343). Shiner (1982: 390) argues that power relations are 
“a matter of ‘governance’: a way of attempting to give structure to the terrain of action 
of others”. In this regard, “power relations form a kind of ‘game’ or ‘war’ in which each 
participant and group of participants develops strategies to gain an advantage”. For 
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Shiner (1992:391) “clearly, the effects of power are not simply negative and restrictive 
but above all productive”. Their productivity creates a fine web of power relations in 
which “power simply produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth”. It is Foucault’s (1980:39) contention that “power reaches into the very grain of 
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their 
discourses, learning processes in everyday lives”.  
 
In his book entitled: Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes (2005:12) offers an 
alternative and fresher formulation of power, power relations, and the way power is 
exercised. He writes: “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary 
to B’s interests”. Lukes’s formulation is consistent with Bachrach and Baratz’s 
(1962:948) view that “power is exercised when A participates in the making of 
decisions that affect B”. Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 949) argue that “to the extent that 
a person or group-consciously or unconsciously - creates or reinforces barriers to the 
public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power”. At the heart of this 
view of power is concern about how the powerful secure the compliance of the 
subordinate, and why power is an unavoidably value-dependent concept.  
 
Lukes (2005:12) argues that: “power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it 
may never be, and never need to be, exercised)”. He contends that “power as 
domination, is only one species of power”. One “can be powerful by satisfying and 
advancing others’ interests”. In the latter respect, the definition of power and any use 
of it “are inextricably tied to a given set of (probably unacknowledged) value-
assumptions which predetermine the range of its empirical application” (Lukes, 
2005:30). Lukes (2005:30) argues that “the concept of power is, in consequence, what 
has been called an ‘essentially contested concept’ - one of those concepts which 
inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users”. 
Therefore, For Lukes (2005:30) “to engage in such disputes is itself to engage in 
politics”. 
 
For Nicholas Burbules’ (1986), the ‘relational conception of power’ brings into the 
analysis another face of power, what Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 947) call the 
‘diffused face power’. Burbules (1986:96) argues that “in general, traditional theories 
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of power have assumed that power is a property of individual persons [centralised], 
wielded instrumentally as a means to particular intended outcomes”. Burbules 
(1986:103) suggests that contrary to thinking of power only as an individual 
possession, power can also be regarded “as a relation among persons [diffused]: that 
A has power over B, but that in most cases B empowers A”. On this understanding, “a 
relation of power binds and constrains the activities of both parties, and each party 
defines its purposes and range of alternatives partly in terms of the other”. As Eldredge 
(2007:4) points out, “definitions of power that equate power with domination and 
assume implicitly that power flows downward from those who hold political authority 
ignore the play of power outside the realm of officially recognized channels of 
authority”.  
 
Indeed Burbules (1986:104) argues that the ‘relational conception of power’ [diffused] 
is a “conception of power as a web, as a system of relations: discursive, practical, 
material, intellectual, and psychological”. This conception reveals four characteristic 
features of power relations: 
 relations of power as to some extent reciprocal, both because of the dynamic 
of compliance and resistance and because a person in power over another in 
one respect may be relatively powerless in other respects; 
 power as transitive in its nature and its effects (the father beats the boy, and 
the boy kicks the dog);  
 the traditional distinction between actual power and potential power is too 
simple, since power can be as effective in its latent form as in its overt 
expression and use; and  
 typologies of ‘forms’ of power treat as distinct what are always and necessarily 
interrelated aspects of a given power relation (Burbules, 1986: 104) 
 
But the exercise of power can also be unconscious. As Lorenzi (2006:93) points out, 
“this may be the case where A exercises its power over B yet remains unaware of its 
consequences”. Lorenzi (2006:94) contends that “how much power we see in the 
social world, and where we locate it, depends on how we conceive of it”. Against this 
backdrop, I want to argue that it is questionable whether in traditional African society 
men wielded more power than women. It is also questionable whether men 
intentionally excluded women from public decision-making processes or whether this 
is merely a perception whose validity needs to be tested by logical and evidential 
procedures.   
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In his book entitled: The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western 
Gender Discourses, Oyèrónké Oyĕwùmi (1997) interrogates the ways in which 
Western assumptions about sex differences are used to interpret Yoruba society, and 
in the process, create local gender systems. Her analysis challenges common ideas 
in Western feminist writings, for instance, (a) that “gender categories are universal and 
timeless and have been present in every society at all times”.  Oyĕwùmi (1997: xi) 
argues that “this idea is often expressed in biblical tone, as if to suggest that ‘in the 
beginning’ there was gender”; (b) that “gender is a fundamental organising principle in 
all societies and therefore always salient. In any given society, gender is everywhere”; 
(c) that “there is an essential, universal category ‘woman’ that is characterised by the 
social uniformity of its members”; (d) that “the subordination of women is universal”; 
and (e) that “the category ‘woman’ is pre-cultural, fixed in historical time and cultural 
space in antithesis to another, fixed category – ‘man’” (Oyĕwùmi, 1997: xii). Oyĕwùmi 
argues that while “Sex (with a capital ‘S’) is a gender system of the West… Sex is not 
the only way to sort out human bodies, not the only way to make sense of sex. One 
can only imagine different cultural classifications and rationales for gender categories, 
different scenarios that take into account the evidence our bodies provide”. Adesina 
(2006:140) contends that Oyĕwùmi’s work demonstrates that the inscription of gender 
ordering in the anatomical body or the coincidence of anatomical maleness and 
anatomical femaleness does not reflect the experience – historical or even 
contemporary in the context in which she worked.   
 
Another issue that warrants a critical response is whether traditional African societies 
and their cultures had procedures for citizens to recall rulers who abused their 
positions of power or who did not represent their offices as they were expected to. The 
literature on traditional African societies and their cultures suggests that rulers who 
abused their positions of power were ‘destooled’ or dethroned (Williams, 2003; 
Gyekye, 1992; Ayisi, 1992; Sparks, 1991). Williams (2003:61) argues that “some 
traditional African leadership and authority systems had specific formal practices 
which positioned citizens to authorise, critique and sanction the ascension of their 
ruler, his or her continued reign, and the selection and ascension of his or her 
successor”. Similarly, Gyekye (1992: 243) posits that among the Akan people of 
Ghana, “The chief was bound by law to rule with the consent of the people. If a chief 
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abused his power, his subordinate chiefs, who were members of his council, could 
depose him”. Commenting on the Southern African traditional communities, Sparks 
(1991:16) writes that “a chief would not make decisions that were binding to his juniors 
unless he discussed the matter with them. The chief might have appeared to be an 
absolute sovereign, but there were measures to regulate his exercise of power. The 
chief governed only as long as the people chose to obey him. If he behaved 
tyrannically he would lose support”. In the same vein, Williams (2003:62) argues that 
“the reign of a particular king, however loved or despised, was never more significant 
than the endurance of the kingdom itself”. 
 
To summarise, I have sketched the socio-political fabric of some traditional African 
societies and argued that they had indigenous institutions of differing degree of 
representation in decision-making and governance. I acknowledged though that these 
institutions have been criticised for being patriarchal and for excluding women in their 
deliberations. However, I argued that patriarchy and the exclusion of women are not 
peculiar to Africa or the African people, but are a global phenomenon that can be 
traced as far back as the time of Athenian democracy. Exclusion of women is also 
prevalent in modern liberal democracies. My view is that central to the above-sketched 
contestations is how power is conceived and exercised, and how its effects are 
understood. Building on the above analysis, in the next section I broach the notion of 
representation. I recognise that the notion of representation is a puzzling, paradoxical, 
and contested concept.24  
 
6.6. The notion of representation 
 
There has been increasing interest among sociologists, political scientists and political 
philosophers in the notion of representation in general (Urbinati & Warren, 2008; 
Mansbridge, 2003; Lublin, 1997; Mill, 1991; Pitkin, 1967), in democratic representation 
(Cotta & Best, 2007; Krouse, 1982), political representation (Runciman, 2007; Rehfeld, 
                                                          
24 See Pitkin, H. 1967. The Concept of Representation, University of California Press: Berkerly; Pitkin, 
H. 1968. Commentary: The paradox of representation. Nomos X, Representation, edited by Roland 
Pennock & John Chapman, Atherton: New York, pp.38-42; Runciman, D. 2007. The paradox of political 
representation. Journal of Political Philosophy, 15 (1), 93-114; Eulau, H., & Karps, P. 1977. The puzzle 
of representation: specifying components of responsiveness. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2 (3), 233-
254.  
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2006; Brennan & Hamlin, 1999), and citizens’ representation (Warren, 2006) in 
particular. Most of these commentators continue to draw on the work of Hanna Pitkin, 
especially her seminal book, The Concept of Representation, as well as journal articles 
she published prior to completion of her doctorate (Pitkin, 1964, 1964b). Pitkin 
(1967:222) conceives of ‘representation’ as “substantive acting for others”. She argues 
that “a representative is defined as a person who has been given authority to act, and 
this in turn means a deployment of rights and responsibilities” (Pitkin, 1964:329). 
Others have argued that “the idea of representation holds that someone stands for, 
speaks for, or acts for another” (Saward, 2009:3). Indeed in The Concept of 
Representation, Pitkin (1967) grapples with the idea of ‘standing for’ by exploring 
’descriptive representation’ [Chapter 4], and ’symbolic representation’ [Chapter 5].  
Pitkin’s (1967:8) ‘first’ working assumption is that “representation does have an 
identifiable meaning applied in different but controlled and discoverable ways in 
different contexts. It is not vague and shifting, but a single, highly complex concept 
that has not changed much in its basic meaning since the seventeenth century”. Pitkin 
(1967:8-9) contends that “representation means, as the word's etymological origins 
indicate, re-presentation, a making present again”. Generally, representation means 
“the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present 
literally or in fact”. But “to say something is simultaneously both present and not 
present is to utter a paradox, and thus a fundamental dualism is built into the meaning 
of representation”. For Pitkin (1967:222), what makes a relationship one of 
representation is “not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure 
and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from multiple activities of many 
people”. Thus, representation is primarily a public, institutionalised arrangement 
involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale 
social arrangements. 
 
Runciman (2007: 93) broaches the paradox to which Pitkin refers above. He argues 
that “this is not a formal or logical paradox, but a linguistic one, and it has its roots in 
the etymology of the term:‘re-presentation’ implies that something must be present in 
order to be ‘re-presented’ but also absent in order to be ‘re-presented’”. It allows for 
the idea of representation to be identified both so that representatives should take 
decisions on behalf of their constituents, who must be absent so that voters should 
issue instructions to their representatives. Runciman (2007:108) contends that the 
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language of representation “can accommodate a broadly coherent conception of 
politics that is still a recognisably democratic one”. Although representative politics 
reduces the focus of political activity to competing claims of representatives to act in 
the name of the represented, this does not necessarily mean that the represented are 
reduced to a passive role. Instead the represented remain the arbiters of political 
representation. Runciman (2007:108) argues that this way, “political representation 
offers a uniquely flexible form of collective activity in which actions are undertaken in 
the name of the abstract group, but assessed by a collection of separate individuals”. 
Thus “the paradox of presence suggests that some variety in our understanding of 
representation is unavoidable” (Runciman (2007:113) 
In the same vein, Mansbridge (2003:215) argues that “constituents choose 
representatives not only to think more carefully than they about ends and means but 
also to negotiate more perceptively and fight more skilfully than constituents have 
either the time or the inclination to do”. However, in reality “none of us is ever fully 
represented - representation of our interests or identities in politics is always 
incomplete and partial” (Saward, 2009:3). My view is that to conceive of representation 
solely in terms of modern-day electoral processes, of constituents electing or choosing 
their representatives, limits the potential for deriving alternative conceptions of 
representation that are also viable even though they might not necessarily be based 
on the idea of the represented choosing representatives. For instance, non-elective 
representation (Saward, 2009; Rehfeld, 2006) and surrogate representation 
(Mansbridge, 2003) have emerged as alternative forms of representation that have the 
desired impact in enabling the public to mediate issues of socio-political importance 
and moral disagreement. What non-elected representation and surrogate 
representation highlight is that at times the “definition of representation – as 
‘substantive acting for others’ - does not in principle require election” (Saward, 2009:4).  
 
In what then do surrogate representation and non-elective representation consist? 
Firstly, “surrogate representation is representation by a representative with whom one 
has no electoral relationship” (Mansbridge, 2003:522). Mansbridge (2003:526) argues 
that “in pure surrogate representation, there need be no relation at all between the 
representative and the individual constituent”. This is because surrogate 
representation provides at national level the elements required for systemic 
democratic legitimacy that other forms of representation do not provide. As Urbinati 
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and Warren (2008:392) note, “representation is at best a surrogate form of 
participation for citizens who are physically absent”. Secondly, non-elective 
representation is based on the assumption that someone or some organisation carries 
the desired force to represent the common interests and common sentiments of 
sections of society that are excluded or marginalised by forces beyond their control.  
 
Saward (2009:1) refers to U2 lead singer and celebrity political activist Bono who has 
declared himself a representative of many people in Africa, whom he argues have no 
voice at all. Bono acknowledges that the peoples of Africa have not asked him to 
represent them. But he believes, cheekily, that they would be glad he did. There is 
absolutely no basis for Bono’s belief. My own view is that he is just a condescending 
Western European celebrity who has an unfounded sense of self-importance that 
drives him to believe he can represent ‘the voiceless Africans’, as if the African peoples 
are a homogeneous group that happens to be desperate for Bono’s representation. 
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008: 481) rightly point out “nobody elected Bono; he is not 
formally accountable to anybody, and most of the people he claims to represent have 
no idea who he is or what he proposes”.   
 
In what ways does the above analysis of representation pertain to the role of women 
in traditional African societies? What form could this role take? How best can it be 
understood? From which vantage point? Can it be understood on its own or when 
juxtaposed with women’s relations with men in their specific contexts? These are 
vexing questions about which there might not be simple answers. Suffice to mention 
though that “any society’s masculinity and femininity are relational constructs” 
(Hussein, 2004:134). A deeper understanding of the social construction of masculinity 
and femininity is critical to our overall understanding of how traditional African societies 
were ordered, and how the notion of gender might have been conceived. Sudarkasa 
(1986:96) attributes perceptions of the ‘status of women’ in traditional African societies 
to the obsession of Western scholars with analyses of the nuclear family and the 
operations of the principle of conjugality in determining kin relations. She argues that 
this emphasis derives from an attempt to analyse kinship in other societies from the 
viewpoint of and with paradigms appropriate to Western kin groups. Ditto Mudimbe’s 
(1985) concern that the ways in which the African Welternschuunge has been 
evaluated were based on a non-African epistemological locus.  
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Nzegwu (1998:602) calls for the use of ‘historicity’ in analysing socio-cultural issues. 
She argues that historicising interpretations should involve “using appropriate 
yardsticks so that the time frames are not illicitly collapsed and conceptual frames of 
cultures are not illicitly switched”. She contends that in Judeo-Christian tradition, and 
in European and American cultures, definitions of gender entail a binary oppositional 
epistemology, which “aligns women in opposition to men” (Nzegwu, 2001:112) . And 
given that the study of gender in African Studies was pioneered by white Africanist 
women scholars, the underlying pivotal gender assumptions of European women were 
carried over to Africa. If we accept the view that the politics of gender is mired in the 
specific social histories, ideological commitments, and cultural strategies of the 
activism of dominant white Africanist theorists, critical questions to ask are: “How 
relevant is the concept of gender to Africa?  What is the basis for universalising it? 
What if there is no social category of woman in a given traditional African society? And 
what if such a society has a non-gendered principle of organisation” (Nzegwu, 
2001:113)?    
 
Some have suggested that in traditional African societies, a meaningful basis of 
identity should be the lineage, where power is diffuse (Claesson, 2011; McIntosh, 
2005; Nzegwu, 2004; Ayisi, 1992). The lineage is a corporate unilineal descent group 
whose members trace their genealogical relationship to a founding ancestor. In my 
Letseka family lineage, the praise songs for our ancestors start by noting that  
“We are the people of Mohaila, of Tsepa, Khomo, Nkhate, Sebothoana, and 
Mochaooana”  
 
The six are names of the founding fathers (baholo) of the Letseka lineage. Therefore, 
the lineage is larger than the nuclear family in that it embraces several generations of 
kin-groups. The principle of organisation in the lineage is age-based seniority. For 
instance, in a lineage-ordered social structure, marriage is not reducible to a 
relationship between a man and a woman, as is the case in a nuclear family. Instead 
it is a union of two or more lineages [the Sesotho term for lineage is leloko].  
 
Nzegwu (1998:611) is unequivocal that family-as-lineage is the appropriate unit of 
analysis in traditional African societies. In the lineal-cultural framework, the marriage 
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partners and their respective families are held together by an intricate structured web 
of interrelationships between their respective families-as-lineage. In this intricate 
structured web, a traditional African household is not a household of masculinity as 
the gendered analysis suggests, but a socially defined site for tending to the well-being 
of the members of the lineage. For instance, Sudarkasa (1986: 100) argues that 
“women were consulted on most governmental affairs. Their participation through their 
spokespersons paralleled the participation of males through theirs”. While there was 
sex differentiation, it does not necessarily follow that it equalled sex discrimination 
(Nzegwu, 1998:6021).  
 
To summarise, I started by acknowledging that the notion of representation is 
paradoxical in that it implies that something must be absent in order to be ‘re-
presented’. I argued that while there is a perception that in traditional African societies 
women were represented by men, a case can be argued that women either 
participated through their spokespersons or were consulted on internal political issues 
and on most governmental affairs. It is my considered view that regardless of the 
foregoing analysis, it is now an opportune moment for the institutions like the imbizo 
and the kgotla to be revisited, candidly investigated, thoroughly debated and 
meticulously refined so that their processes and procedures are refashioned and made 
responsive to modern-day political imperatives and priorities.  
 
6.7  Conclusion  
 
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to explore the potential for the 
amalgamation of traditional African values and liberal democratic values in South 
Africa with a view to understanding the implications of such an amalgamation. The 
exploration was necessary given that South Africa’s constitution is hailed worldwide 
as liberal in that it enshrines a wide range of rights and freedoms for the individual. 
And yet the same constitution also recognises the institution of traditional leadership, 
which is hereditary and therefore not necessarily bound by democratic procedures. 
Some scholars have suggested that the Constitution’s recognition of the institution of 
traditional leadership is not only incompatible with liberal democratic values, but is also 
contradictory. I challenged that suggestion and argued that existence of traditional and 
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cultural institutions in a liberal democracy is not peculiar to South Africa. In fact, as is 
the case in the UK, the Queen is a constitutional monarch who presides over the 
country’s democratic processes. For instance, at the conclusion of an election the 
Queen has a constitutional duty to meet with the winner and incumbent prime minister 
and instruct him/her to form a government. 
 
I argued that South Africa seeks to build a socio-political future based on the 
amalgamation of desirable aspects of traditional African values and desirable aspects 
of liberal democratic values. I suggested that it is a fallacy to think that there is a 
disjuncture between what is perceived to be traditional and what is perceived to be 
modern given that no society is entirely traditional or entirely modern. A traditional 
culture might possess values that are congruent with modernisation, while a modern 
culture might have long held traditions that it might want to preserve for posterity. In 
this regard, tradition and modernity overlap and it might not be easy to decide what is 
traditional or what is modern except by way of very crude and idiosyncratic means. 
 
I attempted a conceptualisation of the notion of authoritarianism, with a focus on 
authoritarian regimes. I argued that governance in authoritarian regimes governance 
is centralised and there is often forcible prevention of political expression by certain 
sections of society. I challenged the view that authoritarianism is peculiar to traditional 
African societies. The basis for this challenge is that the literature shows that socio-
cultural fabric of traditional African societies was marked by communality and 
interdependence, while their political fabric was marked by deliberation and the 
inclination for consensus in decision-making. I argued that some traditional African 
societies were informed by the deliberative model of democracy given that political 
leaders were required to ‘talk until they agreed’ on matters of socio-political importance 
and moral disagreement.  
 
I teased out the notion of representation in relation to the imbizo and the khotla. I 
acknowledged that the notion of representation is paradoxical in so far as it implies the 
making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally 
or in fact. I recognised that the imbizo and the khotla have been criticised for excluding 
women from their processes. However, I argued that exclusion of women is not 
peculiar to Africa or the African peoples. Most of the world’s traditions and cultures are 
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quite distinctly patriarchal. Worldwide men dominate the political arena and formulate 
the rules of the political game. I showed that in some traditional African societies 
women either participated in decision-making through their spokespersons or were 
consulted on internal political affairs and governmental affairs. I suggested though that 
perhaps it is now an opportune moment for the underlying assumptions and guiding 
principles of the imbizo and the kgotla to be revisited, thoroughly investigated, 
vigorously debated and meticulously refined so that they are responsive to modern-
day political imperatives and priorities.  
 
In the next chapter I explore conceptions of education in South Africa with a view to 
suggesting a conception of education, or philosophy of education that will be 
responsive to both traditional African values and liberal democratic values. Such a 
conception of education or philosophy of education would need to start with Africa. It 
would have to locate African cultures, norms and values at the heart of its curricula 
offerings, while at the same time embracing the values that are implicit in the country’s 
constitution, values such as non-racialism, non-sexism, respect for human dignity, 
human rights, and freedoms for the individual. Such a conception of education or 
philosophy of education would seek a common space for   traditional African values 
and liberal democratic values to coexist and flourish in the teaching and learning 
processes. I now turn to the conception of education for an African liberal democracy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION IN A LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
In the foregoing chapters I have mounted three critical arguments: (a) given that its 
Constitution is liberal in that it “affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom” (Republic of South Africa, 1996), South Africa is therefore a liberal 
democracy25 (Deveaux, 2003; Dugard, 1998; Enslin, 1999; Jordan, 1996; Welsh, 
1998). I submitted that generally liberalism attaches a high premium to the rights and 
freedoms of individuals to move, to assemble, to associate, and to openly and 
autonomously express their views, under the rule of law of course (Chapter 4). I 
underscored the importance of the virtues to liberal societies given that the virtues are 
taken to constitute human goodness, excellence, or perfection of the very essence of 
being. I argued that against this backdrop, the viability of most liberal democratic 
societies is predicated on creation and existence of a critical mass of virtuous citizens. 
However, I acknowledged that liberalism is a contested concept. The contestation 
arises from the fact that liberal values such as liberty [freedom], rights, justice, equality, 
and autonomy are variously interpreted by liberals themselves. This has prompted 
some liberals to suggest that perhaps we should recognise that there is no single view 
on liberalism. Instead there is “a multitude of liberalisms” (McKay, 2000); there are 
“many liberalisms” (Friedman, 2003; Rawls, 1996), and that there is “a family of 
liberalisms” (Simhony, 2003). 
 
However, I argued (b) in Chapter 5 that the same Constitution that is widely regarded 
as liberal and egalitarian also recognises the institution of traditional leadership, and 
                                                          
25However, in his book Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy, Eamonn Callan 
(1997:11) warns that “the marriage of liberalism and democracy is a turbulent one, and its turbulence 
is inevitably manifest in our educational thought and practice”. In South Africa this turbulence is as a 
result of the relationship between liberalism, democracy and the institution of traditional leadership. One 
of my tasks in this chapter is to demarcate a philosophy of education that is able to mediate this 
turbulence with a view to ascertaining coexistence between the three.   
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by extension, the practice of African customary law. This makes South Africa a liberal 
democratic state that is also heavily steeped in African traditions and cultures. I argued 
though that it is not unusual for liberal democracy and local traditions and cultures to 
coexist in different sectors of the same society. Firstly, South Africa is an African 
country in which the African peoples constitute the majority. Therefore, there is nothing 
unusual in the country’s intentions to frame its socio-political and cultural trajectory in, 
among others, the local cultures and traditions. Secondly, and contrary to concerns 
that the Constitution’s recognition of the institution of traditional leadership is both 
incompatible with, and contradictory to liberal democratic values (Beall, 2006; Beall, 
et al., 2005; Bentley, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2005), existence of chieftaincy and/or traditional 
institutions of politics and governance in a liberal democracy is not peculiar to South 
Africa. The literature shows that enduring liberal democracies such as Japan (Ruoff, 
2001; Fujitani, 1996), the UK (Harvey, 2004), Belgium (van Goethem, 2011), the 
Netherlands (Andeweg & Urwin, 2002) and Spain (Bogdanor, 1996), to mention a few, 
have had monarchies from time immemorial. But their monarchies have neither been 
a hindrance to democracy in general, nor to liberal democratic governance in 
particular. 
 
Finally (c), and flowing from (a) and (b) above, I argued a case for the amalgamation 
of traditional African values and liberal democratic values in South Africa (Chapter 6). 
The thrust of my argument was that co-existence and/or crosspollination between 
traditional African values and liberal democratic values seems to be fait accompli in 
South Africa given that the country manifests a diversity of African traditions and 
cultures as well as liberal democratic aspirations on account of its 1996 Constitution, 
which is widely regarded as liberal and egalitarian. I posited that South Africa seeks 
to build a socio-political and cultural future based on the co-existence and/or 
crosspollination of traditional African values and liberal democratic values. In section 
1.2 above I made reference to Ware (1992), who observes that the 'exporting' of liberal 
democracy to ex-colonies or to regimes which were conquered militarily, but which 
had no previous history of liberal democracy has transformed liberal democracy 
exponentially. Ware’s (1992:137) view is that “there are today quite distinct types of 
liberal democracy”. This is consistent with the views expressed by Friedman (2003), 
Simhony (2003), McKay (2000), and Rawls (1996) on the existence of a multiplicity of 
liberalisms. 
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In this chapter, which focuses on the educational implications of the foregoing 
analysis, I shall propose a philosophy of education for South Africa, which seeks to 
dovetail both liberal democratic values and traditional African values. I shall argue that 
because South Africa is an African country in which the African peoples constitute that 
majority, it follows that the country’s philosophy of education should be rooted in Africa. 
This means that when framing such a philosophy of education, the cultures and 
traditions of the country’s African peoples must take centre stage. Thus, such a 
philosophy of education would need to unpack critical questions such as what ought 
the ‘African child’ to be educated for? In other words, what set of principles ought to 
frame a philosophy of education for an ‘African child’? Should such principles centrally 
consider the African child’s habitat, or habitus,26 before attempting to embrace other, 
external cultures and ways of knowing? I shall argue that such a philosophy of 
education would need to get learners to clarify for themselves what it means to be an 
African.   
 
Concomitantly, such a philosophy of education would need to be responsive to the 
democratic values implicit in the Constitution of South Africa, such as the values of 
human dignity, equality rights, and freedom. The key question philosophy of education 
would grapple with are how ought a child in an African liberal democracy be socialised 
in order to live a flourishing life in such a political order? In section 1.6 above, I hinted 
at these questions when I asked: What would be the aims of a philosophy of education 
in a liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in indigenous African cultures and 
traditions? I referred to Knight and Collins (2010) who observed that such questions 
arise for all humans, mainly because humans are self-conscious; they are able to 
reflect on the content of their consciousness, and on the relationship between their 
experiences and the rest of the world. Worldwide, liberal philosophers of education 
have tended to emphasise a multiplicity of liberal values. For instance, some 
emphasise the promotion of individual autonomy (Schmenk, 2005; Enslin, 1997; 
White, 1997; Raz, 1988, 1994), while others emphasise the promotion of democratic 
                                                          
26In his book, Outline of a Theory of Practice French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher, Pierre 
Bourdieu (1995) argues that the habitus is the universalizing mediation which causes an individual 
agent’s practices, without either explicit reason or signifying intent, to be none the less ‘sensible’ and 
‘reasonable’. For Bourdieu, the habitus produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, 
in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. 
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citizenship (Nussbaum, 2007, 2006, 2004; Callan, 1997). Still others emphasise 
democratic education (Gutmann, 1999; Dewey, 1966). For instance, Gutmann 
(1999:3) argues that democratic education is a political as well as an educational ideal. 
She contends that “because being a democratic citizen entails ruling, the ideal of 
democratic education is being ruled, then ruling. Education does not only set the stage 
for democratic politics, it plays a central role in it”. For Callan (1997:2), “to believe in 
liberal democracy is to believe in free and equal citizenship”. 
 
This chapter is structured around four sections. I begin with an exploration of the notion 
of liberal education. For my purpose in this study, I prefer Martha Nussbaum’s notion 
of liberal education. Her emphasis on the ‘cultivation of humanity’ and development of 
‘narrative imagination’ can be said to be consistent with the values and principles that 
are implicit in Ubuntu, understood as “human interdependence and humanness” 
(Waghid, 2014; Letseka, 2013a, 2013b, 2012, 2000). Indeed as Beets (2011:80) 
argues, Ubuntu implies that “each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed in 
relationships with others”. Nussbaum (1998:45) seeks “to cultivate the humanity of 
students so that they are capable of relating to other human beings not through 
economic connections alone, but through a deeper and wider set of human 
understandings”. In the second section, I broach the idea of an African traditional 
education (Maharasoa, and Maharasoa, 2004; Mapesela, 2004; Adeyemi, & 
Adeyinka, 2003; Adeyemi., & Adeyinka, 2002; Matšela, 1990, 1979). I shall argue that 
African traditional education is rooted in Africa and seeks to develop a strong African 
communal spirit in children, and to acknowledge and establish an African identity in 
education (Higgs & Smith, 2015). One of the grounding principles of the African 
traditional thought is the idea of ‘living with, and for others’, as lucidly captured in the 
saying: umuntu-ngumuntu-ngabantu.  
 
Some elements of ‘living with, and for others’, as in umuntu-ngumuntu-ngabantu can 
be found in the writings of French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. For instance, the 
relationship between the notions of being-for-others and being-for-myself, which he 
sketches in his book entitled: Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological 
Ontology. Sartre (2003:218) writes that, “Finally in my essential being I depend on the 
essential being of the Other. Instead of holding that my being-for-myself is opposed to 
my being-for-others, I find that being-for-others appears as a necessary condition for 
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my being-for-myself”. Therefore, it follows that an African conception of education that 
is shaped by the values and principles of Ubuntu would be marked by a commitment 
to the well-being of others and the general well-being of the community. For instance, 
as a general courtesy, when Africans meet at the khotla or the market place they often 
inquire about the health and well-being of the family, especially the children and 
grandchildren. This is quite the opposite with Europeans who often comment about 
the weather.  In the third section I propose a philosophy of education for an African 
liberal democracy. As mentioned above, in South Africa, co-existence between 
traditional African values and liberal democratic values seems to be fait accompli given 
that South Africa is a liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in African cultures 
and traditions. In the fourth section I offer some concluding remarks. I now turn to the 
exploration of the notion of liberal education. 
 
7.2  Liberal education 
Various philosophers of education have articulated varying conceptions of liberal 
education (Bailey, 2010; Levinson, 1999; Peters, 1966; Enslin, 1999, 1986, 1985; 
White, 1982). For my purpose in this study I shall draw on Nussbaum’s conception of 
liberal education, which she sketches in her book entitled; Cultivating Humanity: A 
Classical Defence in Liberal Education (1997), and other related publications 
(Nussbaum, 2011, 2007, 2004, 2002, 1998). Nussbaum (2004:42) worries about the 
role of traditional American liberal education in “forming imaginative compassionate 
world citizens”. She is concerned that since 9/11 Americans have generally been living 
in fear. It is Nussbaum’s (2004:42) contention that fear narrows moral imagination and 
makes it “difficult to view with sympathy the situation of people who live at a distance 
or who look different from us”. She opines that fear leads to ‘conflict of civilisations’. 
Nussbaum’s concerns about America’s fear of terrorism and the potential for ‘conflict 
of civilisation’ resonate with Waghid’s (2014) similar concerns about the prevalence of 
crimes against humanity in Africa and the imperative for educational institutions to play 
a significant role in the cultivation of Ubuntu values and moral dispositions. Waghid 
(2014:55) laments the ethnic cleansing in Uganda during the dictatorship of Idi Amin; 
the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda; the incessant ethnic conflicts in Kenya and 
Nigeria; the rapes perpetrated against women and children in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo; political instability and increasing militarisation in the Darfur region of 
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Sudan, and the continuing socio-political instability in Lybia, Tunisia, and Egypt despite 
the overthrow of authoritarian rulers. 
 
The debate on ‘conflict of civilisations’ was made prominent by American political 
scientist Samuel Huntington in his epoch-making book, The Clash of Civilisations and 
the Remaking of World Order. Huntington (1993:29) argues that the clash of 
civilizations occurs often violently, over the control of territory and each other. States 
from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power. They 
struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively 
promote their particular political and religious values. He concludes that “at the macro 
or global level of world politics the primary clash of civilizations is between the West 
and the rest; at the micro or local level it is between Islam and the others” (Huntington, 
1996:255). These clashes induce global fear. Nussbaum (2004:42) surmises that “fear 
leads to polarisation”. Concomitantly, polarisation harms “relationships with other 
nations and with groups inside our own society”. The issues Nussbaum grapples with 
are no doubt vexing issues that pose major challenges for those who are charged with 
the responsibility to educate young children and to prepare them for responsible 
citizenship. Nussbaum is in no doubt that the solution to the issues she raises is in 
education. She argues that “education (in schools, in the family, in programmes for 
both child and adult development run by non-governmental organisations) forms 
people’s existing capacities into developed internal capabilities of many kinds” 
(Nussbaum, 2011:152). Thus, education is necessary “to prepare citizens to 
participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve 
freedom and independence” (Nussbaum, 2011: 154). Ditto Callan’s (1997) book, 
Creating Citizens.  
 
Nussbaum (2007, 2004, 1998, 1997) draws on the teachings of Greek philosophers 
Socrates and Seneca. She refers to Socrates’ principle of ‘critical self-examination’ 
and Seneca’s notion of ‘cultivating humanity’. Both Socrates and Seneca premised 
their conceptions of liberal education on the etymological origins of the word libertas, 
which is Latin for liberty. According to ancient wisdom, Libertas was the Roman 
goddess and an embodiment of liberty or freedom. Arena (2013:6) defines libertas as 
“the status of non-subjection to the arbitrary will of another person or group of 
persons”. She argues that “in the late republic, all Romans shared a basic 
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understanding of the value of liberty: they agreed that fundamentally libertas referred 
to the state of non-slavery” (Arena, 2013:14). In Chapter 3 above, I briefly touched on 
Socrates’ idea of ‘critical self-examination’. I argued that his commitment to critical and 
dialogical questioning led to a relentless critique of authority, motivated by a quest for 
intellectual integrity and moral consistency, and that it was manifest in fearless speech, 
or parrhesia (Letseka, 2008; West, 2004). Socratic wrestled with profound questions 
such as: What is justice? What is courage? What is piety? What is love? It follows that 
Socratic questioning yields intellectual integrity, philosophical humility, and personal 
sincerity. Nussbaum (1998:48) notes that for Seneca, “only liberal education will 
develop each person’s capacity to be fully human, by which he means self-aware, self-
governing, and capable of recognising and respecting the humanity of our fellow 
human beings, no matter where they are born, no matter what social class they inhabit, 
no matter what gender or ethnic origin”.  
 
Thus, Nussbaum’s (2004:44) view is that liberal education is attractive because “it 
places the accent on the creation of a critical public culture, through an emphasis on 
analytical thinking, argumentation, and active participation in debates”. Her notion of 
liberal education is based on three critical skills that are associated with the humanities 
and the arts – (a) critical thinking, the ability to imagine; (b) understanding another 
person’s situation from within – the capacity for empathy, and (c) a grasp of world 
history and the current global economic order or cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum 
(2011:155) argues that these skills are “essential for responsible democratic 
citizenship” because they engender important capacities that pertain to liberal 
democracies, and which liberal education has a moral obligation to cultivate. The 
capacities in question are as follows: 
 Cultivating humanity: the capacity for Socratic self-criticism and critical thought 
about one’s own traditions; 
 World citizenship: the ability to see oneself as a member of a heterogeneous 
nation and world; and 
 Narrative imagination: the ability to sympathetically imagine the lives of people 
different from oneself (Nussbaum, 2001, 1998, 1997).  
Below I briefly elaborate on each of these capacities. Later in the chapter I shall show 
that some of these capacities were also manifest in some aspects of African traditional 
education. 
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7.2.1  Cultivating humanity 
 
By linking the phrase ‘cultivating humanity’ to liberal education, Nussbaum (1997:17) 
recognises that “philosophical questioning arises wherever people are”. It is her 
contention that “philosophy breaks out whenever people are encouraged to think for 
themselves, questioning in a Socratic way”. This is because “Socrates’ inquiry opens 
up the questions that are, and already were, of urgent importance for a culture 
committed to justice” (Nussbaum, 1997:24). Moreover, Nussbaum (2007:28) 
associates ‘cultivating humanity’ with democracy and argues that “democracy needs 
citizens who can think for themselves rather than deferring to authority and who can 
reason together about their choices rather than simply trading claims and 
counterclaims”. In this regard, ‘cultivating humanity’ is predicated on “the capacity of 
critical examination of oneself and one’s own traditions”, or what Socrates calls ‘critical 
self-examination’. This is “a life that accepts no belief that is authoritative simply 
because it has been handed down by tradition or becomes familiar through habit; a 
life that questions all beliefs and accepts only those that survive reason’s demand for 
consistency and for justification” (Nussbaum, 1998:42). Attainment of the capacity for 
‘critical self-examination’ is based on the ability to reason logically; to test what one 
reads or says for consistency of reasoning, accuracy of fact and, finally, of judgement.  
 
In The Apology, Plato (1993:63) writes that after Socrates was found guilty and 
sentenced to death he accepted the judgement and expressed no regrets at the 
choices and decisions he had made. He went on to declare that a life spent “without 
discussing goodness” or examining oneself and others “is not worth living”. I should 
mention that South Africa’s education and training policy requires the development of 
capacities in young people similar to Nussbaum’s idea of ‘cultivating humanity’ and 
development of ‘narrative imagination’, as well as Socrates’ idea of ‘critical self-
examination’. For instance, section 17 of Chapter Four of the White Paper on 
Education and Training, number 195 of 1995, entitled: “Values and Principles of 
Education and Training Policy”, requires that “the curriculum, teaching methods and 
textbooks at all levels and in all programmes of education and training, should 
encourage independent and critical thought, the capacity to question, enquire, reason, 
weigh evidence and form judgments, achieve understanding, recognise the 
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provisional and incomplete nature of most human knowledge, and communicate 
clearly”. This is a desirable policy imperative whose attainment still needs to gain 
traction.   
 
There is a link between Nuussbaum’s views above on ‘cultivating humanity’ and 
Patricia White’s (1996) views on ‘educating citizens for a democratic society, which 
she sketches in her book, Civic Virtues and Public Schooling: Educating Citizens for 
a Democratic Society. White (1996) ventures into a wide array of civic virtues that 
pertain to education for citizenship and which philosophers of education should 
promote through their teaching and research. For instance, she dedicates specific 
chapters to notions such as ‘hope and confidence’, ‘courage’, ‘self-respect and self-
esteem’, ‘friendship’, ‘trust’, ‘honesty’, and ‘decency’. But it is her central assumption 
that I find quiet invaluable to the issues I am grappling with in this study, and that is, 
“things will go better in the polity if citizens acquire the appropriate democratic 
dispositions” (White, 1996:3). It is her contention that “teachers have to encourage 
understanding of, and trust in, the political institutions of the wider society and at the 
same time teach the importance of distrust. She elaborates: “the aim is to give students 
some picture of the nature of different dispositions, their place in the ethical life, the 
tensions between them, how they might be changed over time, and why some people 
or groups of people might be particularly disposed to think and act in some ways rather 
than others” (White, 1996:6). 
 
7.2.2  World citizenship 
 
Historically, Nussbaum (1997:56) observes, “it was neither Plato nor Aristotle who 
coined the term ‘citizen of the world’. It was Diogenes the cynic”. Diogenes chose a 
life of exile from his own native city. He defiantly refused protection from the rich and 
powerful for fear of losing his freedom, and instead he chose to live in poverty. He 
“connected poverty with independence of mind and speech, calling freedom the finest 
thing in human life”. Diogenes “refused to be defined by his local origins and group 
memberships, so central to the self-image of the conventional Greek male; instead, 
he defined himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns” (Nussbaum, 
2002:6-7). Indeed for Diogenes, freedom from subservience “was essential to a 
philosophical life” (Nussbaum, 1997:56). Nussbaum (1997:53) recounts the story of 
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another Greek philosopher, Herodotus, who “examined the customs of distant 
countries, both in order to understand their ways of life and in order to attain a critical 
perspective of their own society”. She notes that Herodotus “took seriously the 
possibility that Egypt and Persia might have something to teach Athens about social 
values”. Herodotus acknowledged that “a cross-cultural inquiry may reveal that what 
we take to be natural and normal is merely parochial and habitual”. It is Nussbaum’s 
(1997:57-58) contention that citizenship of the world is an invitation to become 
“philosophical exiles from our own ways of life, seeing them from a vantage point of 
the outsider and asking the question an outsider is likely to ask about their meaning 
and function”. 
 
These chronicles of Diogenes and Herodotus offer invaluable lessons for those 
wishing to design a philosophy of education that is outward looking instead of inward-
looking or insular. As Nussbaum (1998:43) points out, “citizens who cultivate their 
humanity need a further ability to see themselves as citizens of some local, regional 
group - but also, and above all, as human beings, bound to other human beings by 
ties of recognition and concern”. She recalls that the Stoics’ view of a ‘citizen of the 
world’ was based on the assumption that “thinking about humanity as it is realised in 
the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: for we see ourselves and our customs 
more clearly when we see our ways in relation to those of other reasonable people” 
(Nussbaum, 1997:59). In another publication, Nussbaum (2002) calls this type of 
citizenship, ‘cosmopolitanism’. I briefly touch on ‘cosmopolitanism’ in section 2.5 
above. Here I only make cursory remarks with reference to education, or what 
Nussbaum terms ‘cosmopolitan education’. It is Nussbaum’s (2002:9) contention that 
in educational terms children must “learn enough about the difference to recognise 
common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about these common ends to see 
how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories”. She offers 
four arguments for making cosmopolitan education the focus of world citizenship.  
 
(a) Through cosmopolitan education, we learn more about ourselves.  
 
Nussbaum (2002:11) is wary of education that takes national boundaries as morally 
salient. She argues that such an education too often reinforces the “unexamined 
feeling that one's own preferences and ways are neutral and natural”. A vivid example 
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of this sort of feeling can be seen in the socialisation to defend white privilege in South 
Africa, which was, ironically won by conquest. Ndebele (2007:5) observes that “such 
a culture engenders inward looking behaviour. Where it is as powerful as South 
Africa’s white society, it turns other cultures outside of it into instruments of its self-
defined goals. It limits the capacity of its defenders to empathise with and to even 
imagine a common interest with outsiders”.  
 
(b) We make headway solving problems that require international cooperation.  
 
Nussbaum (2002:12) uses the metaphor of ‘air’ to make the point that “the air does 
not obey national boundaries”. She contends that this simple fact can be, for children, 
“the beginning of the recognition that like it or not, we live in a world in which the 
destinies of nations are closely intertwined with respect to basic goods and survival 
itself”. During my travels around the world I collect miniatures of historical landmarks 
in different cities that I visit – Big Ben Clock tower in London, and Kings College chapel 
in Cambridge, in the United Kingdom; the Colosseum Amphitheatre in Rome, Italy; the 
Parthenon Temple on top of the Acropolis in Athens, Greece; the Eiffel Tower in Paris, 
France; the Statue of Liberty in New York, the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, 
California, in the Unites States, just to mention a few. These are invaluable teaching 
aids that I use to engage my grandchildren in educative global and multicultural 
discussions. It is Nussbaum’s view that in order to conduct global dialogue “we need 
knowledge not only of the geography and ecology of other nations…. but also a great 
deal about their people, so that in talking with them we may be capable of respecting 
their traditions and commitments”. Nussbaum is a strong advocate of the need to 
gradually initiate children into embracing “global planning, global knowledge, and the 
recognition of a shared future”. 
 
 
 
(c) We recognise moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real and that 
otherwise would go unrecognised.  
 
Nussbaum (2002:13) highlights the importance of values such as “respect for human 
dignity and the opportunity for each person to purse happiness”. These values are 
consistent with German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s philosophical concept of the 
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categorical imperative, by which one should act in such a way that one will always 
treat humanity, whether in one’s own person or in the person of any other, never simply 
as a means, but always at the same time as ends in themselves (Paton, 2005; Kant, 
1991). If we agree with the central assumptions of the categorical imperative, it follows 
that as educators we need to recognise our moral obligation to design curricula that 
places the requirements of the categorical imperative at the heart of our pedagogical 
conceptions and practices. 
  
(d) We make a consistent and coherent argument based on distinctions we are really 
prepared to defend.  
 
Nussbaum (2002:14) worries about the high premium that is often placed on blind 
‘patriotism’. This is because blind patriotism can be very close to jingoism – ‘extreme 
patriotism, or belief that one’s own country is always the best.27 Nussbaum notes a 
tendency to undercut the very case for multicultural respect within a nation by failing 
to make central to education a broader world respect. To that end, she appeals for the 
kind of education that enables children “to cross those boundaries in their minds and 
imaginations”, so that they can accord respect to all humanity, and avoid thinking of 
themselves as worthy of special attention and respect than others. In Chapter 6 above, 
I touched on ‘humility’, which I described as “respectfulness and considerateness of 
others” (Hare, 1996:241), or “taking oneself no more seriously than one should” 
(Richards, 1988:258). 
 
Cosmopolitanism should not be misconstrued as a peculiarly Western tradition. 
Nussbaum (1997:53) touches on the work of influential Indian philosopher, poet and 
educational leader Rabindranath Tagore, who developed his own cosmopolitan views 
from older Bengali traditions. In the same vein, she refers to Ghanaian philosopher 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, who remarks as follows about an African identity: “we will 
only solve our problems if we see them as human problems arising out of a special 
situation, and we shall not solve them if we see them as African problems generated 
by our being somehow unlike others”. Lesotho historian Leonard Thompson (1975:24) 
chronicles the travels of Mosotho sage and Moshoeshoe’s mentor, Mohlomi in the 
                                                          
27 See Lal. V. 2005. The tragi-comedy of the New Indian Enlightenment: an essay on the jingoism of 
science and the pathology of rationality. Social Epistemology, 19 (1), 77-91.  
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early 1800s. Consistent with Nussbaum’s (2002) metaphor of ‘air’ above, Mohlomi also 
did not obey national boundaries. Thompson describes Mohlomi as “an indefatigable 
traveller. He went on foot to visit peoples as far away as the Tswana on the verge of 
the Kalahari Desert, the Venda near Limpopo River, the Nguni near the Indian Ocean, 
and the Phuthi near the confluence between the Caledon and the Orange Rivers”. He 
notes that Mohlomi “advised his chiefly hosts to rule their subjects wisely, to care for 
the poor, to abstain from warfare, and not to punish people who had been accused of 
witchcraft”. These accounts illustrate that like Diogenes and Herodotus, Mohlomi was 
also a ‘citizen of the world’. His advice with respect to attitudes towards those accused 
of witchcraft pertains to contemporary South Africa where there have been reports of 
incidents in which the elderly people were set alight and killed because they were 
suspected of witchcraft (Mkamba, 2012). It is my contention that one way of avoiding 
recurrence of such unfortunate incidents of moral indiscretion is by conceiving a liberal 
education that not only emphasises critical thought and respectful argument, but one 
that is also pluralistic and premised on ‘cultivating humanity’. It should be the sort of 
liberal education that enables one “to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of 
someone different from oneself” (Nussbaum, 1998), and moves one to behave and 
act with a deep sense of empathy and consideration towards others. Ratcliff (2012: 
475) writes that ‘empathy’ “essentially involves presenting someone else’s experience 
as theirs, and thus incorporates a distinction between self and other”.  
 
7.2.3  Narrative imagination 
 
By ‘narrative imagination’ Nussbaum (1998:44) means “the ability to think what it might 
be like to be in the shoes of someone different from oneself; to be an intelligent reader 
of that person’s story; and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that 
someone so placed might have, including the many ways in which social 
circumstances shape emotions and wishes and desires”. Thus, ‘narrative imagination’ 
is the ability to decipher, through imagination, the meaning of speech as it expresses 
something of importance in the context of a person’s history or social context 
(Nussbaum, 1998:44). For Nussbaum (2004:46), ‘narrative imagination’ has the 
potential to cultivate in students ‘inner eyes’ or the ability to come into contact with 
“issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and cross-cultural experience and understanding”. 
This is because “narrative imagination is an essential preparation for moral interaction” 
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(Nussbaum, 2006:148). Indeed ‘narrative imagination’ can also be viewed as “the 
cultivation of imaginative sympathy”, which Nussbaum (2007:39) regards as “a key 
prop of good citizenship”. Thus for her, educating for citizenship requires “learning how 
to be a human being capable of love and imagination” (Nussbaum, 1998:45).  
 
A question that might be asked is: How is ‘narrative imagination’ to be developed in 
young people? Nussbaum (2004:46) identifies literature and the arts, that is, music, 
fine arts, and dance as the principal sources for the development of ‘narrative 
imagination’. She argues that “the arts cultivate capacities for judgement and 
sensitivity that can and should be expressed in the choices a citizen makes… Music, 
dance, painting and sculpture, architecture - all have a role in shaping our 
understanding of the people around us” (Nussbaum, 1997:86). Furthermore, 
Nussbaum (1997:88) posits that “narrative art has the power to make us see the lives 
of the different with more than a casual tourist’s interest – with involvement and 
sympathetic understanding, with anger at our society’s refusal of visibility”. Storytelling, 
she argues, enables children to acquire “essential moral capacities”. Through listening 
to stories being read to them, children “learn to attribute life, emotion, and thought to 
a form whose insides are hidden” (Nussbaum, 1997:89). Commenting on the issue 
that pertains to South Africa - ‘racism’, Nussbaum opines that “understanding how a 
history of racial stereotype can affect self-esteem, achievement, and love enables us 
to make informed judgement on issues relating to affirmative action and education”. 
 
For Nussbaum (1997:99), literary imagination develops compassion. And compassion 
is essential for civic responsibility. She notes that as children grow older, they 
gradually learn to ascribe to others, and to recognise in themselves, not only hope and 
fear, happiness and distress, but also more complex traits such as courage, self-
restraint, dignity, perseverance, and fairness (Nussbaum, 1997:90-91). That is, they 
acquire the necessary attributes for compassion. For Nussbaum, compassion 
“involves the recognition that another person, in some ways similar to oneself, has 
suffered some significant pain or misfortune”. It is her contention that the analysis of 
compassion “requires estimating the significance of the misfortune as accurately as 
one can – usually in agreement with the sufferer, but sometimes in ways that depart 
from that person’s own judgement”. Thus, compassion requires “a sense of one’s own 
vulnerability to misfortune. To respond with compassion, I must be willing to ascertain 
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the thought that this suffering person might be me” (Nussbaum, 1997:91). So 
understood, Nussbaum argues, compassion “promotes an accurate awareness of our 
common vulnerability”. Compassionate dispositions are sine qua non for a country like 
South Africa given its past history of racism, discrimination and segregation. As 
Nussbaum (1997:92) rightly counsels, “A society that wants to foster a just treatment 
of all its members has strong reasons to foster an exercise of the compassionate 
imagination that crosses social boundaries, or tries to”. 
 
Nussbaum (1998:44) cautions though that “narrative imagination is not uncritical, for 
we always bring ourselves and our judgements to our encounter with the other, and 
we inevitably will not merely identify; we will also judge that story in the light of our own 
goals and aspirations”. In this regard, ‘narrative imagination’ is an essential 
preparation for moral interaction. Habits of empathy and conjecture conduce to a 
certain type of citizenship and a certain form of community: one that cultivates a 
sympathetic responsiveness to another’s needs, and understands the way 
circumstances shape those needs, while respecting separateness and privacy 
(Nussbaum, 1997:90). Threading together the three capacities, Nussbaum (1998: 45) 
emphasises the importance of producing “Socratic citizens, capable of thinking for 
themselves, arguing with their traditions, and understanding with sympathy the 
conditions of life different from their own”.  
 
Nussbaum’s conception of liberal education is consistent with Debra Humphrey’s 
(2006:3) broad definition of liberal education, understood as “a philosophy of education 
that empowers individuals with broad knowledge and transferable skills, and that 
cultivates social responsibility and a strong sense of ethics and values”. From a 
pedagogical standpoint, Humphreys (2006:3) posits that today’s liberal education 
should advance an essential set of learning outcomes that are necessary for success 
in today’s world. These include: (a) Knowledge of human cultures and the natural and 
physical world. The latter should be grounded in the study of the sciences and 
mathematics, social sciences, humanities, histories, languages, and the arts - focused 
through engagement with big questions, both contemporary and enduring; (b) 
Intellectual and practical skills such as inquiry, critical and creative thinking; written 
and oral communication; quantitative literacy; information literacy; teamwork and 
problem solving; (c) Individual and social responsibilities such as civic knowledge and 
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engagement; intercultural knowledge and competence; ethical reasoning and action; 
foundations and skills for lifelong learning. Finally (d) Integrative learning - synthesis 
and advanced accomplishment across general and specialised studies; the 
demonstrated capacity to adapt knowledge, skills and responsibilities to new settings 
and questions. For Humphreys (2006:3), “a liberal education of this sort is more 
important than ever in today’s volatile global economy and interconnected world”. It is 
her view that liberal education “prepares students to understand the implications of 
our current global interdependence and to grasp complex problems and find innovative 
solutions” (Humphreys, 2003:6).  
 
Amy Gutmann (1999:350) endorses these views on liberal education in her book 
entitled: Democratic Education. She argues that “a system of liberal education 
provides children with a sense of the very different lives that could be theirs”. Also 
weighing in on these views of a liberal education in the knowledge world, Scott 
(2014:25) posits that “the skills and abilities needed in the world today are not only 
knowledge of balance sheets and how to analyse them, but also understanding the 
dynamics of cultures and how people interact”. He argues that “a liberal education 
fosters the ability to distinguish between what is true and what is false…It helps 
students to appreciate that which is the best that has been thought and said, to 
recognise the true, the beautiful and the good, no matter the culture or time”. 
 
To summarise, I have explored Nussbaum’s notion of liberal education. I argued that 
her emphasis on ‘cultivating humanity’, developing ‘narrative imagination’ and ‘world 
citizenship’ are most preferable for my purposes in this study. The reason for this is 
that ‘cultivating humanity’ resonates with Ubuntu, understood as ‘human 
interdependence and humanness’. Furthermore, ‘cultivating humanity’ is consistent 
with the values that are implicit in the constitution of South Africa, such as individual 
rights, freedom, human dignity, respect for persons, and non-discrimination. 
Developing ‘narrative imagination’ or ‘imaginative sympathy’ implies developing 
empathetic dispositions that require one to be an intelligent reader of another person’s 
wishes, desires, fears and aspirations. The need for development of ‘narrative 
imagination’ is in line with the provisions of the DoE’s (1995) White Paper on Education 
and Training, which require that the curriculum, teaching methods and textbooks 
should develop critical thinking faculties in school children. Finally, Nussbaum’s 
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emphasis on ‘world citizenship’ pertains to South Africa given that with the advent of 
democracy in 1994 South Africa was readmitted into the global community. South 
Africa’s affiliation to the various United Nations agencies and to numerous regional, 
continental and trans-continental bodies such as the African Union (AU), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), and the Brazil, Russia, India, and South 
Africa (BRICS) countries gives added impetus to ‘world citizenship’. Thus, the need to 
conceive a broad notion of liberal education such as Nussbaum’s, which blends the 
cultivation of humanity, narrative imagination as well as world citizenship, is critical to 
a country such as South Africa, which is an aspiring African liberal democracy. I now 
turn to African traditional education with a view to ascertaining its potential for co-
existence with liberal education. 
 
7.3   African traditional education 
 
The notion of African traditional education has been widely demarcated by African 
scholars (Kingsley, 2010; Marah, 2006; Maharasoa., & Maharasoa, 2004; Mapesela, 
2004; Adeyemi., & Adeyinka, 2003; Adeyemi., & Adeyinka, 2002; Matšela, 1990, 
1979). Invariably, these scholars have tended to emphasise the following key 
characteristics of African traditional education: 
 Its intimate integration with the social, cultural, artistic, religious, and 
recreational life of the ethnic group (Marah, 2006); 
 Its communal and agrarian orientation (Adeyemi & Adeyinka, 2003; Adeyinka 
& Ndwapi, 2002); 
 Its inclination to equip young people with the competencies that are necessary 
for adulthood (Matšela, 1990, 1979); and  
 Its emphasis on preparation for overall moral goodness (Masolo, 2010). 
 
Perhaps I should preface this section with excerpts from my own research on Ubuntu 
with a view to highlighting its pertinence to African traditional education. This prefacing 
is necessary given that one of my aims in this study is to mount an Ubuntu-oriented 
African philosophy of education that also dovetails elements of liberal education such 
as ‘cultivating humanity’, ‘narrative imagination’, and ‘world citizenship’. In the article 
entitled; “In Defence of Ubuntu”, which appears in the international journal Studies in 
Philosophy and Education, I make a case for resonance between the values that are 
implicit in the Constitution of South Africa and some of the values that are implicit in 
Ubuntu. I argue that Ubuntu is fundamentally a matter of reverence of human life 
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(Letseka, 2012:54). In another article entitled: “Educating for Ubuntu/Botho: lessons 
from Basotho indigenous education”, which appears in Open Journal of Philosophy, I 
advance an Ubuntu-oriented pedagogy and make a case for Ubuntu’s potential to 
cultivate personhood, humaneness and normative inclinations in young people 
(Letseka, 2013a). Finally, in the article entitled: “Anchoring Ubuntu morality”, which 
appears in Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, I explore ways in which Ubuntu 
morality can be anchored in the community, in the family, and in personhood. What 
can be gleaned from the above publications can be summarised as follows: (a) that 
“educating the young people for Ubuntu/Botho through Basotho indigenous education 
has the potential to contribute towards the ideal of creating citizens that are inclined to 
treating others with fairness, dignity and justice at all times” (Letseka, 2013a: 343). 
And (b) that “the family plays a critical role as the primary institution of formative moral 
development, the school of justice, and the medium for the concrete expression of 
communal values” (Letseka, 2013b:358). I suggest (c) that given that Ubuntu, 
understood as human dignity, is central to South Africa’s educational policy 
framework, the country’s schooling system is therefore obligated to promote its values 
and principles (Letseka, 2012:56). 
 
Some of the views I advance above on the link between Ubuntu and education have 
been explored by other African scholars. For instance, in his book entitled: African 
Philosophy of Education Reconsidered: On Being Human, Yusef Waghid (2014a:1) 
makes a strong case for “an African philosophy of education that is guided by 
communitarian, reasonable and culture-dependent action in order to bridge the 
conceptual and practical divide between ‘ethnophilosophy’ and ‘scientific’ African 
philosophy”. He proposes an African philosophy of education that aims at contributing 
“towards imagination, deliberation and responsibility – Ubuntu (human 
interdependence and humaneness) actions that can help towards enhancing justice 
in educative relations, specifically in relation to African education”28 (Waghid, 2014b: 
270). Waghid (2014b:271) contends that “by provoking students towards imaginative 
action and a renewed consciousness of possibility they will learn to acknowledge 
humanity in themselves and others; by encouraging students to work cooperatively 
                                                          
28 Notice conceptual resonance here between Waghid’s (2014b) advocacy of a philosophy of education 
that contributes towards ‘imagination’, ‘deliberation’, and ‘responsibility, and Nussbaum’s (1997) 
emphasis on liberal education’s capacity for the ‘cultivation of humanity’ and ‘narrative imagination’.  
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through sharing, engagement and remaining open to the new and unexpected, they 
will contribute towards cultivating learning communities”.  
 
In my own research on Ubuntu I advocate a traditional African education that seeks to 
create citizens that are immersed in Ubuntu/Botho moral dispositions, consistent with 
Waghid’s idea of an Ubuntu-oriented education above. However, I express concerns 
about incidents of moral indiscretion such as violent crime, domestic violence, rape, 
police brutality, murder of the elderly people on suspicion that they practise witchcraft, 
and homophobia, which have become commonplace in South Africa (Letseka, 
2013a:337). I speculate on how Ubuntu as a pedagogical principle might respond to 
such incidents of moral indiscretion. It is my contention that Ubuntu/Botho morality 
eschews such acts of moral indiscretion. This is because “Ubuntu is a form of moral 
consciousness in terms of which communal Africans embark on caring, 
compassionate, hospitable and forgiving engagements to ensure that human 
interdependency and humanity become actualised” (Waghid, 2014b:271). It follows 
from the above analysis that an Ubuntu-oriented African philosophy of education 
would be the right antidote for the above-mentioned incidents of moral indiscretion 
given that it would be intimately integrated with the social, cultural, artistic, religious, 
and recreational life of communities.  
 
Masolo (2010:251) describes this type of education as ‘social education’. He argues 
that in most traditional African societies, individuals were taught about the structure of 
their social environment and their place in that structure. This sort of knowledge 
unveiled to learners “not only how they related to the whole but also how they were 
expected to behave toward everyone within it, social expectations that were 
determined by how the initiate was related to each member”. For Masolo (2010:242), 
“moral education and the acquisition of the values that sustain the social order are part 
of initiation rituals in most African societies”. With regard to encouraging students to 
work cooperatively and through sharing, I have commented on the notion of letsema 
or cooperative community farming among the Basotho people of Lesotho (Letseka, 
2000:183-184), and argued that central to letsema is the development in children of a 
communal spirit by which each child sees themselves as part of the bigger unit, 
working and living together for the common good (Letseka, 2013a: 342). Masolo 
(2010:240) calls this “a life of cohesion, or positive integration with others”. 
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I have made the point that Ubuntu is based on, among others, the values of caring, 
sharing, respect and compassion, and that caring is associated with a loving attitude 
(Letseka, 2013a, 2013b, 2012). Waghid and Smeyers (2012:20) draw on the literature 
on the ‘ethics of care’ (Mendus, 2008; Slote, 2007; Noddings, 1992) to argue that 
“Ubuntu as a particular ethic of care, through its reliance on empathy and relational 
autonomy, is a very persuasive approach”. Consistent with Nussbaum’s idea of 
‘narrative imagination’ above, they posit that it is possible to inculcate a moral thought 
in children that would enable them to adopt a point of view of other people and to 
develop empathetic dispositions that induce inclinations to want to be moral (Waghid 
& Smeyers, 2012:9). Waghid and Smeyers (2012:19) suggest that through the 
expression umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, or ‘a person is a person through other 
persons’, Ubuntu brings to the fore the idea “why one would want (even need) to be 
moral”. They draw on my own views on Ubuntu as pervasive and fundamental to 
African socio-ethical thought, as illuminating the communal rootedness and 
interdependence of persons; as highlighting the importance of human relationships, 
and as an important measure of human wellbeing or human flourishing in traditional 
African life (Letseka, 2000: 179).  
 
I want to argue that appeal to indigenous African epistemologies such as Ubuntu and 
African traditional education can be regarded as advocacy for the Africanisation of 
knowledge. Wa Thiongo (1994) regards the Africanisation of knowledge as 
‘decolonising the mind’, while Ali Mazrui (2003) calls it ‘cultural decolonisation’. Wa 
Thiongo (1994:100) starts from the premise that 
“Africa as a continent has been a victim of forces of colonial exploitation, 
oppression and human degradation. In the field of culture she was taught to 
look on Europe as her teacher and the centre of man's civilisation, and herself 
as the pupil. In this event Western culture became the centre of Africa's process 
of learning, and Africa was relegated to the background”. 
 
Commenting on the specific case of South Africa, Swana (2015:1) writes that “the bulk 
of South Africa’s black majority has been advised and indoctrinated to believe all valid 
knowledge and wisdom comes from white people, and more particularly that the base 
of all sound knowledge is Western philosophy and the European-style University”. 
Echoing Biko’s (2005, 22) sentiments in Chapter 4 above that South Africa’s white 
liberals claim a monopoly on intelligence and moral judgment’ and try to set the pattern 
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for the realisation of the black man’s aspirations, Swana (2015) charges that “white 
people want us to believe that they are the parents of scholarship and that Western 
epistemology entered African minds that were blank”. He dismisses this as a 
misconception: “Western scholarship and Western philosophy are not the only 
systems of knowledge creation. There is robust Asian philosophy in its multifaceted 
variety, which has decolonised itself and produced top-performing economies and 
sophisticated societies, at a time when Europe in is total crisis” (Swana, 2015).  
 
Letseka (2014a:1304) confirms this view in her observation that “by the time Confucius 
(551-479 BC) died Socrates (469-399 BC) was only ten years old”. She argues that “it 
is evident from this piece of history that Confucius was already an established 
philosopher long before the Greeks Socrates, Plato or Aristotle came to prominence 
as philosophers”. For Wa Thiongo (1994:101), the debate around the Africanisation of 
knowledge should be “about the inherited colonial education system and the 
consciousness it necessarily inculcated in the African mind”. He argues that the call 
for Africanisation of knowledge is the “call for a regenerative reconnection with the 
millions of revolutionary tongues in Africa and the world over demanding liberation. It 
is a call for the rediscovery of the real language of humankind: the language of the 
struggle. It is the universal language underlying all speech and words of our history” 
(Wa Thiongo, 1994:108).  
 
With regard to ‘decolonising modernity’, Mazrui (2003:149) posits that it “is to seek 
cultural nearness to African society and to enable the influence of the local society to 
balance that of the Western reference group”. In South Africa, Jansen (2014) invokes 
the notion of ‘nearness’ to unpack “a particular history of madness in terms of race 
segregation” at a previously privileged white Afrikaans university, and to challenge 
“mind-sets and culture”. Jansen uses the notion of ‘nearness’ with reference to, among 
other things, ‘emotional closeness’; ‘communion’; ‘courage or risk-taking; ‘truth-telling’, 
and ‘mediated action’. Coming back to Mazrui (2003:147), he argues that “African 
perspectives, models of communication, structures of stratification, rules of interaction, 
standards of evaluation, motives of behaviour and patterns of production and 
consumption have all been undergoing the agonies of change partly under the 
disturbing impact of western culture”. He suggests that if modernity is to be 
decolonised, it must first be ‘domesticated’ in order to relate it more firmly to local 
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cultural and economic needs (Mazrui, 2003:148). By way of illustration, in Chapter 3 
above, I show that Japan is a useful example of a non-Western liberal democracy that 
has successfully imported external Western cultures and indigenised them to suit the 
needs and aspirations of the Japanese people (Huntington, 1993; Fukuyama, 1992). 
 
My view is that advocacy for the Africanisation of knowledge should be underpinned 
by important questions regarding the nature, origin and ownership of knowledge. 
University of Wisconsin-Madison’s educational theorist, Michael Apple (2013, 2000) 
raises critical questions with regard to the nature and ownership of knowledge. He 
argues that such “questions are intimately related to the issue of the politics of 
knowledge and the politics of who can legitimately count as knowers” (Apple, 
2013:23). Apple (2000:57) opines that quite often, the ideologies that dominate ‘official 
knowledge’ tend to represent a considerably more elitist orientation. His view is that 
we need more sophisticated models of textual analysis, and that our readings of what 
knowledge is ‘in’ texts cannot be done by the application of a simple formula. The 
sophisticated models of textual analysis to which he refers would prompt us to ask 
important questions such as: What counts as ‘official knowledge’? Whose knowledge 
is it anyway? What ought to be included and/or excluded in children’s textbooks? Who 
should have the moral and intellectual authority over such inclusion and/or exclusion? 
That is, who stands at the ‘centre’ of decision-making over what ought to count as 
‘official knowledge’? And who stands at the periphery? Jansen (2004:112) has been 
in the forefront of exploring the ‘insider-periphery’ discourse in South Africa, with 
particular reference to the notion of ‘institutional culture’, or “the way we do things 
around here”. He argues that institutional culture has to do: 
“with what collections dominate the library; it has to do with who gets honorary 
degrees (and who does not)…it has to do with whose language dominates a 
public meeting or event, and whose is excluded… it has to do with the ways in 
which women are constructed in social relations on the school grounds or 
campus…it has to do with who gets called ‘Mr’ and who, irrespective of age, is 
simply called ‘Klaas’; it has to do with the content of what appears on the 
emblem of the institution; it has to do with the metaphors for talking about 
others; and it has to do with the ways in which schools or universities talk about 
the future”.  
 
Thus, in South Africa and the rest of the African continent where experiences of 
colonial and imperial domination are well documented (Laumann, 2012; Rodney, 
2012; Davidson, 1995, 1994; Pakenham, 1991), advocacy for the Africanisation of 
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knowledge should be about “privileging of the deliberate and critical engagement with 
Africa, African histories, African cultures, African countries, African peoples, African 
promises and African challenges, past and present” (Maluleke, 2011:14). Maluleke 
(2011:14) defines Africanisation as “a deliberate and conscious attempt to understand 
and situate one’s epistemology, academic and research agenda and endeavours 
within an African milieu. It means the deliberate privileging of previously subjugated 
Africa knowledges, texts, contexts and experiences”. In a fitting tribute to Maluleke’s 
argument, the cover page of the 2011 winter Issue of UNISAWISE in which his article 
appears carries an artist side impression of the head of an African youth with the map 
of Africa located inside the youth’s head, with the running title: “Rooted in Africa”. The 
aim of this particular Issue of UNISAWISE is to challenge the taken-for-granted 
assumptions about ‘worthwhile knowledge’ or ‘official knowledge’ as it pertains to 
Africa. It articulates the view that “Africanisation is a process of inclusion that stresses 
the importance of affirming African cultures and identities in a world community” 
(Makgoba, 1997: 199). Ramoupi (2011:9) proposes an education system with a 
curriculum and content that has its roots in African knowledge production, and whose 
foundation of continental knowledge is accepted and embraced before other global 
knowledge production systems. 
 
In South Africa, the ideological background of scholars who have consistently sought 
to cast aspersion on African philosophy of education and indigenous African ways of 
knowing [epistemologies] such as Ubuntu and their capacity for cultural, moral, and 
pedagogical re-imagination have tended to be white, English speaking and of liberal 
orientation (Horsthemke & Enslin, 2009; Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Horsthemke, 
2004). Therefore, it is encouraging that amidst these Afro-pessimistic perceptions 
Waghid (2014a:2) boldly declares his faith and confidence in Ubuntu: 
“As a humanistic concept, Ubuntu can engender cooperative and harmonious 
human relations; as a philosophical concept, Ubuntu can contribute towards 
cultivating the respect and care that are required to produce a morally 
worthwhile African society; and as a politico–ideological concept, Ubuntu can 
engender human interdependence for transformed socio-political action.” 
 
In my own research I have argued that Ubuntu is a normative concept, or a moral 
theory, and a humane notion (Letseka, 2013a, 2013b, 2000). I have made a case for 
Ubuntu’s educational importance and showed that the DoE (2001) recognises 
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Ubuntu’s value in its report, Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy. The 
report identifies Ubuntu (human dignity) as one of the 10 fundamental values in the 
South African Constitution that pertain to education (Letseka, 2012:56). I have 
highlighted the fact that “South Africa’s basic educational policy framework not only 
places a high premium on Ubuntu… but that it also requires the schooling system to 
promote Ubuntu-oriented attributes and dispositions among the learners” (Letseka, 
2012:47).  
 
In another article I draw on Harvard University’s political philosopher John Rawls’ 
books, entitled: A Theory of Justice (1999) and Political Liberalism (1996) respectively, 
to argue that Ubuntu not only embodies the normative principles - values and morals, 
but that it also implies justice. In traditional African societies, justice is conceived as 
Ubuntu fairness, or “doing what is right and moral” (Letseka, 2014a:549). I emphasise 
the importance of locating Ubuntu justice and fairness at the heart of initiatives to 
conceive an Ubuntu-oriented philosophy of education given that Ubuntu is an African 
worldview that embraces specific communal and normative principles and reveres 
human life. Mahao (2010: 321) argues that “democratic accountability in African 
jurisprudence was embedded in the constitutional principle ‘morena ke morena ka 
batho’, translated to mean that the chief is the chief by the grace of the people”. He 
opines that this principle “speaks to the participatory nature of governance which 
renders it inherently democratic and accountable to the governed”. Mahao (2010:321) 
recalls the convictions of Moshoeshoe, king of the Basotho, who always emphasised 
that  
‘Kobo ena ha kea ikapesa, ke e apesitsoe. Ke e apesitsoe ke banna khotla!’ (I 
did not bestow the crown upon myself. It was bestowed on me by the freewill 
of men at the khotla.) 
 
It is Mahao’s (2010: 322) contention that the principle of ‘morena ke morena ka batho’ 
“implied a different philosophy of leadership, constitutionally formulated by cooperative 
and shared authority - a leader governed through clusters of institutions tasked with 
participatory management of public affairs”. He argues that in the context of ‘morena 
ke morena ka batho,’ “leadership was not characterised by a disconnect essentialism; 
an ‘Ivory tower-ness of the ‘I-know-it-all’ or ‘I-hold-all-the-answers’ variety”. Instead 
“the legitimacy of all decisions arose from their being firmly based within the 
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community which co-owned them through active and direct participation in 
governance” (Mahao, 2010:324-325). It is my considered view that this is the basis for 
Ubuntu as justice and fairness. 
 
To sum up then, in this section I have made a case for an Ubuntu-oriented African 
philosophy of education. I have argued that given that Ubuntu morality eschews acts 
of moral indiscretions, Ubuntu can therefore be regarded as a form of moral 
consciousness in terms of which communal Africans embark on caring, 
compassionate, hospitable and forgiving engagements to ensure that human 
interdependency and humane treatment of others prevail. Thus, Ubuntu necessarily 
encourages one to want (even need) to be moral. I argued that invoking an Ubuntu-
oriented African philosophy of education can be regarded as advocacy for the 
Africanisation of knowledge, also known as ‘decolonising the mind’ or ‘cultural 
decolonisation’. Advocacy for Africanisation of knowledge requires the privileging of 
the deliberate and critical engagement with Africa, African histories, African cultures, 
African countries, African peoples, African promises and African challenges. It is about 
challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions and perception of ‘official knowledge’ 
as it pertains to Africa. I showed that South Africa’s education policies recognise the 
importance of an Ubuntu-oriented African philosophy of education and argued that 
schools are therefore obligated to promote Ubuntu moral values. In the penultimate 
section below, I explore ways in which a philosophy of education for an African liberal 
democracy might be conceived. As I alluded to above, given that co-existence 
between traditional African values and liberal democratic values in South Africa is fait 
accompli, it seems logical that the amalgamation of African traditional education and 
a liberal education should be prioritised and promoted as the basis for conceiving a 
philosophy of education for a liberal democratic South Africa. 
 
7.4 A philosophy of education for an African liberal democracy    
 
In my opening remarks to Chapter 1 above, I argued that post-apartheid South Africa 
straddles two seemingly conflicting and incompatible ideological positions. On the one 
hand, South Africa is an African liberal democracy courtesy of its 1996 Constitution 
which enshrines a wide range of rights and freedoms for the individual and is therefore 
widely regarded as liberal and egalitarian. On the other hand, the same constitution 
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recognises the traditional African institutions of politics and governance such as the 
institution of traditional leadership. In Chapter 6 above, I showed that this recognition 
of traditional African institutions has been criticised as fundamentally contradictory to 
the liberal ethos (Beall, 2006; Beall.  et al., 2005; Bentley, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2005). I 
argued though that these criticisms are unfounded given that existence of traditional 
institutions of governance in a liberal democracy is not peculiar to South Africa. This 
duality in the socio-political and cultural complexion implies that South Africa is an 
aspiring liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in African cultures and 
traditions. However, I indicated that it is not unusual for South Africa to manifest 
inclinations to African cultures and traditions given that it is an African country whose 
population is predominantly black and African. I argued though that notwithstanding 
South Africa’s integration into the global community, the imperative for the country’s 
discourses to be rooted in Africa cannot be sacrificed at the altar of globalisation, 
internationalisation and/or cosmopolitanism. I showed that historically Japan is a good 
example of a non-Western liberal democracy that has gone through cycles of 
‘importation’ and 'indigenisation' of external cultures through replication and 
refinement. As a result, Japan can be said to be in the West in some respects, but 
clearly not of the West in important dimensions (Huntington, 1993). I indicated that in 
Japan tradition is not something that is waiting out there, always breathing over one's 
shoulder and demanding to be conserved. Instead tradition is plucked, recreated and 
refashioned in order to make it responsive to the needs and aspirations of the 
Japanese people. Against the backdrop of South Africa’s cultural, traditional, and 
liberal democratic aspirations, in this section I explore ways in which a philosophy of 
education that amalgamates some assumptions of African traditional education and 
some assumptions of liberal education might be conceived.    
 
I start by observing that South Africa is first and foremost an African country. As such, 
any attempts to conceive a philosophy of education should be rooted in the cultures 
and traditions of the majority of the African peoples. As Okrah (2003:93) rightly 
counsels, “education in Africa needs examination of African needs in order to fashion 
the curriculum to meet those needs”. While I support Okrah’s advice on this critical 
point my view is that in the current state of the globally networked communities, any 
conception of a philosophy of education should recognise that South Africa’s 
education should not be regarded as insulated from the imperatives of global networks 
212 
 
 
 
and cultural crosspollinations. Failure to recognise this stark reality would only amount 
to cultural naïveté and parochialism.    
 
There have been numerous attempts by African scholars to articulate an African 
philosophy of education (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru & Makuvaza, 2014; Waghid, 
2014b, 2014c, 2004; Okrah, 2003; Letseka, 2013a, 2013b, 2000; Mkhabela & Luthuli, 
1997).  The reasons for this are not hard to find. As Okrah (2003:12) points out, Africa 
has been colonised by alien forces which have claimed superiority over Africa’s 
cultures, languages and forms of politics at the expense and to the detriment of 
indigenous cultures, languages and forms of politics. Ditto Wa Thiongo’s (1994:100) 
observation above that due to colonial exploitation and oppression Western cultures 
have become the centre of Africa's processes of learning, and African cultures have, 
as a result been relegated to the background. Okrah (2003:12) argues that 
identification of the demise of African oral literature is imperative because if Africa is 
to know its own mind and channel its own course, it can only do so through the 
promotion of its indigenous oral literature and works in African languages.  
 
Other African scholars have explored the notion of African traditional education 
(Masolo, 2010; Maharasoa., & Maharasoa, 2004; Mapesela, 2004; Adeyemi & 
Adeyinka, 2003, 2002; Adeyinka & Ndwapi, 2002; Matšela, 1990, 1979). A common 
thread running through these explorations is recognition of the imperative to ground 
the learning and development of the African child in the social, cultural, artistic, 
religious, and recreational life of the child’s community; and to equip the child with the 
competencies that prepare him/her for adult life in his/her specific socio-cultural milieu. 
In Chapter 5 above, I draw on the work of Matšela (1990, 1979) who argues that 
Basotho traditional education prepared a Mosotho child for civic responsibility. I show 
that this was done by initiating the child in Sesotho cultural values, philosophy, 
personal and family responsibilities, as well as duties to the clan and the people. 
Similarly, Maharasoa and Maharasoa (2004:108) argue that among the Basotho 
“preparation for adulthood encompassed marriage counselling, sexuality education, 
herbology, as well as law and democracy”. In the same vein, Mapesela (2004:322) 
posits that Basotho traditional education sought to “inculcate good ethics, morals and 
values, such as humaneness (Ubuntu), neighbourliness, responsibility and respect for 
self and others”. What can be gleaned from these views is the fact that Basotho 
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traditional education sought to create citizens that were initiated in the attributes that 
were deemed necessary for industry, self-reliance and ‘good’ human conduct. Most 
initiation processes were grounded in the principles of communal interdependence as 
captured in the Sesotho expression: motho ke motho ka batho, whose Nguni 
equivalent is umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu.   
 
Western scholars have also written on conceptions of liberal education (Bailey, 2010; 
Humphreys, 2006; Løvlie. & Standish, 2002; Gutmann, 1999; Levinson, 1999; Callan, 
1997; Nussbaum, 1997; White, 1982; Peters, 1966). As Callan (1997:8) points out, “in 
order to construct an intelligent conception of liberal education…it is necessary to 
ground philosophical claims about education's ideal aims, distributions of control, and 
institutional structures within a practical framework of political and educational 
research”. It is Callan’s (1997:98) view that a liberal education should focus on 
“developing children's capacities for choice”. By the same token, Levinson (1999:161) 
argues that an important requirement of liberal education’s ideal “is to embed 
children's rights in an autonomy-promoting education in the constitution”. This is 
because “liberal education is about creating future citizens and individuals” (Levinson, 
1999:153).  
 
However, and notwithstanding these useful contributions to liberal education, I have 
stated my preference for Nussbaum’s conception of liberal education for the simple 
reason that it resonates with the implicit assumptions of Ubuntu, understood as 
‘human interdependence and humanness’. How then, might African traditional 
education and liberal education be weaved together a view to conceiving a philosophy 
of education that prepares the kind of citizen that is needed to support a country like 
South Africa, which is heavily steeped in local cultures and traditions, while also 
aspiring to be a liberal democracy?  
 
It can be reasonably deduced from the above analysis that there is resonance between 
liberal education as sketched in section 7.2, and African traditional education as 
sketched in section 7.3. It would therefore seem prudent to argue that a philosophy of 
education for an African liberal democracy such as South Africa would need to be 
based on the amalgamation of some assumptions of liberal education and some 
assumptions of the African traditional education. Let me briefly elaborate. In section 
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7.2 above, I demarcated the following as proposed outcomes of a liberal education. It 
seeks to: 
 equip the young people with the competencies necessary for adult life; 
 empower the individual with broad knowledge and transferable skills; 
 create a critical public culture; 
 cultivate  social responsibility; and  
 essential for responsible democratic citizenship    
 
In the same vein, in section 7.3 I identified the following as characteristic features of 
an African traditional education.  It also seeks to:  
 equip the young people with competencies that are necessary for adulthood; 
 inculcate good ethics, morals and values, such as humaneness; 
 emphasise preparation for overall moral goodness; 
 it is communal and agrarian in orientation, and  
 it is integrated with the social, cultural, artistic, religious, and recreational life of 
the ethnic group 
 
Weaving together, on the one hand the above proposed outcomes of liberal education, 
and on the other hand the above characteristic features of African traditional education 
are necessary for the purpose of conceiving a philosophy of education that is suitable 
for a liberal democratic South Africa. The proposed philosophy of education would 
endeavour to equip the young people with the requisite skills and competencies to live 
flourishing lives in an African liberal democracy. Such a philosophy of education would 
seek to cultivate social responsibility and inclinations to desirable ethics, morals and 
values such as Ubuntu or humaneness.  
 
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) offer useful suggestions to the question: What kind of 
citizen is needed to support a liberal democracy such as South Africa? They identify 
the following three visions of citizenship, the personally responsible citizen; the 
participatory citizen, and the justice-oriented citizen. In what ways would each of the 
three visions of citizenship pertain to an African liberal democracy like South Africa? 
Firstly, the personally responsible citizen acts responsibly in his or her community by, 
for example, obeying the laws of the country and engaging in volunteer activities to 
help those less fortunate (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004:241). Westheimer and Kahne 
(2004:243) argue that “obeying laws that flow from democratic structures such as 
legislatures is essential”. It is their view that efforts by educators to foster ‘personal 
responsibility’ in young people can be justified on the grounds that such educators 
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have the potential “to produce trustworthy, helpful, hard-working, and pleasant 
students” (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004:244). The ability of  a country’s education 
system to produce ‘trustworthy, helpful, hardworking and pleasant students’ goes a 
long way towards ensuring that the sort of moral indiscretions about which I have 
expressed concerns above might not become commonplace. This is because 
‘personally responsible citizens’ would not be inclined to engage in such incidents of 
moral indiscretion.   
 
Secondly, participatory citizens are inclined to engage in collective, community-based 
efforts. Westheime and Kahne (2004:240) show that participatory citizens are active 
member of community organisations and/or improvement efforts. They organise 
“community efforts to care for those in need, promote economic development, or clean 
up environment”. They know how government agencies work and know strategies for 
accomplishing collective tasks. Westheime and Kahne’s (2004:240) plea is that 
“citizens must actively participate and take leadership positions within established 
systems and community structures”. In my own research, I have identified letsema or 
cooperative community farming among the Basotho people of Lesotho as a typical 
example of both participatory citizenship and responsible citizenship.29 Finally, the 
justice-oriented citizens are responsive to social problems and to structural critique in 
order to make a difference. Westheimer and Kahne (2004:242) argue that “educational 
programmes that emphasise social change seek to prepare students to improve 
society by critically analysing and addressing social issues and injustices”. The 
purpose of such educational programmes is “to engage students in informed analysis 
and discussion regarding social, political, and economic structures” with a view to 
considering “collective strategies for change that challenge injustice and … address 
root causes of problems” (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004:243).  
 
To summarise, in this section I have explored ways in which a philosophy of education 
that weaves some assumptions of African traditional education and some assumptions 
of liberal education might be conceived. I found potential overlaps between 
conceptions of liberal education and conceptions of African traditional education. I 
                                                          
29 See Letseka, M. 2000. African Philosophy and Educational Discourse. In Philip Higgs., Ntombizolile 
Vakalisa., Tyobeka  Mda., & N’dri Thérése Assié-Lumumba (eds) African Voices in Education, Juta: 
Cape Town, pp.183-184. 
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argued that these overlaps constitute plausible grounds for weaving together the two 
conceptions with a view to mounting a philosophy of education that pertains to a 
country like South Africa, which is an aspiring liberal democracy that is at the same 
time heavily steeped in local cultures and traditions. I found synergies between the 
proposed philosophy of education for an African liberal democracy and Westheimer 
and Kahne’s (2004) proposed three visions of citizenship, namely; the personally 
responsible citizen, the participatory citizen, and the justice-oriented citizen.     
 
7.5  Conclusion 
The starting point of this chapter was the need for a philosophy of education for a 
liberal democracy like South Africa. And second, that such a philosophy of education 
would need to recognise that South Africa is first and foremost an African country 
whose population is predominantly black and African. The latter condition requires that 
such a philosophy of education be rooted in the cultures and traditions of the majority 
of the African peoples. The reason for this is that as is the case with most African 
countries except Ethiopia, South Africa has suffered from multiple experiences of 
colonial and imperial domination, exploitation, oppression and human degradation, 
first, from the Dutch, then the British, and finally apartheid.  Colonialism, imperialism 
and apartheid each claimed superiority over African cultures, African languages, and 
African forms of politics and governance, at the expense and to the detriment of 
indigenous cultures, languages and forms of politics. Therefore, there are compelling 
reasons for the reclamation of Africa’s cultures, African languages, and African forms 
of politics and governance. I argued that appeal to these indigenous African 
epistemologies or ways of knowing should be regarded as advocacy for the 
Africanisation of knowledge, what Wa Thiongo (1994) calls ‘decolonising the mind’, 
while Mazrui (2003) calls it ‘cultural decolonisation’.  
 
Given that post-apartheid South Africa has strong liberal aspirations courtesy of the   
Constitution of 1996, the proposed philosophy of education would need to embrace 
liberal democratic values. For my purpose in this study I expressed preference for 
Martha Nussbaum’s conception of liberal education. This is because her emphasis on 
‘cultivating humanity’ resonates with the implicit assumptions of Ubuntu, understood 
as ‘human interdependence and humanness’. Furthermore, her emphasis on 
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developing ‘narrative imagination’ implies developing empathetic dispositions, which 
require one to be able to blend with the other person’s wishes and desires, fears and 
aspirations. Finally, Nussbaum’s emphasis on promotion of ‘world citizenship’ pertains 
to South Africa given that since the advent of democracy in 1994, South Africa has 
been integrated in the global community.  
 
Against the backdrop of post-apartheid South Africa being a liberal democracy that is 
also heavily steeped in African cultures and traditions, I argued that the need to 
amalgamate liberal democratic values and traditional African values seems to be fait 
accompli. Concomitantly, this chapter proposed a philosophy of education that 
amalgamates some assumptions of liberal education and some assumptions of 
African traditional education. The reason for this is that there seems to be areas of 
overlap between some outcomes of liberal education and some characteristic features 
of African traditional education. For instance, both aim to equip the young people with 
the requisite competencies that are necessary for adult life. Both aim to develop 
humane attitudes among the young people so that they can live flourishing lives. And 
both are committed to developing in young people attributes of industry and self-
reliance, as well as inculcating responsible citizenship. Thus, the proposed philosophy 
of education for an African liberal democracy would need to be one that seeks to equip 
young people with the requisite skills and competencies to live flourishing lives in an 
African liberal democracy. I posited that in the last instance, the proposed philosophy 
of education for an African liberal democracy would be one that endeavours to create 
the personally responsible citizen; the participatory citizen, and the justice-oriented 
citizen.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
8.1    Introduction  
 
In this final chapter I offer some concluding remarks. What I have attempted to do in 
this study is to explore conceptions of education for a post-apartheid South Africa that 
has liberal democratic aspirations whilst it is also heavily steeped in African traditions 
and cultures. The constitution of South Africa and its associated laws and policies are 
widely recognised as liberal and egalitarian. And yet sections 211 and 2012 of the 
same constitution recognise the traditional institutions of politics and governance such 
as the institution of traditional leadership. By extension, the constitution of South Africa 
also recognises the practice of customary law. However, I argued that there is nothing 
unusual in South Africa’s inclination towards African traditions and cultures. But that it 
seems to be fait accompli given that the country is first and foremost an African country 
predominantly populated by the African peoples. In fact it would be unusual were 
South Africa to be seen to turn its back on the African traditions and cultures while fully 
embracing and privileging the Western liberal democratic values and forms of 
governance.  
 
I argued that given that South Africa is an African liberal democracy it is reasonable to 
expect education policy makers to recognise some elements of liberal education when 
framing education policies. And yet it is ironic that while South Africa’s liberal 
democratic inclination is widely recognised and spoken about by the elite, there is no 
commensurate recognition by the ruling tripartite alliance comprising of the ANC, 
COSATU and the SACP, of the logical connection of the country’s socio-political 
landscape with liberal philosophy or liberal political theory. Similarly, while there is 
general awareness of the importance of indigenous African epistemologies and other 
indigenous ways of knowing such as Ubuntu to South Africa’s socio-political and 
cultural fabric, these have not been sufficiently built into the school curriculum. Instead 
Ubuntu has been reduced to a hobby word that is widely exploited for commercial and 
ideological purposes. For instance, “Ubuntu School of Philosophy (Pretoria), Ubuntu 
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Security Company (Pietermaritzburg), Ubuntu Security alarm systems in Gauteng, 
Ubuntu Education Fund and Ubuntu Centre (Port Elizabeth) to computer software, 
namely the Ubuntu Linux computer operating system” (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 
2013:200).  
 
And while the official DoE (2001:3) report, Manifesto on Values, Education and 
Democracy recognises Ubuntu, which it equates with ‘human dignity’, later DoE 
reports such as the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (2011b) for grade 
R-3, and grades 4-6 life skills, and Values and Human Rights in the Curriculum (2005) 
make no mention of Ubuntu. For instance, the Curriculum and Assessment Policy 
Statement only refers to “skills and values worth learning in South African schools” 
(DBE, 2011:4), and “positive attitudes and values” (p.8). One of my cardinal aims in 
this study was to locate indigenous African epistemologies and other indigenous ways 
of knowing such as Ubuntu at the heart of conceptions of education in South Africa, 
and therefore at the heart of curriculum as well as of teaching and learning. Otherwise 
how are educators expected to induct children into Ubuntu morality if this expectation 
is not institutionalised in education policies where it can be monitored and evaluated? 
This chapter is structured around three sections. In the first section I highlight the main 
arguments and emergent trends with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the 
study’s research aims can be said to have been attained. While this study is mainly 
philosophical and exploratory, in the second section I briefly map out possible ways in 
which some of the main arguments and emergent trends from the study might be 
realised in classroom practice through the creative efforts of teachers. In the final 
section I shall sketch further areas for research arising from the study. I now turn to a 
brief demarcation of the study’s main arguments and emergent trends.     
 
8. 2    Key arguments and emergent trends  
 
In chapter 1 I opened with a sketching of two conflicting and seemingly incompatible 
ideological positions that I believe shape the South African socio-political landscape. 
The purpose of this sketching was to highlight the challenges that the ideological 
positions in question might potentially pose for the direction that the country’s post-
apartheid conceptions of education might take. I indicated that on the one hand South 
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Africa is an aspiring liberal democracy thanks to its constitution of 1996 which 
enshrines and affirms a wide range of rights and freedoms for the individual (Robinson, 
2012; Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Deveaux, 2003; Waghid, 2003; Enslin, 1999; 
Dugard, 1998; Jordan, 1996). On the other hand, I indicated that the same constitution 
recognises the traditional African institutions of politics and governance in the form of 
the institution of traditional leadership, and by extension the practice of African 
customary law (Republic of South Africa, 1996). I suggested that this seeming duality 
in the country’s socio-political landscape suggests that South Africa is an aspiring 
liberal democracy that is also heavily steeped in African traditions and cultures. I 
argued though that this is not unusual given that South Africa is an African country 
whose total population is almost 80% African. It can then be expected that when 
framing a philosophy of education geared at serving this majority of the African 
peoples their cultures and traditions will have to take centre stage. By this I mean when 
conceptualising a philosophy of education that aims at preparing the African children 
to live flourishing lives in an African context the underlying assumptions, principles and 
values of such a philosophy of education would have to be ‘rooted in Africa’. That is, 
it must call for “an awareness of the location of the production of knowledge in Africa” 
(Lenka-Bula, 2011:12). 
 
With the above-mentioned socio-political landscape in mind I stated the study’s main 
research question, which is: “Is the perception that indigenous African values and 
ideas of politics are incompatible with, and contradictory to liberal democratic values 
and ideas of politics necessarily valid?” The three sub-research question sought to 
expand the scope of the main research question in the form of further probes. For 
instance, (a) what is the basis of the claim that a liberal democratic state that attempts 
to shape its future political trajectory by amalgamating indigenous African values and 
liberal democratic values is doomed to fail? (b) Is the amalgamation of indigenous 
African institutions such as chieftaincy and the monarchy peculiar to South Africa? 
And (c) what should the philosophy of education or a conception of education that 
amalgamates indigenous African values and liberal democratic values consist of? In 
answering these questions my aim was to mount a rebuttal of perceptions that 
indigenous African values and ideas of politics are incompatible with, or even 
contradictory to liberal democratic values and ideas of politics. Arising from this 
rebuttal, my purpose was to propose a conception of education or a philosophy of 
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education that locates indigenous African epistemologies such as Ubuntu at the heart 
of conceptions of education in general, and education for citizenship in South Africa in 
particular.  
 
A question that might arise would be why is this necessary? The simple answer to this 
question is that South Africa, like the rest of the African continent, except Ethiopia, has 
suffered from multiple experiences of colonial and imperial domination, exploitation, 
oppression and human degradation. First, South Africa was occupied by the Dutch 
under Jan van Riebeek in 1652. Following the defeat of the Boers during the Anglo-
Boer war in 1902 South Africa was then occupied by the British under Lord Alfred 
Milner. Finally, South Africa fell under apartheid in 1948 when the Nationalist Party 
under DF Malan won the whites’ only election. I argued that colonialism, imperialism 
and apartheid all claimed superiority over African cultures, African languages, and 
African forms of politics and governance. I cited Wa Thiongo (1992:100) who argues 
that Africa was taught to look on Europe as her teacher and the centre of man's 
civilisation, and to see herself as the pupil. As a result Western culture became the 
centre of Africa's process of learning, and African cultures and epistemologies were 
relegated to the periphery. Western culture, especially Western forms of knowing 
became what Apple (2000:57) calls ‘official knowledge’.  
 
In chapter 2 I provided a review of the literature from which I drew to advance and 
support my central arguments in the study. I opened up by making a case for a 
detailed, rigourous and critical review of literature, showing why this sort of review of 
literature is important for a doctoral research. The review spanned the fields of 
philosophy of education, political philosophy, and African philosophy, with an 
emphasis on Ubuntu. In chapter 3 I sketched the research methodology by which this 
study was conducted. I stated that this was a philosophic study that was conducted 
through a philosophic inquiry, understood as a paradigm that has its origins in 
philosophical pragmatism. Against this backdrop of the above statement I 
differentiated between ‘methodology-as-philosophy’ and ‘methodology-as-technique’. 
I argued that while ‘methodology-as-technique’ tends to portray research as the 
deployment of particular methods or procedures that are presumed to be scientific, 
and therefore capable of yielding verifiable, and therefore objective knowledge, 
‘methodology-as-philosophy’ recognises that educational research will always framed 
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in terms of certain values. It raises fundamental questions about the very pursuit of 
social and educational research, and challenges the process, the goal of knowledge, 
the ideal of truth, and the possibility of objectivity (Hammersley, 2006:274).      
 
In chapter 4 I explored the contestations around the place and value of liberal 
democracy to Africa in general (Ake, 1993), and to South Africa in particular (Biko, 
2005; 1972; Makgoba, 1998; Gilliomee, 1995). For instance, I teased out Ake’s 
(1993:243) argument that the familiar assumptions and political arrangements of 
liberal democracy make little sense in Africa because liberal democracy assumes 
individualism, and there is little individualism in Africa. Numerous African scholars 
have written extensively on communality and communal interdependence in traditional 
African communities (Chichane, 2008; Letseka, 2000; Gyekye, 1997, 1992; Michel, 
1997; Shutte, 1994; Teffo, 1994; Mbiti, 1989). It is often wrongly assumed, as Ake 
(1993) does, that traditional African communality and interdependence preclude 
individuality. But this is a mistaken assumption. As Wiredu (1996:72) points out, the 
distinction between communalism and individualism is simply a matter of degree. A 
considerable value may be attached to communality in individualistic societies, just as 
individuality is not necessarily trivialised within communalism. Similarly Gyekye 
(1997:45) posits that “the common good, properly understood, is not reducible to an 
artificial combination of individual interests or preferences. The common good literally 
and seriously means a good that is common to individual human beings – at least 
those embraced within a community, a good that can be said to be commonly, 
universally, shared by all human individuals”. From a deeper philosophical lens Taylor 
(1991:161) reminds us that it is possible to have communitarian or holist ontology and 
to still value liberalism’s individual rights. By this he means that one can subscribe to 
communitarianism at the analytical level and still advocate liberal goods such as rights 
and freedom at the ontological level. 
 
One of the points I made is that liberal democracy can no longer be regarded as a 
monopoly of the West. As Ware (1992:140) notes, the exporting of liberal democracy 
to ex-colonies or to regimes that were conquered militarily, but that had no previous 
history of liberal democracy has exponentially transformed liberal democracy. I 
showed that historically, as a non-western liberal democracy Japan has gone through 
‘cycles of importation of external cultures’ and 'indigenisation' of those cultures through 
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replication and refinement (Huntington, 1996:94). As a result, while Japan is known 
for its strong traditional inclinations, tradition in Japan is not something waiting out 
there over one's shoulder. Instead it is plucked, recreated and reshaped in order to be 
responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people at any given historical moment 
(Gusfield, 1967: 358). 
 
For Lumumba-Kasongo (2005:7), the struggles outside the West have shaped liberal 
democracy’s content and contributed to its redefinition. As a result there are now quite 
distinct types of liberal democracy (Ware, 1992:137). Lumumba-Kasongo (2005:13) is 
convinced that liberal democracy pertains to Africa. He argues that a critical 
knowledge of liberal democracy and its processes can benefit the African peoples in 
their quest to invent a developmental democracy and new democratic state’s 
paradigms that are essential for progressive social change. South Africa’s constitution 
of 1996 is a good example of a non-Western country that attempts to appropriate 
liberal philosophy and liberal political theory with a view to refashioning their underlying 
assumptions and values and to make them responsive to local socio-political and 
cultural imperatives.  
 
Against the backdrop of the above analysis I argued that there was probably nothing 
fundamentally untoward in Biko’s (2005:22) scathing attack on South Africa’s white 
liberals. Biko’s attack should be viewed within the context of the historical moment and 
political struggles of the BCM, which he led during the era of apartheid’s oppressive 
laws and policies in the 1970s, and which eventually claimed his life at a tender age 
of 30 in police custody. Biko (2005:22) argued that South Africa’s white liberals 
claimed a monopoly on intelligence and moral judgment. They wanted to set the 
pattern and pace for the realisation of the black man’s aspirations. They sought to 
remain in good books in both the black and white worlds while they skilfully extracted 
what suits them from the exclusive pool of white privilege. Similarly Makgoba’s 
(1998:278) charge that South Africa’s white liberals did not fight to remove the subtle 
version of apartheid, which was part of their life, their socialisation, their culture, and 
history given that racism was linked to white privilege, seems valid and safe to say 
that it pertains to the specific historical moment and political era. The point I sought to 
make is that the contestations around liberalism in South Africa should be seen as part 
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and parcel of attempts to pluck, create and shape the liberal ideas, and to reframe 
them to suite the liberation struggle imperatives.  
 
I debated Gilliomee’s (1995:84) view that South Africa does not represent enough of 
a common society to provide a sufficiently stable base for a well-functioning liberal 
democracy because it lacks the social requisites associated with the consolidation of 
liberal democracies. I argued that this sort of argument is inconsistent with current 
trends in social theory and political practice, trends which are marked by a history of 
liberalism that is in a constant state of reinvention (Bell, 2014:705). I offered a rebuttal 
of the view that coexistence between liberal democracy and the traditional African 
institutions of politics and governance is both incompatible and contradictory (Beall, 
2006; Beall., Mkhize., & Vawda, 2005; Bentley, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2005). I premised my 
rebuttal on the assumption that coexistence between liberal democracy and traditional 
institutions of politics and governance is not peculiar to South Africa. I showed that 
liberal democracies such as Japan, the UK, Belgium, The Netherlands and Spain have 
had monarchies from time immemorial. However, their monarchies have never been 
incompatible with, or contradictory to liberal democracy. Instead, as in the case of the 
UK, the Queen is a constitutional monarch with vested powers and authority to invite 
the potential prime minister to Buckingham Palace to ask him/her to form government. 
I posited that historically the exportation of liberal democracy to regimes that had no 
previous history of liberal democracy has so transformed liberal democracy (Ware, 
1992) that liberal democracy can no longer be said to be the monopoly of Western 
society. The struggles outside the West have shaped liberalism’s content and 
contributed to its redefinition (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005). 
 
One of my major aims in this study was to argue for the reclamation of indigenous 
African epistemologies or ways of knowing such as Ubuntu not only in mainstream 
philosophical parlance, but also in the way we educate the young people. This 
reclamation, also known as the ‘Africanisation of knowledge’ is necessary given that 
historically the African continent in general, with the exception of Ethiopia, has suffered 
from prolonged colonial and imperial domination, exploitation, degradation, 
oppression and dehumanisation. Colonial and imperial domination and oppression 
claimed superiority by colonisers over the African peoples, African cultures, African 
languages, and African forms of politics and governance, at the expense and to the 
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detriment of indigenous African cultures, languages and forms of politics. I cited Ngugi 
Wa Thiongo (1994) who argues for ‘decolonisation of the mind’ as a form of 
Africanising knowledge; Ali Mazrui (2003) who calls for ‘cultural decolonisation’, and 
Smith (2008)  who advocates the debunking of ‘imperial cultural worldviews. For 
instance, Wa Thiongo (1994) reminds us that Africa was taught to look on Europe as 
her teacher and the centre of man's civilisation, and herself as the pupil. As a 
consequence Western cultures became the centre of Africa's process of learning, and 
African cultures were relegated to periphery. Writing about the colonial experiences of 
the Maori people of New Zealand, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2008: 56) warns against 
research that is conducted through ‘imperial eyes’. She argues a case for research 
that has the potential to “deliver social change for people who were oppressed” (Smith, 
2008:165). Writing with reference to South Africa, Swana (2015) argues that white 
people want blacks to believe that they [whites] are the parents of scholarship, and 
that Western epistemology entered African minds that were tabula rasa, or blank 
slates.  
 
Of course the view that Western epistemology entered African minds that were blank 
slates is a myth that needs to be debunked once and for all for its complete lack of 
substance. For instance, in a useful paper on whether philosophy originated from 
Greece Letseka (2014:1305) offers a powerful rebuttal. She contends that philosophy 
flourished in Egypt from about 3400BC to 343BC and in Kush (also known as Nubia 
or Ethiopia by the Greeks) from about 1000BC to 625BC. She argues that ideas about 
world views (metaphysics), knowledge views (epistemology), and value views 
(axiology), were fully developed by African ancestors long before Greek civilisation 
became prominent. Letseka (2014:1305) notes that Greek philosopher Plato visited 
the ancient Kemetic civilization of Egypt around 390BC as part of the collegial tradition 
which required scholars to visit places of particular reputation to learn from the experts, 
and forge collaborative partnerships in areas of mutual research interest. Kenyan 
philosopher Odera Oruka’s (1990:44) research on Sage-Philosophy in his country 
showed among others that the old sages, who had no prior experience of formal 
Western education were surprisingly rigorous, dialectical and deeply philosophical in 
their engagements with local socio-political and cultural matters. Thus central to 
appeals for the ‘Africanisation of knowledge’ is the imperative to ‘decolonise’ the 
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African minds from the inherited colonial education systems and the consciousness 
such education systems inculcated in the minds of the African peoples.  
 
In chapter 5 I explored the indigenous African epistemologies with a focus of Ubuntu.  
I sketched the criticisms of Ubuntu by Enslin & Horsthemke (2004), English liberal 
scholars who doubt the viability of Ubuntu as a model for conceptions of education 
and democracy in South Africa. I argued that at the heart of Ubuntu is respect for 
human life and dignity. By this I meant that Ubuntu accords all human beings a moral 
status. This suggests that Ubuntu has the potential to foster a shared moral discourse, 
which Morrow (2007:142) lamented was missing in South Africa as a result of the 
ravages of apartheid. I argued that the struggle for Ubuntu can therefore be regarded 
as the struggle for people trying to come to terms with the brutality and desperateness 
of a society that has been deeply ruptured by its legacy of segregation and racial 
discrimination. I made a case for Ubuntu’s centrality to South Africa’s imperatives for 
political power and democracy. I argued that Ubuntu has the potential to contribute to 
the development of an ethical disposition that might enable South Africans to reach 
out beyond narrow racial and ethnic identities. As such Ubuntu has the potential to 
frame a communally based conception of justice in traditional African societies. 
 
I drew on the work of Nigerian political economist Claude Ake (1993) to argue that 
African democracy needs to be recreated in the context of the realities in political 
arrangements of the African cultural context. It is Ake’s (1993:244) considered view 
that a unique African democracy must be shaped by the singular reality that the 
constituency whose democratic participation is crucial comprises ordinary peoples, the 
majority of whom are illiterate, poor, rural dwellers in an essentially pre-industrial and 
communal society. For Ake, this communality defines the people’s perceptions of self-
interest, their freedom and their place in the social whole. Drawing on the work of 
Kwame Anthony Appiah (1997) I acknowledged that Africa is an enormous continent 
with enormous diversity of cultures. Appiah (1997:47) argues that the central cultural 
fact of Africa’s life remains not the sameness of cultures, but their enormous diversity. 
In his seminal book, In my Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, Appiah 
(1992:26) argues that Africans do not have a common traditional culture, a common 
language, a common religious or conceptual vocabulary. They do not even belong to 
a common race. But despite this range of differences, an underlying unity and 
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continuity ties the diversity of the African peoples. I sketched the Basotho indigenous 
education, which I argued aimed to create citizens who are initiated in the sort of 
personhood that was deemed to be essential for ‘good’ human conduct among the 
Basotho people. However, and given the above-mentioned diversity I caution that a 
particular peoples’ indigenous education, for instance, the Basotho’s, cannot be 
generalised and presumed to be representative of all the African peoples and their 
cultures. I contended though that invoking Ubuntu, especially in debates on education 
and democracy in South Africa points to Ubuntu’s embeddedness in conceptions of 
education and democracy in Africa’s indigenous social and cultural contexts.  
 
I showed that Ubuntu is already built into South Africa’s education policy reports such 
as the DoE’s (2001) Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy, which describes 
it as ‘human dignity’ and one of the fundamental values that ought to be promoted by 
the country’s public schooling system. In the same vein, the White Paper on Education 
and Training makes it mandatory for the public education system to promote the 
development of independent and critical thought, the capacity to question, reason, 
weigh evidence and form judgements. But as mention in the introduction above later 
DoE reports such as the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (2011b), and 
grades 4-6 life skills, and Values and Human Rights in the Curriculum (2005) hardly 
mention Ubuntu, which begs the question whether the DoE no longer recognises 
Ubuntu as an important normative value that needs to be developed among the young 
people in these critical stages of their growth and development? This study sought to 
address that lacuna.  Its stance is that because Ubuntu morality eschews any acts of 
moral indiscretion, Ubuntu is therefore a form of moral consciousness that has the 
potential to ensure that caring, compassionate, hospitable, forgiving engagements, 
human interdependency and humane treatment of others can prevail in African 
communities.   
 
In chapter 6 I ventured into the thrust of the study, namely, the potential for 
amalgamation of traditional African values and liberal democratic values in South 
Africa. This exploration was premised on the assumption that the proposed 
amalgamation can be said to be fait accompli given that while the constitution of South 
Africa is liberal in that it enshrines a wide range of rights and freedoms for the 
individual, the same constitution also recognises the institution of traditional 
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leadership. I argued that this implies that South Africa is an aspiring liberal democracy 
that is also heavily steeped in local traditions and cultures. I unpacked these cleavages 
arising from South Africa’s inclination to both traditional and perceived modern political 
and cultural institutions. Other scholars argue that this seeming duality between 
traditional institutions of politics and governance and liberal democratic values is 
incompatible with, and contradictory to liberal democratic values and principles 
(Bentley, 2005; Beall, 2006; Beall, et al, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2005). I countered and 
argued that this claim of incompatibility and contradiction is in fact a philosophical 
fallacy. The basis for my counter argument is that no human culture is absolutely 
unchanging, totally refusing to take advantage of possible benefits that often 
accompany encounters with other cultures (Gyekye, 1997). I pointed out that a 
traditional culture might possess values that are congruent with the central features of 
liberalism the same way that liberalism might also contain elements that are clearly 
traditional and inherited from past generations. I argued that post-apartheid South 
Africa has the opportunity to harness both traditional institutions of politics and 
governance and liberal democratic values in order to fashion a new socio-political 
order that is responsive to the country’s contemporary socio-political and cultural 
challenges and imperatives.  
 
I challenged the claims that traditional African societies and their cultures were 
authoritarian. I argued that those who make such claims neither substantiate them nor 
mount compelling theorisation of the notions of ‘cultures’ and ‘authoritarianism’. I 
offered a theorisation of the notion of culture (s) and underscored that often cultures 
are contradictory, loosely integrated, contested, subject to constant change, and 
therefore weakly bounded. With respect to the notion of ‘authoritarianism’ I focused on 
authoritarian regimes for a clearer illustration. I argued that governance in authoritarian 
regimes is centralised, and that authoritarian regimes forcibly prevent political 
expression through interventionist policies. They use repressive means when other 
methods of co-optation and control fail. I disputed the presumption that the above 
described form of social ordering can be said to pertain to traditional African societies 
and their cultures given that the literature shows that there was differing degree of 
representation in decision-making and governance in some traditional African 
societies, and that some of these societies were characterised by deliberation and 
collective decision-making. I unpacked the notion of representation and argued that it 
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is paradoxical in that it implies that something must be absent in order to be ‘re-
presented’.  
 
Chapter 7 proposes a philosophy of education for South Africa, which amalgamates 
liberal democratic values and traditional African values. While there are various 
conceptions of liberal education that have been articulated by liberal philosophers of 
education, for my purpose in this study I opted for Martha Nussbaum’s notion of liberal 
education. Nussbaum’s emphasis on ‘cultivating humanity’ and developing ‘narrative 
imagination’ resonates with Ubuntu, understood as ‘human interdependence and 
humanness’. I argued that ‘cultivating humanity’ resonates with the values that are 
implicit in the constitution of South Africa, values such as individual rights, freedom, 
human dignity, respect for persons, and non-discrimination. For instance, Nussbaum 
associates the cultivation of humanity with the ability to think what it might be like to 
be in the shoes of someone different from oneself, and to behave and act with a deep 
sense of empathy and consideration towards others. Another quality that stands out 
from Nussbaum’s conception of liberal education is ‘narrative imagination’. Nussbaum 
(1998:44) argues that development of ‘narrative imagination’ aims at instilling in young 
people the ability to think what it would be like to be in the shoes of someone different 
from oneself. This way development of ‘narrative imagination’ can be regarded as the 
pursuit of ‘imaginative sympathy’. It follows therefore that ‘narrative imagination’ is 
essential preparation for moral interaction in that it has the potential to cultivate a 
sympathetic responsiveness to others’ needs.  
 
Waghid and Smeyers (2012:20) point out that Ubuntu is a persuasive approach in that 
it is a particular ethic of care that relies on empathy and relational autonomy. In a 
separate paper Waghid (2014a:2) describes Ubuntu as a humanistic concept; a 
philosophical concept, and a politico–ideological concept. He argues that as a 
humanistic concept Ubuntu can engender cooperative and harmonious human 
relations; as a philosophical concept, Ubuntu can contribute towards cultivating the 
respect and care that are required to produce a morally worthwhile African society, 
and as a politico–ideological concept, Ubuntu can engender human interdependence 
for transformed socio-political action. I argued a case for resonance and convergence 
between Nussbaum’s emphasis on ‘cultivating humanity’ and developing ‘narrative 
imagination’ above, and the notion of Ubuntu, understood as a humanistic concept 
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(Waghid, 2014a); as a moral theory (Teffo, 1994); as a theory of right action’ (Metz & 
Gaie, 2010; Metz, 2007), as a notion of African jurisprudence (Mahao, 2010), and as 
a conception of African communal justice (Letseka, 2014a; Keevy, 2008).    
 
Against the backdrop of the above sketching of resonance and convergence between 
liberal education and some aspects of Ubuntu what I attempted to do in this study was 
to propose a philosophy of education that amalgamates some assumptions of liberal 
education and some assumptions of African traditional education, especially the 
latter’s emphasis on Ubuntu moral dispositions. While African traditional education can 
potentially inculcate in young people good ethics, morals and values such as 
humaneness (Ubuntu), neighbourliness, responsibility and respect for self and others, 
a thoroughly  thought through liberal education has the potential to create the kind of 
citizenship needed to support a fledgling liberal democracy such as South Africa. 
Amalgamating the two would be a useful strategy for creating citizens that are 
immersed in Ubuntu-oriented liberal democratic values and principles. In the final 
section below I propose possible practical approaches by which the above values and 
principle might be taught in class. 
 
8. 3    Proposals for classroom practice 
 
Notwithstanding that this study is mainly philosophical and exploratory a question that 
might be ask would be, how might the proposed philosophy of education that 
amalgamates some underlying assumptions of liberal education and some underlying 
assumptions of indigenous African epistemologies be realised in South African 
schools? I am mindful of the fact that the mere mention of generalised ‘South African 
schools’ might raise eyebrows given that South African schools are so vastly 
differentiated along the diverse quintiles in which they might be located.30 However, 
and having said that, it is my considered view that such differentiation should not 
preclude proposals being made on how the proposed philosophy of education might 
be attained through pedagogical practices. To that end any proposals for pedagogical 
practices I make in this section should not be taken to presume that all schools are the 
                                                          
30 See DoE. 2004. National Norms and Standards for School Funding. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
  
 
231 
 
 
 
same. However, there is an expectation that in general teachers can adapt some of 
the proposals in line with their respective contexts and still deliver desired outcomes 
relative to their respective contexts.  
 
The pedagogical practices I shall propose (a) storytelling, (b) philosophy for children 
(P4) and (c) the teaching of history. It is my contention tha the three have the potential 
to attain the sort of capabilities associated with Nussbaum’s focus on ‘cultivating 
humanity’ and developing ‘narrative imagination’. It is Nussbaum’s (1997:88) 
contention that storytelling enables children to acquire the essential moral capacities. 
With respect to the teaching of history, Amy Gutmann (1999:63) proposes that it 
should not be just a series of elections, laws, treaties, and battles, but lessons in the 
practice…of political virtue, lessons that require students to develop and to exercise 
intellectually disciplined judgment. It is Gutmann’s (1999:310) considered view that 
mutual respect can be cultivated by teaching history and politics “to introduce students 
to paradigmatic examples of citizens reaching beyond national boundaries in 
recognition of the equal rights of all people”. What I attempt to do here is merely to flag 
some of the pedagogical approaches school teachers across the spectrum might want 
to adopt from time to time and in their day to day mediation of classroom teaching. 
Nussbaum is convinced that narrative arts have the power to make us see the lives of 
others with more involvement and sympathetic understanding. However, and given 
the concern that many South African teachers have poor basic levels of content 
knowledge and that a high proportion of them is unable to answer questions aimed at 
their pupils (Spaul, 2013:5), realistically therefore, school teachers can only do what 
is feasible given their specific circumstance.  
 
 
 
8. 3.1 Story telling 
 
Cavarero (2000:3) describes storytelling as narration. She argues that “narration …is 
a delicate art – narration reveals the meaning without committing the error of defining 
it”. Cavarero goes further to state that “narration reveals the finite in its fragile 
uniqueness, and sings its glory”. In the same vein Scheub (1996: xv) posits that 
storytellers “fuse idea and emotion into story, and in that interchange audience 
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members are wedded to the past, as a significant exchange occurs: the past 
influences and shapes the experience of the present, at the same time that the 
experience of the present determines what of the past is useful and meaningful today”. 
Among the Basotho storytelling or narration is known as ditśomo or dipale - folktales. 
Storytelling is a craft that is generally presumed to be mastered by the elders, 
especially the great-grand mothers. Letseka (2014b:353) surmises that this is because 
“grandparents were guardians of language and the keepers of culture”. Traditionally 
therefore the ditśomo or dipale were part of the oral tradition in which stories are orally 
passed from one generation to the other by the elders, and became part of the 
community’s tradition. Kock (1997:355) notes that in Sesotho culture the ditśomo or 
dipale were a pre-Christian philosophy of life that articulated righteousness and 
empathy. Coplan (1993:92) argues that the ditśomo serve as a form of schools for the 
teaching of literature and history. Their aim is to expose a Mosotho child to “the 
principles and contradictions of social philosophy and social behaviour”. Coplan points 
out that like auriterary metaphors, most traditional Sesotho ditśomo or dipale are full 
of surprises and attacks ranging from the uncanny to the fantastical, with mythical 
creatures, wild animals, and even wilder humans pursuing improbable stratagems. 
And yet at the heart of Sesotho ditśomo or dipale are home truths about the nature of 
humanity and society. It is no wonder that the ditśomo or dipale are so crucial to 
Basotho social philosophy.  
 
The story of moshanyana’ Sankatana and Khodumodumo among the Basotho   
 
One of the most popular Sesotho folktales is the story of moshanyana’ [boy] 
Sankatana and Khodumodumo. Sankatana represents the liberator, while 
Khodumodumo symbolises a monster that takes the black peoples into captivity and 
bondage. Khodumodumo appears and in its wake consumes the entire Basotho nation 
except one pregnant woman who escapes by smearing her body with ashes and cow 
dung as a form of camouflage instead of ochre, which Khodumodumo associates with 
humans. Khodumodumo mistakes her for a soil-encrusted stone and spares her. As 
Khodumodumo departs in its search for more humans it gets stuck at the mountain 
pass and cannot cross to the other side. Meanwhile the woman who survived gives 
birth to a boy who miraculously grows into a young man, fully dressed in a blanket, 
and armed with a spear and shield, and identifies himself as Sankatana (the ragged-
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one) (Coplan, 1993). Sankatana battles Khodumodumo with his spear, kills it and frees 
the people. Coplan (1993:93) contends that the story of Khodumodumo (culture villain) 
and Sankatana (culture hero) plays around with a series of culturally sentient 
metaphoric tropes, bringing them into a metonymic relationship and creating a 
dialogue between social ideology and practice. Centrally, as a tśomo the story of 
Sankatana conveys the message of a hero figure who defeats the villain – 
Khodumodumo, and frees the people from political captivity and cultural bondage. 
Coplan (1993:92) suggests that “Kholumolumo embodies the white South African 
state, enveloping the black multitudes in bondage, while Senkatana represents their 
young liberator”. Another interpretation of is that “In this future southern Africa, 
Khodumodumo could be the symbol of the 'apartheid' dispensation, while Sankatana, 
as redeemer, could be the symbol representing a President Mandela figure” (Kock, 
1997:355). And so while in Sesotho myths and legendaries the story of Sankatana is 
told as ditśomo or folk tale, pedagogically it also serves a critical historical purpose by 
getting children to link it to, and reflect on our contemporary historial setting.  
 
8.3.2 Philosophy for children (P4C) 
 
Philosophy for children, otherwise simply referred to by the acronym P4C has become 
the subject of interest for philosophers of education in Southern Africa (Letseka, 2014, 
2013, 2012; Ndofirepi, & Shumba, 2012; Ndofirepi, 2012, 2011), in the United Kingdom 
(White, 2011; Trickey and Topping, 2004; Murris, 2000); in Australia (Bleazby, 2011); 
in Canada (Daniel and Auriac, 2011; Daniel, 1999), and in the US (Lipman and Sharp, 
1978). P4C was developed by Matthew Lipman in the 1960s, and developed further 
collaboration with Anne Sharp in the 1970s. Lipman grappled with very important 
question whether children can be taught reasoning. Lipman (1976:17) was intrigued 
by the idea of storytelling of how children’s thought processes work. His put across his 
idea in a fascinating metaphor as “to instruct the child in the hygiene of thinking 
(Lipman, 1976:18), implying that ‘good thinking is hygienic; and bad thinking is 
unhygienic’. Lipman and Sharp (1978:85) opined that the idea of teaching philosophy 
to children was handcapped by a number of presuppositions including the view that 
the difficulties in presenting philosophy to young people lay in the inherent complexity 
of the subject, and the abstractness which made it dreary and forbidding for children. 
This led to the assumption that teaching philosophy should only centrate on providing 
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enrichment to brighter students in secondary school years. Lipman & Sharp (1978:85) 
contend that “traditional reluctance to discuss matters philosophical with children is 
the product of …reliance upon an archaic theory of education”.   
 
Lipman (1976:28) was convinved that there is a way to get children to think 
philosophically. He argued that teachers must do more than merely titillate children’s 
interest. He suggested that they need to construct instructional materials and 
instruments that contain intellectual shock and surprise, and ignite their curiosity.  
Lipman (1976:28) argued that “a curious child is like a coiled spring in that he contains 
his own energy, his own dynamism, his own way of opening or unfolding. But one must 
find the proper trigger mechanism to release that energy”. Linking P4C with storytelling 
above Lipman (1976:27) argues that “using the techniques of children’s storytelling, it 
should be possible to relate idealised instances of cooperative, participatory discovery, 
not only of the principles of logic, but of ideas in a wide variety of philosophical 
domains”. Lipman suggests that the stories “should serve as springboards for 
intellectual discussions, and that these discussions should serve to promote 
heightened awareness of the understanding of the world these children inhabit, as well 
as their own identities in that world”. 
 
Letseka (2014b: 353) expounds on how the use of stories from Southern Africa can 
potentially enhance prospects for P4C. She draws on the work of South Africa’s 
Award-winning storyteller Gcina Mhlophe whose stories appropriate the local South 
African context in multiple personifications of animals such as the Leopard, the Giraffe, 
and the Zebra. A good example is Fudukazi’s Magic (Mhlophe, 2009).  This is a 
children’s storybook for primary school children in Grades 2, 3, and 4. It tells the story 
of the wise old Tortoise called Fudukazi “who uses her imagination and magic to 
decorate the world colourfully” to bring happiness among some of the depressed and 
unhappy animals. The story is that in the beginning, today’s most colourful animals - 
the Leopard, the Giraffe, and the Zebra wore coats that were dull and uninspiring. As 
they each agonised about how dull and uninspiring they were, Fudukazi arrived, asked 
each of the animals in turn to close their, wove her magic, and when they each opened 
their eyes they wore the beautiful and colourful coats with which they are today 
associated. Letseka (2014b: 354) points out that the ditśomo or dipale – folktales, 
“touch on acts of kindness, which revolve around the area of moral literacy”. 
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Fudukazi’s Magic is about how old Tortoise Fudukazi takes away the misery of the 
Leopard, the Giraffe, and the Zebra’s feeling of dullness and replaces it with a sense 
of goodwill and wellness.   
 
8.3.3 The teaching of history  
 
The teaching of history has become synonymous with memorisation of perceived 
historical ‘facts’ such as events [e.g. the Second World War, the Battle of Isandlwana, 
the Battle of Berea], names of prominent people in history [e.g. Adolf Hitler, 
Cetshwayo, Moshoeshoe], dates and places of historical significance [e.g. 
Isandlwana, Thaba Bosiu]. To add to this unsophisticated approach most prescribed 
history textbook, for instance, Blake and Haliburton’s Frome Stone Axe to Space Age 
treats the history of the black peoples as a peripheral issue under the umbrella of a 
Eurocentric interpretation. This approach not only treats the teaching of history as 
“preordained or as following an uncomplicated path that is inevitable” (Waring, 
2010:283), but it also presumes “there are simple, monocausal explanations for why 
and how history happens” (Waring, 2010:287). In What is History? Edward Hallett Carr 
(2008) eloquently counsels that history consists essentially in seeing the past through 
the eyes of the present, in the light of its problem, and that and that the main work of 
the historian is not to record, but to evaluate; for, if he does not evaluate, how can he 
know what is worth recording? In this subsection I want to propose the teaching of 
history through ‘chronology’ and ‘causation’. 
 
Waring (2010:284) argues that “chronology and causation are integral and intertwined 
elements in enabling students to organize their historical thinking and construct 
plausible historical narratives”. The teaching of history should therefore offer students 
“multiple opportunities to construct historical narratives to gain a better understanding 
of historical causality and how the narratives that they consume have been 
constructed” (Waring, 2010:286). Considering, and making chronology and causation 
integral to the teaching of history can, to invoke the title of Waring’s paper, help 
students ‘escape historical myopia’. 
 
Using chronology and causation can potentially enable the students to understand, for 
instance, the battles between the Basotho and the British, or between the Basotho 
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and the Boers. A detailed chronology of the arrival of the British settlers in South Africa 
or the Boer Trekkers from the Cape becomes a useful history exercise in that it can 
show the students that the arrival of the white settler communities posed a threat to 
Basotho’s arable and pasture lands. Land was important to the Basotho as a means 
of production or a means of livelihood. The Basotho were subsistence farmers who 
also practised animal husbandry. Their need of the land was therefore manifold. They 
depended on the land to farm agricultural produce and staple foods such as maize, 
sorghum and wheat. At the same time, and given that the Basotho herded animals 
such as cattle, horses, donkeys, goats and sheep they needed the land for pastures. 
Rosenburg and Weisfelder (2013:27) remind us that “during the pre-colonial period 
the Basotho maintained a mixed economy that was based on the cultivation of 
sorghum and the herding of cattle”. In their account of the Boer wars Knight and 
Embleton (1996:13) note that as a result of the Boer Trek the area north of the Orange 
River “gradually filled up with Boer farmers looking for land”. Similarly Rosenburg & 
Weisfelder (2013:5) observe that the Basotho “encounters with the British and Boer 
intruders meant that the greater portion of the fertile land of Moshoeshoe’s domain 
was lost to white farmers, leaving the Basotho to eke out a living in the rugged 
remnants”. 
8.4  Areas for further research   
 
While this study has established the potential for the amalgamation of liberal 
democratic values and traditional African values, with particular emphasis on Ubuntu, 
and implications of this amalgamation to conceptions of education in South Africa, 
some important and related areas of research were not touched on or covered. In this 
section I demarcate and highlight these areas.  
 
8.4.1   The integration of Ubuntu in the school curriculum 
 
This study established that while Ubuntu was prominent in the official Department of 
Education’s (2001:3) report, Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy 
recognises Ubuntu, which it equates with ‘human dignity’, the most recent education 
policy documents have abandoned any mention of Ubuntu. The extent to which 
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Ubuntu can be turned into a policy and implementation imperative is an area that shall 
be pursued post this study.  
 
8.4.2 Liberal philosophy as integral to the country’s constitution  
 
The study recognised that the constitution of South Africa enshrines a wide variety of 
rights and freedoms for the individual, which makes South Africa an aspiring African 
liberal democracy. However, the ruling tripartite alliance still holds on to the ideology 
of Marxism-Leninism and the ideal of ‘national democratic revolution’. This seeming 
ideological contradiction was only barely touched upon in section 4.4 of the thesis, and 
shall be explored in more detail as a further spin-off from the thesis.   
 
8.4.3 The place of traditional African institutions in a liberal democracy 
 
Are traditional African institutions of governance and politics incompatible with 
liberalism, and by extension, liberal democratic values? An argument that this study 
considered, but rebutted was that a seeming marriage between the two is both 
incompatible and contradictory. Drawing on the literature I showed that worldwide 
there are liberal democracies that have had monarchies from time immemorial and 
continue to have close working relations with their monarchies. A question that 
warrants further research is, why do contradictions and incompatibilities only seem to 
apply to South Africa? 
 
 
 
8.4.4 The nexus between Ubuntu and Open Distance Learning 
 
As a scholar and researcher of Ubuntu and open and distance learning (ODL) it is 
evident that there is a disjuncture between talking and writing about Ubuntu values 
and principles, and actualising the same values and principles. The extent to which 
Ubuntu can be broadly integrated in the development of teaching material and in the 
institution’s pedagogical principles and practices is matter for further research. 
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8.5  Conclusion    
 
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is threat together the study’s main 
arguments and emergent trends. I briefly sketched the main arguments in each of the 
foregoing chapters and illustrated how each of the chapters is an integral part of the 
case that the study as a whole attempted to make. That case is as follows: South 
Africa is an aspiring ‘liberal democratic state’ that is also heavily steeped in African 
traditions and cultures. And while other scholars have tried to portray the relationship 
between liberal democratic values and traditional African values as incompatible and 
fundamentally contradictory, this study offered a rebuttal of that portrayal. Drawing on 
the literature the study showed that having traditional institutions of culture, politics 
and governance in a liberal democracy is not peculiar to Africa or the African peoples. 
Instead it is a global phenomenon that can be found in liberal democracies such as 
Japan, the UK, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Spain, which have monarchies. I 
showed that existence of traditional institutions such the monarchy, does not inhibit 
the practice and flourishing of ‘democracy’ or ‘liberal democratic values and principles. 
I argued that due to the evolution, importation and indigenisation of liberal democracy 
by non-western democratic nation states, it can no longer be the case that liberal 
democracy is the monopoly of the west. 
 
Against the backdrop of the above new and different take on liberal democracy, I 
proposed that a country like South Africa has the opportunity to conceive a new 
philosophy of education that amalgamates liberal democratic values and traditional 
African values. I argued that such a conception of education would encompass 
aspects of liberalism such as ‘cultivating humanity’ and a traditional African worldview 
such as Ubuntu, which is normative and humane. I proposed that such a philosophy 
of education might be attained through storytelling and the teaching of history. 
Storytelling engenders a better understanding of the past better, and prepares the 
students to comprehend how the past influences and shapes the experience of the 
present. The teaching of history through chronology and causation can potentially 
enable the students to organise their historical thought processes and construct 
narratives that position them to gain a better understanding of historical events.   
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